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Abstract 
The low bid method has been the most common competitive bid selection approach used 
for public projects in the U.S. construction industry. This method is usually coupled with 
a prequalification process to ensure that the lowest bidder has the financial capacity, the 
necessary experience, and enough bonding capacity to take charge of the project and to 
perform the work according to the project's requirements. However, driven by their bad 
financial status or by their urgent need for work, some contractors tend to abuse the free 
and price-directed competitive nature of the low bid method by deliberately submitting ex-
tremely low bid prices in order to enhance their chance of winning and to at least cover their 
general and administrative expenses. Thus it is possible for the project to be awarded to 
an accidental or deliberate unrealistic low bid. This often leads to cost overruns, schedule 
delays, claims and further disputes between parties during construction. 
This research investigates alternative competitive bidding methods that have the poten-
tial to remedy the aforementioned drawback of the low bid method. Monte Carlo simulation 
approach is used to study and model average-based bidding methods where the winning bid 
is defined in relation to the average of submitted bids. This research also studies two other 
competitive bidding methods: the second low bid method where the second lowest bid 
is awarded the project and the median bid method where the winner is defined to be the 
xvii 
median bid. The merits and shortcomings of these methods are analyzed and compared 
relative to each other and to the low bid method through produced nomograms that depict 
the winning probability, the optimum markup and the optimum expected profit under each. 
After studying the aforementioned bidding methods from the perspective of a risk-
neutral contractor, this research uses established principles of decision analysis and utility 
theory to develop a risk-sensitive bidding model that can be applied to each of the studied 
bidding methods. This model helps a contractor determine his optimal markup for a project 
given his risk attitude and his uncertainty about the project's estimated and final costs. 
xvin 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 General 
In the construction industry, and particularly in the public sector, open competitive bid-
ding has been the main bid selection process used in the U.S. and in most countries around 
the world. The low bid method is the most common form of competitive bidding where 
the lowest responsive and responsible bidder is awarded the project. A bid is qualified 
as responsive if it conforms with the conditions and specifications detailed in the bidding 
invitation documents of a project. A bidder is considered responsible if he is capable of 
performing the work as required, which is judged through the contractor's license, his per-
formance history on similar projects, his good reputation for completing projects on time 
and within budget, and his financial capacity. 
Open competitive bidding, mainly the low bid method, promotes transparency in the 
bidding process and ensures fairness in the construction market where all contractors have 
the opportunity to bid on projects and thus removes any suspicion of unequal treatment by 
the procuring entity. Additionally, it promises owners the best returns on investments by 
having their projects built according to the designed plans and specs for the lowest possible 
1 
price. 
The lowest bid price might not always be the most economical one for the owner be-
cause it might not always result in the lowest possible final cost after project completion. 
It is possible for a bidder to submit the lowest bid because of an innovative cost-saving 
technique or well-experienced management and planning teams and in this case the low-
est bidder is indeed the most competent one. However, an owner should also be aware of 
a possible risk of selecting a bidder who deliberately submits an unrealistically low bid 
price only to apply for excessive change orders after winning the project that can signif-
icantly raise the cost of construction above the original contract price. Poor economic 
environments with low cashflow and slow economic growth and a contractor's desperate 
need for work to stay in business might induce such bidding strategy where a contractor 
views change orders as a means to expand the scope of work and widen his profits which 
were in part given up for the sake of a lower bid price. Awarding the job to the lowest bid-
der allows deliberate unrealistic low bids to win the project which increases the chance of 
cost overruns, schedule delays, claims and adversarial relationship between parties during 
construction. 
Defining what can be classified as an "unrealistically low" bid price is an ambiguous 
task. Identifying a minimum reasonable threshold for the price of a project by the owner is 
difficult and subjective. And the greater the diversity in bids, the harder it is to establish a 
minimum threshold under which bids will be considered unrealistic. A European Commis-
sion report considers a bid "abnormally low" if : 1) in the light of the client's preliminary 
estimate and of all the tenders submitted, it seems to be abnormally low by not providing 
a margin for a normal level of profit and 2) the bidder can not explain his price on the 
2 
basis of the economy of the construction method, or the technical solution chosen, or the 
exceptionally favorable conditions available (EUROPA 1999). In this thesis, we refer to 
an unrealistic low bid as being deliberately submitted by a contractor with the intention 
to cut corners by filing change orders and claims after winning the project. This causes 
substantial risk of cost overruns, disputes between parties, and sometimes compromised 
quality. 
Sometimes the ambiguity of the design and construction specs of projects leads to a 
higher variability in the submitted bids which makes it more difficult for the owner to iden-
tify a bid as unrealistically low. On the other hand, some contractors might take advantage 
of these ambiguities and of possible design flaws or omissions in the plans and specs by 
only reporting them after winning the project. 
Another drawback of the low bid method is the fact that it is prone to unethical collusion 
practice among bidders due to its fierce competitive nature. Collusion is the practice where 
bidders coordinate their bids together before their submission in order to restrict competi-
tion and share profits in the market. Some contractors view the low bid method as a highly 
risky bidding process because they often have to cut their profits in order to increase their 
chances of winning projects. Thus they resort to collusion as a way to protect them against 
uncertainty in workload fluctuations (Doree 2004). 
3 
1.2 Problem Statement and Previous Work 
1.2.1 Low Bid Method 
The competitive low bid method can, and sometimes does lead to the selection of in-
competent bidders, disputes and adversarial relationships between owners and contractors, 
excessive claims and thus additional costs, and to corrupt practice such as collusion among 
bidders (Grogan 1992; Holt et al. 1995; Clough and Sears 2005). Thus, the initial bid price, 
considered as the lowest price for performing the work, rarely ends up to be the final cost 
of the project. 
To improve the low bid selection practice, prequalification has become a standard prac-
tice for most public works in the United States and is conducted by the procuring entity 
to check the technical and financial capability of a contractor often before granting him 
access to bidding documents. The contractor's criteria that are usually evaluated through 
the prequalification process are his financial stability and capacity, his experience and per-
formance on similar past projects, the skills of his personnel and their ability to perform the 
work. Additionally, most states and local governments require contractors to be licensed 
and to submit certificates of insurance before starting work. 
Moreover, the U.S. federal law for public projects (Miller Act) requires contractors to 
submit bid, performance and payment bonds which are a form of guarantee that the con-
tractor will sign the project for his stated bid price, perform and complete work as required 
per contract documents and specs, and that he will pay all parties working for him on the 
project. Sometimes, bonding can replace prequalification because the surety, which is the 
party providing the bonds, performs a thorough and strict investigation of the contractor's 
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character, capacity and capital before assuming the liability; thus owners view bonds as a 
guarantee of the contractor's responsibility. 
Although prequalification and bonding evaluate a contractor's performance record and 
financial capability, they are not foolproof processes and they do not prevent the selection 
of unrealistic low bids. In fact, it is still possible for a prequalified contractor to be the low-
est bidder and hence be awarded the project because of an accidental or deliberate mistake 
in its bid. 
1.2.2 Multi-Criteria Bid Selection 
There have been some attempts by government procurement agencies in some countries 
such as Italy, Peru, Taiwan, and China to improve the bidding practice by moving from a 
solely price-based selection to a multi-criteria selection approach that considers technical 
merit of the proposal, financial plan, completion date, aesthetic and functional character-
istics, environmental aspects, after-sales service and technical assistance, and other factors 
beside the price. This bidding method is called the "most advantageous tendering ap-
proach" and it does not award the project to the lowest bidder but rather to the most 
economically advantageous tender. 
Before the request for proposals, a committee is usually formed to determine the bid 
evaluation criteria that are important to the owner for a specific project, and then assign 
weights to these criteria to reflect their relative importance. Usually, the weight of the bid 
price criterion would not exceed 50%. After receiving bids, the committee will evaluate 
and score them according to the predetermined list of criteria and consequently the bid with 
the highest combined score wins the project. 
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This multi-criteria selection approach provides more flexibility to the owner as it allows 
him to specify more than one bidding criteria that he considers important in evaluat-
ing the tender proposals for a given project. However, it is more complex and more 
time-consuming than the low bid method. Most importantly, it is based on a subjective 
assessment of the criteria and their weights and therefore it does not ensure transparency 
in the bidding results as much as the low bid method. This makes it more susceptible to 
protests by unsuccessful bidders. 
In addition, the most advantageous tendering approach is usually applied to design-
build projects where the bidder takes charge of designing and constructing the project and 
sometimes even operating it for some time before turning it to the owner (the latter case is 
known as a turnkey project). Under design-build projects, contracting firms would either 
have developed in-house design capabilities or would form joint ventures with professional 
design firms. 
The fact that design has to be completed by the contracting firm explains the need 
to check design and quality criteria such as technical merit of a proposal, aesthetic and 
functional characteristics, and environmental aspects as required by the most-advantageous 
tendering approach. However, this research is only interested in design-bid-build projects 
where the design and construction services are awarded separately and consequently the 
contractor is responsible for the project construction given its completed design at the time 
of bidding. This is the usual context within which a low bid method is used. 
Based on the aforementioned, this research recognizes the need to explore alternative 
competitive bidding methods that have the potential to address the problem of selecting 
unrealistic low bids under the low bid method which present a higher risk of cost overruns, 
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disputes and unsatisfactory project results for both parties. 
1.2.3 Average-Based Bidding Methods 
One alternative that has been practiced in some countries such as Italy, Taiwan, and Peru 
is to determine the winner in relation to the average of all submitted bids. These are called 
average-based bidding methods and are applied in different forms where the winning bid 
can be defined as the closest to the arithmetic average of all submitted bids, or the closest 
to but less than the average, or the closest to the average computed after excluding all bids 
that differ more than a certain percentage from the original average value. 
Florida State Department of Transportation (FDOT) has also experimented with a set 
of innovative contracting methods among which is the average bid method. According to 
FDOT, the objective behind average-based bidding methods is "to get the contractor to bid 
the true and reasonable costs for a project in order to minimize claims and cost overruns 
during construction" (Florida DOT 2000, AASHTO 2001). 
Average-based bidding methods have been adopted in practice to remedy the problem 
of unrealistic low bids since they do not allow a single deliberately manipulated bid to 
create similar problems. Under these methods, a contractor does not have an incentive 
to deliberately or unrealistically lower its price because the lowest bidder is not awarded 
the project anymore. For example, if a contractor submits a very low bid price under an 
average-based bidding method with the intention to make up for it later through change 
orders, he will have a very minimal chance of winning because its bid will slightly lower 
the average but will not have a chance to win since it can not be the closest to the average. 
However, the same bid will ensure a much higher winning probability under the low bid 
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method. 
Ioannou and Leu (1993) presented the only bidding model developed in the construc-
tion engineering and management literature for the average bid method where the winning 
bid is the closest to the average of all submitted bids. This research expands on the model-
ing approach followed by Ioannou and Leu (1993) for the average bid method to study and 
model other alternative competitive bidding methods based on average and order statistics 
such as the below-average bidding method, truncated average-based bidding methods, the 
second-low and the median bid methods. 
These alternative bidding methods are investigated analytically and the probability of 
winning under each is determined through Monte Carlo simulation using a decision analy-
sis approach. Based on the simulation results, this thesis develops nomograms that can be 
easily used by contractors to determine their optimum markup and expected profit under 
each of these methods. It also helps owners compare expected bidders' strategies under 
different bidding methods in order to choose the most appropriate one for their domain. 
1.2.4 Decision Analytic versus Game Theoretic Approach 
It is important to acknowledge here that many competitive bidding models for auctions 
have been developed in several disciplines including economics, operations research, so-
ciology and computer science which followed a game-theoretic approach (Paul Klemperer 
1999; Rothkopf and Park 2001). These models flowered towards the end of 1970s through 
papers by (Milgrom 1981, 1987; Myerson 1981; Riley and Samuelson 1981; Milgrom and 
Weber 1982) and many others. 
Auction theory models are based on the assumption that all players in the game behave 
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rationally and that they all know the game they and their competitors are playing. A Nash 
equilibrium in an auction model is a set of strategies for each player such that no player has 
anything to gain by unilaterally changing his strategy. Competitive bidding in construc-
tion can be viewed as a first-price sealed-bid auction with incomplete information where 
the auctioneer (i.e., the owner) seeks the lowest offered price rather than the highest price 
sought in typical auctions. 
There has been debate in the literature about the relative merits of using game the-
ory versus decision analysis to model competitive bidding under sealed-auctions. In fact, 
both approaches prescribe how a bidder should choose its action to optimize its payoff 
function based on available information about other bidders' strategies. The main differ-
ence between decision analysis and game theory is that the former focuses on one decision 
maker facing an uncertain environment and the latter considers the strategic interaction 
between rational decision makers. Many researchers argued in favor of the decision analy-
sis approach considering that rational behavior is not necessarily predictive of competitive 
behavior (Binsbergen and Marx 2007; Rothkopf 2007). 
In this research, we consider the perspective of a single decision maker (the contrac-
tor) and follow the decision analysis approach to model his decision about optimal markup 
prior to bidding on a project and after the cost of the project has been estimated. 
It is important to realize that different contractors interpret the bidding documents dif-
ferently. For example, the interpretation of the scope of the work based on plans and 
specifications prepared by the designer can vary significantly from one contractor to the 
other. Thus, what is included in the work, the quality of the finished product, quantities of 
work items, and especially decisions about the most appropriate construction methods can 
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vary significantly from one bidder to the next. 
These different interpretations of the general conditions of the contract determine the 
framework within which the owner and contractor interface for the performance of the 
work and the effect it has on the cost outcome. For example, the interpretation of a change 
condition clause as it applies to geotechnical information can have a profound effect on the 
cost risk that a contractor has to assume. This effect can be as large as 50% of the estimated 
project cost. This makes a game theoretic approach where all contractors have the same 
understanding of the game very difficult to apply. 
This does not mean that the decision analysis approach does not pose its own set of 
problems. The most important of which is the availability of historic data that can be used 
to predict the bidding behavior of the contractor's opponents for the particular upcoming 
project. In an ideal situation, the contractor would have historical bidding data for the same 
set of opponents he is about to face and for the exact type and size of project he is about to 
bid on. Such data, however, is almost never available. Therefore, simplifying assumptions 
need to be made. The most common one is to eliminate the project size effect by con-
sidering apparent bid-to-cost ratios which represent the opponents' bid values on previous 
projects divided by the estimated cost of the contractor for these projects. 
Even then, if there is enough historical data, it would be better to stratify projects by 
type and size. For example, commercial buildings should be considered separately from 
high-rise buildings. And in each category, projects of small, medium or large size should 
also be considered separately. As the number of past bidding data becomes smaller, it is 
necessary to merge stratification categories with a commensurate loss of accuracy. In the 
extreme, a contractor may be required to bid on a project of a new type, of a much different 
10 
size, and in a new location that he has never faced before. In this case, the only information 
available to the contractor would be completely subjective based on his total experience up 
to that point. Yet, the lack of statistical data does not remove the decision that needs to be 
made. The contractor still has to bid the job and the overall methodology still applies. 
1.2.5 Optimal Markup Decision with Risk Sensitivity 
The other major contribution of this dissertation is the formulation of risk-sensitive bidding 
models that can be used by risk-averse contractors to determine the optimum markup that 
maximizes their expected utility of profit for a given project. These models are developed 
for two of the aforementioned bidding methods: the low bid method and the average bid 
method, and can be applied to the remaining bidding methods as well. Established prin-
ciples of decision analysis and utility theory are used to examine the competitive bidding 
problem with its inherent uncertainties. 
Risk and uncertainty are present in all construction work. Construction risk can be as-
sociated with different factors such as the size of the project, the complexity of the project, 
its location, and the experience of the contractor with similar type of work. Other sources 
of uncertainty include unexpected weather conditions, unexpected ground conditions, or 
even unanticipated market changes. Thus, it is important to identify the potential sources 
of risk for each project so they can be dedicated just enough contingency allowances in 
bids. Failure to estimate the risk and uncertainties that accompany a specific project often 
leads to a delayed project with cost overruns and compromised quality (Thompson and 
Perry 1992). This research recognizes the importance of considering the uncertainty in the 
project final cost when determining the markup for a project and thus captures its effect on 
11 
the optimum markup decision through risk-sensitive bidding models. 
Moreover, the attitude of a contractor towards taking risks is a major factor in determin-
ing the optimum markup for a project. In fact, a construction project can be considered as a 
lottery with different profit outcomes resulting from the expected variance in the final cost 
of the project. The value of this lottery differs from one contractor to another depending 
on their risk attitudes. Thus, it is very important to consider the behavior of a contractor 
towards risk (expressed through its risk aversion coefficient) when making decisions under 
uncertainty such as the optimum markup decision, and in complex and risky environments 
such as the construction field. The risk attitude of a contractor is captured through a utility 
function that translates dollar amounts into utility numbers that reflect the worth of these 
amounts to the contractor. The risk-sensitive bidding models developed in this research 
assume a risk-averse contractor with an exponential utility curve. 
Previous bidding models in the construction engineering and management literature did 
not include a risk-sensitive analysis of the optimal markup decision. Some of these models 
were based on the sole objective of maximizing expected monetary value of profit and thus 
they did not take into consideration the importance of the risk behavior of a contractor in 
making optimal markup decisions. Another set of bidding models considered the markup 
bidding decision as a multi-attribute one and claimed to use multi-attribute utility theory to 
determine the markup for a given project. However, these models considered the additive 
approach for the multi-attribute utility theory which is more appropriate for economic anal-
yses and is not the adequate approach to use for modeling such complex bidding decisions 
under uncertainty because it ignores the interaction between the different attributes. All the 
aforementioned developed bidding models will be described in detail in Chapter 3 of this 
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thesis with a discussion about their limitations. 
In brief, previous construction bidding models have not considered risk aversion ex-
plicitly and have not applied risk-based single-attribute or multi-attribute utility theory 
to determine optimal markup. Therefore, this research develops a risk-sensitive bidding 
model that aims at determining the contractor's optimal markup for a project through max-
imizing its expected utility value of profit. This model takes into account 1) the risk attitude 
of the contractor, 3) the uncertainty about winning the project, and 3) the uncertainty about 
the estimated and final costs of the project. The underlying methodology can be applied to 
any of the bidding methods modeled and studied in this research. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This research models and studies alternative competitive bidding methods in the construc-
tion field and investigates their potential relative to the prevailing low bid method in use 
today. 
The two main objectives are: 
1. To provide information and insight to owners so they can choose the appropriate 
bidding method for their domain. 
2. To help contractors select an optimum markup to maximize their expected profit (if 
risk neutral) or their expected utility (if risk averse) under each of the investigated 
bidding methods. 
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, this research first investigates the winning 
conditions under each of the considered bidding methods and simulates their corresponding 
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probability of winning distributions. These simulation results are used to derive the opti-
mum markup and optimum expected profit under each of the considered bidding methods 
from a risk-neutral perspective, and to compare their relative merits and shortcomings. 
Then, based on the derived probability of winning, this research develops a risk-
sensitive bidding model that can be applied to each of the investigated bidding methods 
and that takes into consideration the risk attitude of the contractor, the uncertainty about 
winning a project, and the uncertainty in the final cost of the project if won. A sensitivity 
analysis is also conducted to study the impact of each of these uncertainty factors on the 
optimal markup decision under the low and average bidding methods. 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation presents the modeling and analysis of competitive bidding methods that 
can remedy the drawback of the low bid method which has been the most common bid 
selection approach in the U.S construction industry. Then, this dissertation develops a risk-
sensitive bidding model that can help a contractor determine its optimum markup for a 
project given its risk attitude and given the uncertainty in the estimated and final costs of 
the project. 
We start with a general overview about the different bid selection approaches in con-
struction and then we investigate specifically the low bid method which is the most common 
form of competitive bidding. We discuss the drawbacks of the low bid method and we 
shed light on some alternative bid selection approaches that were developed and practiced 
in some countries (Chapter 2). Then, a review of the bidding models developed in the 
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literature is presented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 presents a review of the average bid method model developed by Ioannou 
and Leu (1993) and reproduces the simulation results for that model and its comparison 
with the low bid method. 
Chapter 5 presents the below-average bid method which defines the winning bid to be 
the one closest to and lower than the average of submitted bids. This chapter provides an an-
alytical approach to determine the markup winning regions under a below-average bidding 
method and then uses Monte Carlo simulation to produce nomograms for the probability 
of winning, the optimum markup and the optimum expected profit under this method. It 
also compares the results with the ones for the low and average bid methods. 
Chapter 6 presents models and analyses for the truncated average and below-average 
bidding methods where the bid average is determined after eliminating the lowest and high-
est submitted bids. The results are compared to those for the average and below-average 
bidding methods to investigate the effect of excluding bid outliers on (i) the winning prob-
ability, (ii) the optimum markup and (iii) the optimum expected profit. 
Chapter 7 presents the second-low bid method which defines the second lowest bid as 
the winning bid. This method is studied analytically, modeled, and then compared with the 
low and average-based bidding methods through their simulation results. 
Then, the median bid method is presented in Chapter 8 which defines the winning bid 
to be the one that is higher than half of the bids and lower than the other half. This bidding 
method is defined in two ways depending on whether the number of opponents is odd or 
even. An analytical expression for the probability of winning is presented for both versions. 
Also, Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the median bid method and to produce the 
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corresponding nomograms which are then compared with the average and below-average 
bidding methods. 
Chapter 9 addresses the effect of bidding method on the willingness of contractors to 
search for and adopt cost-saving innovations. In particular, it investigates how the adoption 
of a cost-saving innovative technology by a contractor would affect its bid price and how 
much of the cost-savings get passed to the owner in the form of lower bid prices under each 
of the investigated bidding methods. 
Then, Chapter 10 presents the formulation of a risk-sensitive bidding model that takes 
into account a contractor's degree of risk aversion and the uncertainty in project cost to 
determine the optimum markup for a project. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyze 
the effect of varying the degree of the contractor's risk aversion and the level of uncertainty 
in a project's final cost on the optimum markup. This chapter also studies the effect of 
variability in the opponents' bids on the optimum markup. Then, this chapter concludes by 
incorporating the uncertainty in estimated cost of the project in the formula developed for 
the expected utility of profit and studies its effect on the optimum markup. 
Chapter 11 sets the basis for a stability analysis of the previously discussed bidding 
methods by modeling a preliminary interactive bidding environment where contractors are 
competing against each other over a certain number of projects. The simulation results 
showing the progress of the optimum markup over time are presented for all bidding meth-
ods and compared. 
Chapter 12 provides guidelines on how to use the probability of winning and optimum 
markup nomograms to determine the optimum markup in the case where the number of 
opponents is unknown to the contractor prior to bidding. 
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At the end, Chapter 13 summarizes the work achieved in this dissertation, highlights its 
conclusions and provides a brief description of future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Bid Selection Approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the primary challenges that faces owners in the construction sector is to devise a 
competitive bidding system capable of determining the best qualified contractor who is able 
to finish the project within the estimated duration and within the budgeted cost without any 
quality compromise. 
The low bid method has been the most common bid evaluation method used in the con-
struction industry worldwide. The basis for the widespread use of the low bid method is 
that, other things being equal, the project should be awarded to the most efficient contrac-
tor and thus maximize the owners' return on investment. However, awarding the project to 
the lowest bidder has not proven effective for many projects often leading to cost overruns, 
compromised quality, claims and increased disputes between the different construction par-
ties. 
This chapter examines first the different procurement categories and their uses includ-
ing competitive bidding, direct negotiations and competitive negotiations. Then it explores 
the competitive bidding process further through a discussion about the low bid method 
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and its drawbacks. To remedy the shortcomings of the low bid method, prequalification 
and bonding requirements as well as alternative bid-awarding methods have been devel-
oped by government officials responsible for public procurement. This chapter provides an 
overview about the different practiced bidding approaches worldwide and discusses recent 
developments in government procurement laws for public projects aiming for improving 
the bid selection process. Finally, we conclude with a summary that explains the motivation 
behind this research. 
2.2 Overview of the Different Types of Procurement Meth-
ods 
The design of bid-awarding procedures and the choice of the most appropriate bidding 
method for a specific project can have a significant impact on the economic efficiency, the 
transparency of the bidding approach and on the final quality of the project (Kerf 1998). 
The bid awarding procedures that have been used worldwide in the construction industry 
can be grouped under three categories which are competitive bidding, direct negotiations 
and competitive negotiations. Each of these is discussed below. 
2.2.1 Competitive Bidding 
The competitive bidding approach based on price is often the only approach available for 
public projects and is characterized by the following: 
1. A public notification that announces the intent of the procuring agency to award a 
construction project and the deadline for the proposals' submittal. 
19 
2. Distribution of information about the project to potential bidders in addition to 
the bidding documents, and any prequalification or evaluation criteria that will be 
adopted in the bidding process. 
3. Prequalification of potential bidders according to the criteria mentioned in the dis-
tributed bidding documents. 
4. Submission of bids. 
5. A formal public process for evaluating bids from prequalified contractors, selecting 
and announcing the winner. 
This is a generic description of the competitive bidding framework and some specific 
characteristics might differ depending on the preferences of the procuring entity. Examples 
include the order of the prequalification step in the bidding process, the criteria required 
for prequalification, and the method used for selecting the winner such as the low bid price, 
the closest to average bid price or any other alternative. 
Open competitive bidding has been the preferred method for awarding public projects 
because it ensures transparency in the bidding process and provides further clarity in the 
selection results that helps answer any doubts or claims that unsuccessful bidders might 
make. Also, open competitive bidding gives all potential bidders the opportunity to bid on 
the advertised project which creates stronger competition, incites each contractor to look 
for innovative ideas and present its best proposal, and promises owners the best return on 
investment. Furthermore, governmental agencies like using the competitive bidding ap-
proach because it is easier and less costly to design, manage, and implement. In addition, 
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most countries have public procurement rules that mandate the use of open and public 
competitive bidding for the bid award process of any public construction project. 
However, it is important to realize that competitive tendering is most efficient when the 
bidding documents and technical aspects of a project are well-defined such that there is less 
chance for subjective interpretation and abuse of the free competitive environment. A con-
cern that practitioners and researchers share about the most common form of competitive 
bidding, which is the low bid method, is that it can lead to the selection of incompetent 
contractors because competition relies so heavily on price. 
Also, it is possible for the project to be awarded to a contractor who has made a mistake 
in its bid, either accidentally or deliberately. In such cases where the contractor relies on 
change orders and claims to make up for its unrealistic low bid, the owner faces the risk 
of a higher chance of cost overruns, schedule delays and excessive claims by the contrac-
tor. This negative aspect of the competitive low bid selection approach is a main incentive 
behind this research. 
The two other bidding approaches are not of interest for this dissertation but are men-
tioned below in this section to provide a complete overview about the different existing 
procurement methods. 
2.2.2 Direct Negotiations 
The approach of direct negotiation is more common in the private construction sector where 
the procuring entity compiles a list of its favored contractors and then contacts each to ne-
gotiate the terms and conditions of the contract and to know the details of the proposal he 
can offer. At the end of the negotiation phase, the procuring agency selects the contractor 
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who provides the project bid that best fits its objectives and requirements. 
This form of bidding is usually preferred if the owner is concerned more about construc-
tion competency and quality than the cost of the project. In such cases, it makes sense for 
the owner to negotiate the project with few contractors with whom he has had a successful 
and satisfactory experience on previous projects. 
On the other hand, negotiated tendering can also be used in situations where the com-
petitive tendering approach might not be the most convenient approach to use such as: 
1. Projects in smaller municipalities where it might be difficult to attract many competi-
tors or where it might be costly to arrange a competitive bidding process. 
2. Complex projects where the technical aspects and specifications are not fully defini-
tive at the time of bidding and thus using a competitive procedure might be abused 
by contractors at the expense of the owner. 
3. Emergencies and natural disasters in which major repairs are time-critical and should 
be completed rapidly. A negotiated offer is the fastest approach in this case. 
2.2.3 Competitive Negotiations 
The competitive negotiation approach forms a middle ground between competitive bidding 
and direct negotiation. According to this method, an owner uses initially the competitive 
process to advertise broad specifications of the contract and invite interested bidders to 
submit proposals. Then, the prequalification stage follows and only the responsible and 
responsive bids pass to the next phase of the process. At this point, the owner will simul-
taneously enter into direct individual negotiations with one or more of the selected bidders 
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to discuss the terms of their contracts and to explore further opportunities to enhance their 
proposals and tailor them to the owner's request. At the end of the negotiations phase, the 
procuring entity will award the contract to the bidder who mostly satisfies its requirements 
through negotiation. This bidding approach is often used by federal construction-awarding 
agencies and was enacted in 1984 through the Competition in Contracting Act which was 
passed to limit the non-competitive sole-source contracts that were often used by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (Clough and Sears 2005). 
Based on its aforementioned description, the competitive negotiation approach pre-
serves competition by giving the chance to all interested contractors to bid on the project. 
Additionally, it uses private negotiations to incite innovative ideas and to enhance submitted 
proposals such that they become in perfect alignment with the owner's requirements and 
within the contractor's capabilities. Hence, this approach works best for projects that are 
not definite in nature and which provide opportunities for innovative and creative proposals. 
2.3 Competitive Tendering 
2.3.1 Low Bid Method 
The low bid method has been the main competitive bidding method used in the U.S. and 
all over the world. This method defines the contractor who submits the lowest responsive 
and responsible bid to be the project winner. The basic objective of this method is for the 
owner to save money by obtaining construction services at the lowest price. Yet, it has been 
claimed by many researchers and practitioners that this process fails to select the best con-
tractor for the job who will provide the best quality of work at the optimal price. Awarding 
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the job to the lowest bidder has often resulted in construction delays, cost overruns, and 
higher repair and maintenance costs due to the flawed quality of work; which all together 
exceed the initial savings of the owner from using the low bid method (Grogan 1992; Holt 
et al. 1995; Clough and Sears 2005; Himes 2008). Thus, the lowest bid does not always 
end up being the lowest project cost (to the owner) after completion. 
The major drawback of the low bid method is that it may result in unrealistically 
low bids often way below the engineer's estimate. Some possible reasons behind these 
extremely low bids could be mistakes such as omission of some cost items, undermeasure-
ment of quantities, underestimation of labor requirements, or failure to include sufficient 
allowance for overhead costs (Park 1979). These mistakes might be due to the lack of ex-
pertise of the estimating team on similar types of projects, incomplete information about 
the project, or insufficient time allowed for contractors to prepare their bids. On the other 
hand, a contractor can deliberately submit a very low bid with the purpose of winning the 
project and then make up for it by filing change orders and claims later during construction. 
This bidding practice induces strong competition between contractors and pushes them 
to investigate all possible methods that will allow them to reduce their costs and conse-
quently lower their bid values in order to increase their chances of winning the project. 
Therefore, and in order to underbid all opponents, a contractor might compromise some of 
the requirements of the project by using lower material quality for lower costs, choosing 
less skilled labor to perform the work for lower wages, and taking health and safety risks 
on the job for a faster work pace. Sometimes, a contractor might even cut on its desired 
profit from the project in order to increase its winning probability and then tries to make up 
for the lost profit through change orders and claims during construction. In such cases, the 
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low bid method, which promises the owner a project construction at the lowest cost, is ac-
companied with many hidden costs that arise from more contract changes, more claims and 
litigation, and more maintenance costs due to the compromised quality of work (Grogan 
1992). Consequently, performing the job at the lowest cost becomes nothing but wishful 
thinking for both the owner and the contractor. 
A contractor might deliberately submit a very low bid after he performs a thorough 
review of the bid documents looking for design errors and ambiguities, and assesses the 
possibility for future change orders and claims. The fact that the construction plans and the 
design documents for a project are not always perfect and might sometimes include design 
flaws or omissions help induce such behavior by some contractors. In this case, contractors 
tend to take advantage of this issue by not reporting any of those errors to the owner during 
the bidding phase and once the project is won, they submit claims and change orders to 
cover the errors in the design. 
For the low bid method to be successful, the project's specifications and plans should 
be drafted unambiguously and flawlessly with all the necessary details needed to avoid a 
misinterpretation or manipulation of the project's standards. However, this rarely happens 
in reality especially in the case of complicated projects. Furthermore, the issue of quality 
control under a low bid tender is ensured only through supervision and inspection on behalf 
of the owner. This is not always enough because it might be affected by the complexities of 
the construction field where not every error or omission can be detected, and by some un-
ethical coordination that might sometimes occur between the contractor and the inspector 
to the disadvantage of the owner. 
An owner is often dissatisfied with the quality of the final work obtained through a low 
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bid system. That is because there is a discrepancy in the standards levels that both parties 
set for the project. On one hand, the project plans and specifications are considered the 
minimum acceptable quality standards by the owner. However, on the other hand, those 
same specs are viewed by the contractor as the highest quality standards required for the 
job because providing a higher quality implies higher costs which counteracts the initial 
goal of underbidding all opponents (Feldman 2006). Not only that, but a contractor might 
even skip on some of those required specs or use lower-quality materials than specified 
in the project in order to submit a lower bid and enhance its winning chance (Sandquist 
2007). This gap between the expected quality by the owner and the achieved quality by 
the contractor led public procurement agencies to search for ways to improve the low bid 
practice and the most prevailing one is enforcing prequalification on potential bidders. 
The low bid method is coupled nowadays with a prequalification stage that checks the 
technical and financial capabilities of a contractor before granting him access to bidding 
documents. This protects owners and contractors against inexperienced or incompetent 
bidders. The next section provides a further description of the criteria used to qualify 
contractors under a low bid awarding method. 
2.3.2 Prequalification Process of Contractors and Surety Bonding 
Prequalification of contractors has been an essential step followed by many US departments 
of transportation (DOT) before the award of a project in order to assess the capability of 
a contractor to perform the work as per specifications and contract documents. It has be-
come an almost international standard practice in the public construction sector field and 
especially in highway construction projects (Clough and Sears 2005). According to the 
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Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), the contractor performance evaluation 
shall be studied for at least the last two construction seasons in order to determine his pre-
qualification status. For a contractor to be authorized to receive the bidding documents for 
a project, he should be prequalified in the work classification specific to that project with 
a numerical rating and a net financial rating equal to or greater than the rating specified in 
the project advertisement. 
Some DOTs do not require prequalification for projects that are less than a certain 
threshold, e.g., Florida's DOT does not require prequalification of contractors for projects 
that are less than $250,000. 
The prequalification of a contractor is usually valid for one year or more from the date 
of the submitted financial statements but this can differ from one department to another. 
Some also argue that prequalification should not be rechecked on a yearly basis but it 
should rather be conducted again before every project because the contractor's workload, 
financial status or performance record might sometimes change in less than a year. 
There has been significant amount of research concerned with determining the list of 
prequalification criteria necessary to ensure a good quality, an on-time and within-budget 
project. These include (Russel 1990; Ng and Skitmore 1999; Hatush and Skitmore 1997; 
Holt 1998) and many others. Based on these findings and on most U.S. DOT prequalifica-
tion processes, the most important criteria used to evaluate a contractor's performance are 
the following: 
1. Financial resources: a bidder should submit a report of its most recent audited finan-
cial statements which should include several items reflecting the accounting practices 
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of the bidder. Examples of these include an independent certified public accountant's 
report, a balance sheet, an income statement, a statement of cashflows and retained 
earnings, and any other documents that the bidder thinks might help evaluate his 
financial status. 
2. Equipment and Personnel Capabilities: the bidder should submit evidence of the 
following: 
(a) The availability of equipment required to perform the type and magnitude of 
the work as per specifications of the contract with its relevant information such 
as the model, the description, the date of acquisition, and the operating status. 
(b) The experience and the skills of its key qualified personnel who are responsible 
for the supervision of the work. This is usually done by submitting a list of the 
projects completed showing the type and classification for the project, and the 
tasks fulfilled by each of the company's team members. 
(c) The experience of the company, i.e., the experience of its principals and man-
agers. 
3. Past Experience: Study of past projects (name, location, type, duration, cost) that 
the contractor has worked on to check any history of late completion of project, 
claims, uncooperative attitude, deficiency in quality of completed work, and notices 
of non-payment filed by subcontractors or suppliers. 
Additionally, most states require a contractor to be licensed for the type of work he is 
bidding on and in the state where the job is located. 
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Moreover, surety bonding is required by U.S. federal law (Miller Act 1935) on govern-
ment public works and might sometimes replace the prequalification process of a contrac-
tor. According to the Surety and Fidelity Association of America, a suretyship is defined 
as "a very specialized line of insurance that is created whenever one party guarantees per-
formance of an obligation by another party". A surety bond for a construction project is a 
three-party written agreement in which the surety assumes the liability for debt, default, or 
failure of the contractor in fulfilling its duties to the owner (Clough and Sears 2005). 
The common forms of bonding required for public projects are the performance bond 
which guarantees that construction will be completed in accordance with the contract doc-
uments, the payment bond which guarantees payment for labor and materials used or 
supplied during construction, and the bid bond which serves as a guarantee that the con-
tractor will sign the contract for the stated amount in his bid and that he will supply other 
bonds. 
The bonding capacity of a contractor is the amount of surety credit extended to him 
based on his financial status(assets, networth, etc.) and it generally indicates the maximum 
value of uncompleted work the surety will allow the contractor to have on hand at any 
time. Thus, the "available bonding capacity" of a contractor, given the current projects he 
is working on, is usually evaluated by the surety prior to bonding any new project of that 
contractor. In other words, each new project the contractor desires to bid on must be within 
his available bonding capacity. 
More importantly, and before extending any bond, the surety performs a thorough inves-
tigation about the contractor's ability to perform the work based on his character, capacity, 
and capital (known as the 3C's). The character of the contractor is evaluated based on 
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personal responsibility, integrity and habits, business stability and reputation for complet-
ing projects on time and paying to all parties. The surety also checks the capacity of the 
contractor by reviewing his performance record on previous projects including type, size, 
nature, complexity, completion time, and relationship with owner and other parties, in ad-
dition to the personnel expertise, managerial and organizational skills, and planning ability 
of the firm. The third "C" evaluated by the surety is the capital of the firm which includes 
financial obligations of the contractor (debt vs. equity), working capital, credit with banks 
and general credit reputation, condition of equipment, insurance coverage, and others. 
In addition, the surety may require a contractor to submit periodic reports about the 
progress and cost information for his current projects, both bonded and unbonded, to mon-
itor his performance and to determine the profitability of current work on hand, and may 
contact the owner or project manager to follow-up on the contractor's performance on 
bonded projects (Russel 1991). 
The cautious and detailed investigation conducted by the surety before bonding any 
project explains why some states might substitute their prequalification process for con-
tractors by just requiring them to provide performance and payment bonds for the project. 
Additionally, most DOTs require a bidder to submit certificates of insurance to cover work-
ers' compensation, social security and unemployment, to insure project property, materials 
and equipment, and to cover personal injury or property damage to others. 
On the other hand, there are some exceptional cases where even if the contractor is 
already prequalified and ranks as the lowest bidder, he would not be awarded the project. 
According to MDOT, this happens if either of the following provisions applies: 
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1. Proceedings are underway to revoke the bidder's prequalification. This usually hap-
pens if one of the following occurs: 
(a) Affiliated contractors submitted more than one proposal for the same work. 
(b) The contractor made or submitted to the department false, deceptive, fraudulent 
statements or certifications in any document required by the department or any 
claim of payment submitted to the department. 
(c) The contractor defaulted on any recent contract. 
2. The department determines that it would be contrary to the public interest to award 
the contract to that bidder based on information recently known to the department. 
In this case, the contract is usually awarded to the next lowest responsive and responsi-
ble bidder. 
Note that some state DOTs such as the New York State department do not require pre-
qualification of bidders but their qualifications for the job are rather checked after they 
submit their proposals. This process is called post-qualification. First, the potential bid-
ders are required to submit performance and payment bonds. Then, the lowest two or three 
bidders must file a form for post-qualification which usually contains general information 
about the firm, its financial information and a list of its recently completed contracts and of 
its current uncompleted work. 
Although prequalification and surety bonding assess the contractor's capability to per-
form a job according to the contract documents and the project specifications, the assump-
tion that the lowest bid can be confidently accepted is not always true. In fact, it is possible 
for a prequalified contractor to be awarded the project by submitting an unrealistic low bid 
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accidentally or deliberately. Holt and et al. (1995) discussed some of the shortcomings of 
prequalification as follows: 
1. There is no universal approach for contractor prequalification. Documentation de-
scribing the prequalification process provides a general description of the necessary 
steps to evaluate contractors but does not go into detail about possible assessment 
methods. This allows for subjective interpretation. For instance, when evaluating the 
financial status of a contractor, what aspects should be considered and what years 
should be accounted are examples of decisions that might vary from one selection 
committee to another. 
2. Long-term confidence in contractor prequalification can lead to problems: Some 
procuring entities tend to have a long-term confidence in the contractors' prequal-
ification results. Most tendering agencies update their list of prequalified bidders 
on an annual basis. However, sometimes, a contractor might suffer a decline in its 
reputation within a year which might change its status to a non-qualified contrac-
tor. Hence, enforcing prequalification before the start of a project is essential for its 
success. 
Therefore, although prequalification and bonding help to ensure that bidders have the 
necessary financial capabilities and the required technical and managerial skills to un-
dertake a project, it does not guarantee successful performance by the contractor nor 
satisfactory quality of the project. Thus, it is important to include in every project incen-
tives for achieving good performance and sanctions for unsatisfactory quality of the project 
in addition to strictly monitoring the work and enforcing contract compliance (Kerf 1998). 
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2.3.3 Corruption in Construction Industry Resulting from Cost-Directed 
Competition 
Experts identify public procurement in the construction industry as one of the areas most 
prone to corruption. In fact, according to a survey conducted by Transparency International 
Survey, the public construction field was ranked as the most corrupt industry worldwide 
(Rose-Ackerman 2008). Corruption includes unlawful and unethical behavior, such as 
fraud, bribery, collusion, or simple abuse, that is practiced by some contractors and some 
government officers, which leads to inefficient spending of the public money and affects 
the quality of construction services. 
Corruption is defined by the World Bank Sanctions Committee as the "offering, giving, 
receiving or soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of an official in the pro-
curement or selection process or in contract execution". According to the American Society 
of Civil Engineers, corruption accounts for approximately $ 340 billion worth of annual 
worlwide construction costs (ASCE 2004). It can occur in many forms such as bribes 
dedicated to alter project selection, tender specifications, procurement outcomes or con-
tract negotiations, collusion among contractors, and cover poor quality work construction 
practices and thefts of materials (Kenny 2009). 
One form of corruptive behavior can occur at the very beginning of the bidding process 
where a contractor might abuse the confidentiality of the submitted proposals and bribe an 
inside source before the bid opening in order to obtain information about the competitors' 
bid prices that are already submitted. Consequently, the contractor can alter its bid such that 
it becomes lower than the opposing bids and such that its winning chance is maximized. 
Another form of corruptive behavior can occur during the construction phase of the 
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project where the party responsible for supervising the work can be bribed to alter its re-
port about the quality of the work, the performance of the contractor, and the adherence of 
the work with the project specifications. 
Furthermore, collusion is a main form of corruptive behavior often practiced by a group 
of contractors who agree to coordinate their market behavior in order to restrict competition 
and share profits. Under this illegal practice, bidders group into cartels and plan on sharing 
projects among themselves by deliberately losing bids or by restraining to bid on a certain 
project. This is referred to as bid rigging. To elaborate more on this process, when a project 
is advertised, the bidders on this project meet shortly before the deadline for bidding. The 
purpose of this meeting is to choose which bidder among them would submit the lowest 
bid and how much should the bid value be. The bidder chosen to submit the lowest bid 
is mainly the contractor who offers the highest compensation to the other bidders. Then, 
when the time for bidding comes, the predetermined winner submits the agreed upon bid 
and all opposing contractors submit higher bid prices. To compensate the losing companies, 
the winner will then pay to the unsuccessful contractors the amount of money agreed on 
during the meeting held before bidding. Note that the smaller the number of competitors, 
the easier it is for the bidders to agree and set the collusion norms (Doree 2004). Normally, 
one or two major contractors would set the rules such that the smaller market players would 
have to eventually play along to avoid being cut off from new projects. 
It is important to realize that the predictability of the low bid method selection process 
makes the collusion practice easier. Due to the fact that the bidding process relies only on 
the sole cost criterion, colluders have a higher opportunity to plan the results to their advan-
tage. In addition, the low bid method is a highly risky bidding process where contractors 
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have to reduce their profits in order to increase their winning chances. Therefore, they tend 
to avoid or minimize that risk-taking situation by colluding with each other and thus shar-
ing the market. Thus, some contractors who operate under a low bid tendering scenario 
consider the collusion practice a powerful mean to help them stabilize their workload and 
reduce their uncertainty about future workload fluctuations (Doree 2004). 
On the other hand, corruptive behavior is not only a characteristic of unethical bidders 
but it is also practiced sometimes by procuring parties and governmental officers respon-
sible for tendering public projects who might alter or tailor the bidding documents such 
that the bidding results match their preferences. This form of corruption can occur through 
many ways as follows: 
1. It can start in the very first phase of advertising the contract even before the bidding 
process takes place, where the procuring entity can draft the project specifications 
and requirements such that its favored contractor is the only qualified bidder. 
2. Some procuring entities might disclose information about the project and the bidding 
data to their preferred contractor before the announcement of the bid tender, which 
provides him with more time to prepare his bid proposal. This leads to asymmetric 
information available to the different bidders on the same project and to unfairness 
in the selection process. Examples of countries where this unethical practice occurs 
include Taiwan (Perng and Chang 2004) and China (Sha and Lin 2001). 
3. Procuring entities might sometimes select low-circulation local newspapers to pub-
lish tendering information of a project in the purpose of helping a preselected supplier 
to have a greater chance in winning the job. And sometimes the invitation to tender 
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for an open bid is not even publicized to restrict the number of bidders participat-
ing and to limit the competition to the benefit of the favored contractor. On the 
other hand, the tender to bid can be publicized but the time given to contractors can 
be made short without considering the nature, the scale and the complexity of the 
project which gives little time to bidders to professionally evaluate their bid price for 
the project or even to submit their bids on time. 
4. The evaluation criteria based on which the contractor will be selected and awarded 
the contract might not be stated clearly in the bidding documents which allows for 
more manipulation of the winner selection by the committee. 
Based on the aforementioned, unethical behavior and abuse of the competitive bidding 
system (mainly the low bid method) can be equally practiced by contractors and by procur-
ing entities. Thus, over the last decade, many research studies and a number of world-wide 
organizations such as Transparency International, the World Economic Forum and the In-
ternational Federation of Consulting Engineers showed a remarkable interest in devising 
anti-corruption measures for publicly tendered projects. These organizations have inves-
tigated and formulated ways to prevent or at least reduce corruption in the construction 
sector. Some of these recommendations are listed below: 
1. The development of government procurement laws that provide detailed descrip-
tion of the bidding process and organize its different procurement stages such as 
the preparation of tender documents, the criteria considered for prequalification, the 
selection process of the bidders, and the necessary monitoring of the construction 
process. The presence of strict and clear rules helps reduce misunderstandings and 
36 
subjective interpretations of the law and promotes transparency and fairness of the 
bidding process. This can also increase the public confidence in the integrity of the 
public sector. 
2. The criteria for evaluation and selection of the winner for a specific project should 
be described in detail and in an explicit way in the tender documents and should be 
available for review at anytime the contractor wishes to check them. 
3. It is important to recognize the need for tough sanctions against companies caught 
bribing such as blacklisting from future bidding. 
4. A set of measures need to be taken to ensure the reform of government agencies 
supervising public works such as improving procedures of competitive selection, 
clarification of staff and institutional roles and responsibilities, and improved audit-
ing of financial flows through levels of government. 
Despite the efforts of world-wide organizations to devise ways that help fight corrup-
tion, these norms are rarely recognized or adopted by the construction parties (Kenny 
2009). And hence, there remains an urgent need to increase the awareness of the gov-
ernmental agencies and the contracting firms to the negative effects of corruption such as 
low quality construction and low economic returns on investments. 
Therefore, and because of its intensely competitive nature and inherent uncertainties, 
the construction industry remains susceptible to corruption and unethical behavior under 
any bidding method. However, the heavily price-based competitive nature of the low bid 
method and its simplicity in determining the winner increases the risk of corruption. 
37 
2.4 Alternative Bid-Awarding Approaches to the Low Bid 
Method 
As discussed in previous sections, the major drawback of the low bid method is that it al-
lows for the selection of unrealistically low bid prices that are substantially lower than the 
engineer's estimate and that will most likely lead to a higher final cost of the project (Lo et 
al. 2007). 
Hence, the governments of several countries, a number of U.S. public-sector agencies 
such as the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and a num-
ber of state DOTs have been rethinking the traditional low bid process and experimenting 
with a collection of alternative bidding methods that can successfully substitute the low 
bid method and ensure a better construction quality and a more efficient project delivery 
(Taricone 1993, Gordon 1994). These alternative procurement methods are described in 
this section. 
2.4.1 Cost-Time (A+B) Bidding Method 
Many departments of transportation around the U.S. started experimenting with this bid-
ding method back in 1991 upon the recommendation of the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration. The A+B bidding method awards projects to the lowest bid too but based on two 
criteria: the project bid price (A) and the estimated duration to complete the project (B). 
This method started gaining more interest as the highway construction industry was becom-
ing mostly occupied with rehabilitation and reconstructing projects which usually occurred 
inconveniently at heavy traffic locations and thus needed to be completed as fast as possible 
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(Herbsmann 1995). 
The A+B bidding method was the first deviation from a one criterion bid selection ap-
proach (lowest price) to a multi-criteria bid selection approach, specifically a two-criteria 
method in this case. The concept behind the A+B method or the cost-time bidding method, 
is that the project is awarded to the lowest combined bid taking into account the cost and 
the time. Thus, the first step is to convert the project duration into a monetary value. For 
this purpose, the department of transportation determines a ratio called the Road-User Cost 
(RUC) that expresses the value of a time unit (e.g., an hour or a day) as a function of the lost 
economic benefits of the road to the public, such as the costs resulting from traffic delays, 
additional travel time, fuel expenses and other factors. 
The RUC coefficient is usually included in the tender documents and thus it is known 
to bidders before bidding on the project. But, estimating RUC can be quite difficult and 
subjective because it is based on the expected impact of the construction work on the public 
using that road. Consequently, each bid is evaluated as the sum of: 1) the estimated project 
duration submitted in the proposal multiplied by the RUC factor, and 2) the bid price value. 
Accordingly, the lowest responsible and responsive combined bid value is determined to be 
the winning bid under this method. 
An updated version of the A+B method that became even more popular includes an 
incentive clause. In this case, the contractor is encouraged to finish the project earlier than 
planned and in case he accomplishes that, he would be compensated with an amount of 
money equal to the number of days ahead of schedule multiplied by the RUC factor given a 
maximum threshold for the incentive fee. The objective behind adding the incentive clause 
is to motivate contractors to work faster which should lead to better planning and manage-
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ment, investigation of innovative construction technologies, more accurate scheduling of 
the project, and more efficient use of the resources (Herbsmann 1995; Shr and et al. 2004; 
El-Rayes2001). 
Hence, the A+B bidding method can be considered as a modified low bid method where 
the contractor has the incentive to achieve the lowest bid price and the lowest time estimate. 
In fact, a contract awarded through the A+B method is not much different from a contract 
awarded through the low bid method including an incentive clause that rewards contractors 
for finishing the project earlier than its initial completion date and a liquidated damages 
clause that requires the contractor to compensate for a delayed completion of the project. 
The A+B bidding method is best used for highway or transportation projects that cause 
inconvenience to the public due to congestion and rerouting of traffic during construction 
and thus need to be completed as fast as possible. 
2.4.2 Multi- Criteria Selection Approach 
This section examines the multi-criteria selection approach developed and practiced in 
some countries and which selects the project winner based on an evaluation of several 
criteria pertaining to the proposal itself including the bid price. 
European Union Public Procurement Law 
The general framework on the coordination of procedures for the award of public work, 
supply, and service contracts was defined in the directive 2004/18/EC by the European Par-
liament and the Council of 31 March 2004. This directive follows the same principles of 
"national treatment" and "non-discrimination" defined in the "Government Procurement 
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Act" also known as the "Agreement" by the World Trade Organization. These principles 
aim to ensure transparency and openness as well as objectivity and legitimacy in the award 
of public contracts and to facilitate cross-border trade between the signatories (Bovis 2005). 
This directive applies to public contracts whose value exceeds EUR 6,242,000. 
The European Union (EU) directive for public projects (2004) states that after adver-
tisement of the project and receipt of offers from different bidders, the next stage of the 
procuring process is the qualification of contractors according to the following criteria: 
• Educational, professional qualifications and managerial skills of the firm. 
• A list of the projects carried out over the past five years accompanied by certificates 
of satisfactory execution for the most important projects indicating the type, date, lo-
cation and value of the these projects and whether they were carried out successfully 
and completed on time. 
• A statement about the equipment and plant facilities of the firm and any other tech-
nical capacities necessary for performing the project. 
• Evidence of financial and economic standing of the firm through appropriate state-
ments from bankers, and statements about balance sheets and annual turnover on 
construction works for the last three years. 
Furthermore, it states that a contractor qualification is automatically declined if one 
of the following situations applies: 1) the contractor has been convicted for an offense 
concerning his professional conduct, 2) is the subject of proceedings for a declaration of 
41 
bankruptcy, 3) has been guilty of professional misconduct, or 4) has not fulfilled obligations 
relating to social security contributions or to the payment of taxes. 
The qualification process described in the European Directive for public projects is sim-
ilar to the post-qualification process used by some U.S. states departments of transportation. 
However, the concept of surety bonding, required by federal law on U.S. public projects, 
is not present yet in European countries. Instead, a contractor submits a letter of credit, 
issued by a bank, as contract guarantee to the owner (Calveras et al. 2004). However, let-
ters of credit differ fundamentally from surety bonds because banks, in contrary to surety 
companies, do not assume the liability in case the contractor defaults and thus do not have 
any incentive to conduct a thorough investigation about the contractor's responsibility and 
reputation and to monitor his work progress during construction. 
The award criterion commonly used in U.S. is the low bid method whereas there are 
two award criteria described in the EU public procurement directive and these are: 
1. The traditional low bid method 
2. The most economically advantageous offer 
The low bid method, as explained previously, defines the lowest bidder as the winner. 
In the case the procuring entity detects an "abnormally low" bid, i.e., much lower than the 
other submitted bids, the EU Legislation gives the tenderer the opportunity to justify his 
bid through submitting more details about the economies of his construction method, the 
chosen technical solution, the originality of his work and other possible information. Then, 
in case the bid ends up rejected, the procuring entity is required to communicate to the 
42 
Commission the reasons for the rejection to ensure the transparency of the bidding process 
results. 
On the other hand, the second bid-awarding approach that is listed under the Euro-
pean public procurement law is the "most economically advantageous offer" where the 
procuring entity relies on several other criteria beside the bid price to determine the winner 
such as technical merit of the proposal, financial plan, completion date, aesthetic and func-
tional characteristics, environmental aspects, after-sales service and technical assistance, 
and other factors. The former list is not exhaustive and can be further tailored to the needs 
and requirements of the tendering party provided that all evaluation criteria are listed in 
the invitation to tender with the weight given to each so that bidders can form a clear idea 
about the relative importance of the different criteria considered for selecting the winner. 
These criteria have to be determined for each project since they must allow each bid to be 
evaluated with respect to the conditions and specifications for that particular project. 
The multi-criteria selection approach has its own advantages and drawbacks relative 
to the low bid method. First, it provides more flexibility to the owner and allows him to 
choose the best-value bid that fulfills all his required criteria including but not limited to 
the bid price. However, this approach is more subjective than the low bid method since it 
is based on the evaluation of some qualitative criteria which are hard to quantify and for 
which the procurement law does not describe in detail possible assessment methods; and 
thus it does not ensure transparency in the results as much as the low bid approach. Ad-
ditionally, the bid evaluation process itself is more complicated than that under a low bid 
method and incurs higher transaction costs because it covers a wider range of criteria to 
evaluate, and the expenses of the selection committee which has to set the criteria and their 
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weights, and evaluate each of the submitted bids. 
The European public procurement directive is obligatory and thus it must be applied to 
all public work contracts of the countries that are member states of the European Union. 
The list of member states of the EU includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom. 
The European Union Directive for public procurement applies to both design-bid-build 
and design-build projects and specifically states that: 
"In view of the diversity of public works contracts, contracting authorities 
should be able to make provision for contracts for the design and execution 
of work to be awarded either separately or jointly. It is not the intention of this 
Directive to prescribe either joint or separate contract awards. The decision 
to award contracts separately or jointly must be determined by qualitative and 
economic criteria, which may be defined by national law." 
Some of the criteria considered in a multi-attribute selection approach such as tech-
nical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental aspects, and after-sale 
services and technical assistance are concerned with evaluating the design aspects of the 
project and its operation after completion. This suggest that the multi-criteria selection ap-
proach is best used for design-build or design-build-operate projects where both design and 
construction services are awarded to the same contractor who would either have a built-in 
design department or form a joint venture with a professional design firm. In the case of a 
design-build-operate project (turnkey), the contractor is also responsible for operating the 
project for some time before turning it to the owner. However, this research focuses on 
public projects delivered through the design-bid-build approach which has been the most 
commonly used method (Pietroforte and Miller 2002), and where the contractor bids only 
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on the construction of a project for which the design has already been completed by a 
separate engineering entity. 
China 
Moving to the Chinese construction market, the competitive tendering approach was in-
troduced around the 1980s. Before that time, projects were assigned to contractors by 
the Chinese government which was also responsible for covering all construction costs. 
In other words, the construction industry was considered to be a non-profit sector where 
contractors were not entitled to make any profits. This led to the absence of competition 
between contractors and thus to their lack of motivation. Consequently, in 1984, the State 
Planning Commission and the Ministry of Construction together issued the first official 
regulation promoting and controlling the application of competitive tendering practices in 
the Chinese construction industry (Shen and Song 1998). 
With the introduction of competitive tendering, the bid price criterion was the main 
determinant in awarding construction projects. Then, as the Chinese market was gradually 
suffering from corruption and from the use of bribery to obtain projects, a new regulation 
specifying management measures for controlling tendering practices was issued in 1992 by 
the Ministry of Construction (Zou and et al. 2007). Despite all the attempts to improve 
the competitive open tendering process in China, there was still a significant amount of 
projects that were assigned by the government to state-owned contractors. Thus, the Chi-
nese market tendering practice comprised both methods: open competitive tendering and 
selective tendering and hence it was considered a partially competitive industry. 
Then, the Chinese tendering law was enacted in January 2000 stating that tendering 
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practices should be controlled by law rather than by governmental administration action 
(Zou and et al. 2007). This tendering law introduced the multi-criteria bid selection ap-
proach which is similar to the most economically advantageous offer approach described 
in the European government procurement law. 
Taiwan 
Most of the public sector projects in Taiwan have been tendered using the low bid-awarding 
method. However, given the low economic growth of Taiwan and with the increase of cost 
overruns and delays in public construction due to awarding contracts to unreasonably low 
bids, the Government Procurement Law (GPL) in Taiwan, enacted in May 1998, devised an 
alternative bid selection method called the Most Advantageous Tendering Approach (MAT) 
(Yang and Wang 2003). Similarly to the public procurement laws developed in Europe and 
China, this bidding method awards the project to the most convenient bid instead of the 
lowest bid based on a multi-criteria selection approach. 
2.4.3 Average Bid Method 
Average-based bidding methods are price-based competitive methods where the winner is 
determined in relation to the average of all submitted bids. Different variants of the aver-
age bid method have been used previously in some countries such as Italy, Peru and Taiwan 
(Henriod and Lantran 2000). Additionally, and in 1996, the Florida Legislature amended 
the law to authorize the Florida Department of Transportation to use alternative contracting 
techniques on $60 million out of the approximately $ 1.25 billion worth of annual FDOT 
contracts to assess their effect on expediting project completion and helping reduce cost 
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Figure 2.1 Owner's Decision Tree for Bidding Methods. 
overruns. Among these methods is the Bid-Averaging method where the contractor who 
submits the closest bid to the arithmetic average of all submitted bids is awarded the project 
(Florida DOT 2000). According to FDOT, the intent of using this method is to "get the con-
tractor to bid the true and reasonable costs for a project in order to minimize claims and 
cost overruns during construction". 
Similar to the low bid method, average-based bidding methods promote transparency 
and fairness in the bidding process, and include prequalification for bidders, in addition 
to bonding and insurance requirements. The average bid method has been modeled and 
analyzed by Ioannou and Leu (1993) and their results are reproduced in the next chap-
ter to allow comparison with other alternative competitive bidding methods studied in this 
research. 
The average bid method leads to higher bid prices for the owner than the low bid 
method. Thus, by awarding the project to the closest bid to the average, the owner could be 
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missing the opportunity to receive a genuine competent low bid that can provide him the 
same service but for a lower cost. However, if an owner chooses the average bid method, 
he can be theoretically protected against unrealistically low bid prices and their consequent 
problems during construction, which is a main drawback of the low bid method. This 
tradeoff between the two methods, expressed in Figure 2.1, depends on the owner's prefer-
ences for a given project and hence, represents an important decision for the owner to make 
before tendering any project. 
2.5 Summary 
Open competitive bidding based on price is the main procurement approach used to award 
public construction because it provides all contractors an equal opportunity to bid on their 
desired projects and at the same time it promotes transparency and clarity in the bidding re-
sults. The low bid method has been the most common form of competitive bidding used in 
the U.S. and in most regions of the world, and awards the project to the lowest responsible 
and responsive submitted bid. 
The low bid method promises owners to provide them with the best cost-savings, how-
ever, it often is not the case. The price-competitive nature of the low bid method allows 
selection of incompetent contractors who might accidentally or deliberately submit unre-
alistic low bids with the intention to make up for that by filing claims and change orders 
after the project is won. This often leads to cost overruns, delays and disputes between the 
different contract parties. 
The low bid method is usually coupled with a prequalification process conducted by 
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U.S. Departments of Transportation to check the financial capability of the contractor, his 
performance records on previous projects, and his personnel skills. Moreover, a contractor 
is usually required to submit bid, performance and payments bonds. These bonds are usu-
ally extended to the contractor by the surety based on a thorough investigation about his 
character, capacity and capital. 
Although prequalification and bonding are a form of assurance for the owner that the 
contractor is financially and technically capable to perform the project according to spec-
ifications, they do not provide a guarantee that a contractor who deliberately submits an 
unrealistic low bid will not be selected as the project winner. 
Hence, a departure from the low bid method (a price based approach) towards a multi-
criteria selection approach was developed by governmental procurement laws in several 
regions of the world. The cost-time selection approach, also known as the A+B method, 
gained attention in the U.S. and particularly for transportation projects in the purpose of 
accelerating the completion of work that cause inconvenience to the public such as high 
traffic or obstruction of roads. According to this method, the lowest combined bid, in terms 
of bid price and cost, is awarded the job. 
Another alternative that appears in the European public procurement directive and in 
the government procurement laws for Taiwan and China, is the multi-criteria selection ap-
proach known also as the most economically advantageous offer. This bidding method 
performs a qualification process for contractors after receiving their bids and then evalu-
ates qualified bid proposals based on several criteria such as technical merit of the proposal, 
financial plan, completion date, bid price, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environ-
mental aspects, after-sales service and technical assistance, and other factors. This method 
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induces more flexibility but also more subjectivity into the bidding process and thus might 
not ensure the same transparency in the bidding results as the low bid method. 
In fact, the multi-criteria approach is more appropriate for design-build projects since 
it evaluates design aspects of proposals. However, this research is interested in address-
ing the problem of unrealistic low bids submitted for design-bid-build projects where the 
contractor is concerned only with the project construction. 
Average-based bidding methods constitute another alternative price-based approach 
that was applied by FDOT on some projects and was practiced in some countries such as 
Taiwan, Italy and Peru. Ioannou and Leu (1993) modeled and analyzed one form of these 
methods which awards the project to the closest bid to the average of all submitted ones. 
This variant of average-based bidding methods prevents unrealistic low bid prices from be-
ing awarded the project but it also leads to higher bid prices for the owner and might result 
in bid price creep on the long-term. 
Ioannou and Leu (1993) presented the only paper in the construction engineering and 
management literature that analyzed and modeled an average-based bidding method. This 
research expands on their work and investigates other competitive price-based bidding 
methods based on average and order statistics, analyzes their relative merits and shortcom-
ings, and explores their potential in addressing the problem of selecting unrealistic low bid 
prices under the low bid method. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review of Bidding Models in 
Construction Engineering and 
Management 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an overview about the competitive bid selection approach 
in public construction and its most common form, the low bid method. It also described 
the prequalification process, bonding and insurance requirements that usually accompany 
the low bid method in the US construction industry. The previous chapter also presented a 
review of public procurement laws and regulations that were developed in some Asian and 
European countries and that promote alternative bid awarding methods as a remedy to the 
drawbacks of the low bid method. 
To complete the picture, this chapter focuses on the theoretical bidding models that 
were developed in the literature and that were mainly concerned with defining and mod-
eling one or both of a contractor's main bidding decisions which are: 1) the decision of 
whether to bid or not on a certain project, and 2) how to determine the optimal markup to 
use for that project in case the decision to bid is made. 
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First, this chapter provides a summary of the results presented in the first set of bidding 
models which aimed at defining the different bidding factors that a contractor should con-
sider before choosing to bid or not on a certain project. Then, and given the focus of this 
research, this chapter examines in more detail the bidding models that were developed to 
help a contractor determine its optimum markup for a given project. These bidding models 
can be divided into three main categories: 1) profit-maximization models that are based 
on the sole criterion of maximizing profit, 2) multi-attribute bidding models that recog-
nize the importance of different attributes in determining the contractor's markup through 
maximizing additive utility and 3) artificial intelligence based models that use a neural net-
work approach where a set of input and output bidding data are fed to the network which 
learns the association and then generalizes it to find the optimum markup for new bidding 
situations. 
The following sections provide more details about the three described categories of 
models and their limitations. 
3.2 Main Bidding Decisions in Construction 
The construction bidding market is a challenging and highly competitive environment 
where contractors have to make several interdependent decisions under uncertainty and 
in a timely manner. The two main decisions that a contractor has to consider, whenever 
a new project appears in the market, are whether to bid on that project and if yes, which 
markup to use. 
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Bidding Decision 
It is usually not an easy job for the contractor to consider all the factors related to a bid/no 
bid decision within the limited time he has before each bid submission. There have been 
many investigations and surveys conducted by researchers to determine all the relevant 
criteria that affect the contractor's decision to bid on a particular project (Ahmad 1990; 
DeNeufville and King 1991; Shash 1993; Ahmad and Minkara 1988; Chua and Li 2000; 
Mehmedali and Abdulrezak 2007). Below, we provide a summary of these main bidding 
factors and we classify them into project-related, company-related, and market factors. 
The project-related factors can be summarized through the following questions that a 
contractor should answer before bidding on a project in order to determine the desirability 
of the project: 
1. Does the project type match with the specialty and work scope of the firm? 
2. Is the project complexity within the capability of the firm? 
3. Is the size of the project compatible with the size and capabilities of the firm? 
4. Is the project located within the work boundaries of the contractor? 
5. What is the estimated duration of the project? Will the project keep the contracting 
firm tied up for a long period such that it might be missing other projects that are of 
higher interest? 
6. What are the contract terms and conditions and what is the type of the contract? 
7. Are there any risk factors related to that project that might affect its final cost or its 
53 
end outcome such as uncertainty about the construction site, the ground conditions, 
or the weather conditions? Other risk factors include the degree of completeness of 
the project documents, the amount of changes expected during the project execution, 
the confidence of the firm about its cost estimate for the project and its confidence in 
its subcontractors. 
8. How is the relationship between the contractor and the owner, and what kind of pre-
vious experiences (successes or failures) did they have together? What is the history 
of the owner's payments in past projects (any delays or disputes)? 
9. Is the allowed duration for bid preparation enough? 
10. Does the project contribute to increasing the firm's dominance in the market and 
reputation, and does it improve the expertise of its personnel? 
On the other hand, there are some other important factors relating to the current status 
of the contracting firm in the market that should be considered when bidding on a project. 
These factors are expressed through the questions below: 
1. Is the contractor licensed for such types of projects? Does the contractor anticipate 
any complications in getting permits and approvals for building the project? 
2. Does the current workload of the contractor allow him to take any additional projects? 
In other words, does he have enough available bonding capacity to bid on the project? 
3. Is the contractor in urgent need for work to cover its general, administrative and 
overhead expenses? 
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4. Is the estimated project dollar volume within the contractor's financial capability? 
5. Is local labor available or is there a need to bring labor from outside which means 
additional costs of relocation? 
6. Is the company's personnel well trained and skilled for such types of projects? 
7. Does the company have the required equipment to perform the work or does it need 
to rent or purchase the necessary equipment? 
8. What kind of previous experience and what level of performance was achieved on 
similar past projects? 
In addition, some other factors related to the market characteristics such as the expected 
competition level for the advertised project, the possibility of other interesting upcoming 
projects, the economic situation and the inflation rate of the region where the project is 
located, might have an impact on the contractor's decision about whether to bid or not on 
that project. 
This research assumes that the contractor has already went through the process of eval-
uating the aforementioned bidding criteria and consequently has made the decision to bid 
on the project. Thus, the next decision the contractor has to make is determining the op-
timum markup to use for that project, which is more within the scope of this dissertation. 
Therefore, the next section explores the bidding models developed in the literature focusing 
on the optimal markup decision. 
55 
Optimum Markup Decision 
Once a contracting firm has made the decision to bid on a certain project, it is then faced 
with a more challenging decision which is to select a bid that is low enough to win the 
project and at the same time high enough to make a good profit. A natural objective for 
each construction company is maximizing its profit in order to ensure survival in the mar-
ket. However, although profit maximization is usually the most frequently used bidding 
objective (Boughton 1987), many researchers argue that it should not be considered the 
sole criterion upon which the markup is based. 
A contractor's need for work might sometimes play a conflicting role with short-term 
profit maximization and thus is identified as a major factor when determining the optimum 
markup for a project. For instance, if a contractor is in a bad financial situation and is in 
urgent need of cashflow to cover its overhead and its general and administrative expenses, 
winning the project becomes a priority even if it comes at the expense of a much lower 
profit. Thus, the need to continuously cover some fixed costs such as offices' rentals, util-
ities, personnel salaries, insurance payments on property and equipment, and others might 
sometimes drive the contractor to submit a very low bid so that he can at least breakeven 
and stay in the business. One way to measure a contractor's need for work is to compare 
the size of its current project backlog against the annual project workload; and the lower 
this ratio is, the higher is the contractor's need for work (DeNeufville and King 1991). 
Identifying the optimal markup for a certain project is not an easy task because any 
slight difference in the markup applied to a certain job has the ability to change the win-
ner's identity. Thus, many bidding models have been developed in the literature to assist 
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a contractor in choosing the right markup given a specific project. The very first models 
in the history of construction bidding (Friedman 1956; Gates 1967; Carr 1982) were based 
on the single objective of profit maximization. Then, the literature started focusing more 
on the importance of taking into consideration several bidding factors that affect the de-
cision of bidding on a certain project and that also influence the best markup to choose. 
Additionally, and with the development of utility theory concepts, some researchers ar-
gued that bidding decisions should reflect the risk attitude of a contractor and therefore the 
bidding objective function should maximize the utility of profit rather than its monetary 
value (Willenbrock 1973; Ibbs and Crandall 1982). Thus, many bidding models were later 
developed (Seydel and Olson 1990, 2001; Dozzi and et al. 1996; Marzouk and Moselhi 
2003; Wang and et al. 2007) that emphasized the idea that the optimal markup decision 
is multi-attributed in nature, and that the utility of these attributes should be considered 
rather than their actual values to account for the unique preferences of each contractor. On 
the other hand, another category of bidding models emerged in parallel with the multi-
attribute models and were developed based on neural networks concepts (Moselhi and et 
al. 1993; Hegazi and Moselhi 1994; Fayek 1998; Li and et al. 1999; Liu and Ling 2003, 
2005; Han and et al. 2005; Chao 2007). The concept behind these newly emerging models 
started with Carr and Sandahl (1978) who used multiple regression analysis to develop two 
bidding models to help contractors with the decisions of bid/no bid and optimal markup re-
spectively. The neural networks based models define the optimum markup estimation as an 
unstructured analogy-intensive problem and therefore they determine the optimum markup 
through building an analogy or some form of pattern recognition with previous bidding 
situations. 
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The following sections describe the benefits and limitations of the three aforementioned 
categories of bidding models. 
3.3 Profit-Maximization Bidding Models 
Friedman (1956) is the first to present a bidding model for markup optimization in a com-
petitive bidding environment. According to Friedman, a contractor can have multiple 
bidding objectives such as maximization of total expected profit, maximization of return 
on investment, minimization of expected losses, minimization of competitors' profits, and 
maintaining a minimum level of workforce continuity. However, his model was based on 
the sole objective of maximizing total expected profit considering it the most important and 
common objective. Friedman relied on the bidding patterns of potential competitors to de-
termine the optimum markup for a project under a low-bid selection approach. In order to 
determine the probability of winning from a contractor's perspective against his opponents, 
Friedman made some implicit assumptions such as the independence of the competitors' 
apparent bid-to-cost ratios and the availability of bidding history about opponents. There-
fore, the probability of winning was determined as the product of probabilities of bidding 
lower than each of the opponents. 
About ten years later, Gates (1967) also developed a bidding model that was based 
on maximization of total expected profit. Similarly to Friedman's model, Gates' model 
also relied on competitors' bidding history to determine a contractor's winning probability 
given a certain markup. However, his model differs from Friedman's in the way of calcu-
lating the probability of winning of a certain contractor against his opponents. Gates( 1967) 
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criticized Friedman's assumption of statistical independence of the opponents' bids and 
his expression of the probability of winning over a group of competitors as being equal 
to the product of the individual probabilities of winning against each competitor. How-
ever, Gates' formula for the probability of winning was based on unstated assumptions and 
hence its validity and comparison against Friedman's model were the target of much de-
bate(Rosenshine 1972; Benjamin 1972; Dixie 1974; Fuerst 1976; Gates 1976; Benjamin 
and Meador 1979; Ioannou 1988). 
Carr(1982) criticized Friedman's and Gates' models as being limited by their assump-
tions, and presented a more general bidding model based on the contractor's cost distribu-
tion and its opponents' bid distributions. According to Carr, Friedman's model assumes 
that the uncertainty in bid-to-cost ratio lies completely in the opponents' markup, which is 
not accurate because variations in bids can also be due to variations in costs. Carr(1982) 
expressed the probability of winning of a contractor against its opponents as the probability 
of winning over the lowest bidder, and developed a formula to derive the distribution for 
the lowest bid-to-cost ratio based on historical data about the contractor's costs for previous 
projects and its opponents' bids. However, Carr's expression for the low bid-to-cost dis-
tribution is based on competitors' costs for previous projects which are not revealed to the 
contractor. Hence, Carr had to make some assumptions, which are debatable. For instance, 
Carr assumed that bidders have the same variance in their cost estimates in the absence of 
any further information. He further assumed that the competitors' cost variance is equal to 
half the bid-to-cost ratio variance of the considered contractor and then stated that this is 
based on the conventional wisdom of the construction industry. Carr compared his model 
to Friedman's and Gates' models through a numerical example and concluded that Gates 
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model produced expected profit values that do not differ remarkably from those produced 
by his model, although the recommended markups by both do divert significantly. 
All three bidding models developed by Friedman, Gates and Carr aimed at determining 
the optimum markup that would maximize a contractor's profit under a low bid tendering 
scenario. The difference between the three bidding models lies mainly in their way of de-
termining the probability of winning of a contractor against his opponents given a particular 
markup. 
The main limitation of these models is that they do not take into consideration that 
different contractors might value the same profit amount differently according to their risk 
attitude and to their current circumstances. The bidding models by Friedman, Gates, and 
Carr are based on maximizing expected monetary value of profit where as a more realistic 
objective function would be maximizing the expected utility of profit. 
Additionally, another concern that researchers had about these statistical bidding mod-
els is that they all aim for the sole objective of maximizing profit whereas bidding is a 
complex decision making process that should account for several non-price criteria such as 
project-related factors, client-related factors, contractor's risk behavior, need for work, and 
many others (Boughton 1987). Hence, a whole set of multi-criteria bidding models were 
later developed in the literature to address this limitation, and these models are discussed 
in the next section. 
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3.4 Multi-Attribute Bidding Models 
Willenbrock (1973) was among the first authors to highlight the importance of determining 
the optimal markup for a project by maximizing the expected utility of profit rather than its 
expected monetary value. To reach an optimal markup that is compatible with the contrac-
tor's personal goals and circumstances, Willenbrock stated that the bidding model should 
include the contractor's risk preferences as reflected by functions representing his utility 
values. However, Willenbrock did not present any utility-based bidding model but only 
provided guidelines for determining utility functions of contractors in bidding situations. 
Then, Ibbs and Crandall (1982) suggested that bidding decisions should not only in-
corporate the risk attitude of a contractor through its utility function but should also have a 
multi-attribute nature. They presented field results for interviews conducted with a group 
of contractors that substantiated the importance of considering multiple criteria for bidding 
decisions. Ibbs and Crandall considered the problem of evaluating new business mar-
kets and described it as a multi-attributed bidding decision depending on three parameters 
which are profit return, contract size and regulatory aspects. They used a numerical exam-
ple just for the purpose of illustrating the use of multi-attribute utility theory formula for 
the aforementioned bidding decision. Thus, Ibbs and Crandall (1982) did not present any 
utility-based bidding model for determining optimal markup but they just used the multi-
attribute utility theory formula in an illustrative example to emphasize that any formulation 
of a multi-attribute utility bidding model represents a trade-off between the model's degree 
of realism and the ease of computational analysis. 
Seydel and Olson (1990) devised a quantitative method that incorporated decision-
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maker preferences in a multi-criteria bidding setting based on the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process technique (AHP). However, their model did not incorporate the utility values for 
the multiple criteria but rather their expected monetary or actual values and therefore it did 
not account for the risk behavior of the contractor. 
AHP is a decision making tool developed by Saaty to assist people in organizing their 
thoughts and judgments in order to make more effective decisions (Saaty 1994). This tech-
nique defines a decision problem as a hierarchy of criteria, subcriteria and alternatives. 
When applied to the bidding decision problem, the AHP hierarchy consists of the first 
level representing the decision maker's overall utility that needs to be maximized, the mid-
dle level(s) representing the decision criteria and sub criteria if any, and the lowest level 
comprising a finite set of markup alternatives. Seydel and Olson's model used the AHP 
technique to derive the relative weights of the criteria, subcriteria and the set of alternatives 
(or markups in this case) at the bottom level of the hierarchy. Although markup should be 
treated as a continuous variable, Seydel and Olson used a finite discrete set of alternatives 
that represented the most relevant markup choices to be able to apply the AHP technique 
to their bidding model. Their model relied on competitors' previous bidding data to deter-
mine the range for the lowest submitted bid and consequently it assumed the probability of 
winning given a certain markup to follow a uniform distribution over this range. 
Seydel and Olson's (1990) multi-attribute bidding model aimed at optimizing three bid-
ding criteria: profitability, risk exposure and work force continuity. A set of relative weights 
for the three criteria was developed through pair wise comparison reflecting the decision 
maker (the contractor) preferences. Their model's final output consisted of a set of bid 
markup alternatives with their corresponding scores where the markup alternative with the 
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highest score is considered the optimum markup. 
A major drawback of the bidding model developed by Seydel and Olson (1990) is that 
it ignores any interaction between the different attributes or criteria upon which the model 
is based. Another limitation is that it only evaluates a finite set of markup alternatives and 
thus the optimum markup value recommended by their model is only the optimal among 
a finite set of alternatives chosen at the beginning while developing the model hierarchy. 
Most importantly, the main limitation of Seydel and Olson's model is that although it recog-
nized the multi-attribute nature of a bidding process, it did not incorporate the risk behavior 
of the contractor in the optimum markup decision and hence had no basis on any theory for 
rational behavior. In 2001, Seydel and Olson extended their bidding model by integrating 
it into a general multi-criteria bidding framework that divided the multiple bidding criteria 
into two major objectives which are profit and volume maximization, however, it still had 
the same aforementioned limitations. 
On the other hand, Dozzi and et al.(1996) developed a bidding model that applies utility 
theory to a multi-attribute bidding criteria model in order to reach the optimal bid markup. 
They used twenty one different decision criteria in their bidding model that were classified 
into environmental, company and project related factors in a hierarchical structure. The 
definition, range of interest and scale of each criterion were defined and represented by a 
utility function that reflects the preferences of the decision maker relative to that specific 
criterion. However, Dozzi and et al.(1996) used a straight line utility function for each of 
the bidding criteria used in their model, which indicates a risk-neutral contractor. Thus the 
risk attitude of the contractor was not reflected in their model, as claimed. They rather used 
the straight-line utility curve to set a consistent normalized scale for all attributes where 
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the attribute value of neutral desirability to the decision maker is assigned a utility of zero 
and the most preferred value is assigned a utility of one. Another limitation of their model 
is that the combined multi-attribute value is obtained by addition of the three individual 
criterion utility values multiplied by their respective weights, which ignores any possible 
interdependence between the different bidding criteria (DeNeufville 1990). 
Then, in order to determine the optimum markup value, Dozzi and et al.(1996) defined 
a piecewise linear markup utility curve based on the smallest, the most common, and the 
largest markup values used by the company, and then used it to match the final combined 
utility value for the project with the corresponding markup. And here we note another 
major limitation of this bidding model which is the fact that it does not take into account 
the probability of winning given a certain markup which reflects the contractor's chance of 
winning the project in the first place. 
Marzouk and Moselhi(2003) built on Dozzi's work and presented a similar multi-
attribute model but with the difference that it is not limited to a fixed number of criteria 
and therefore it provides more flexibility in building the decision hierarchy that most suits 
the user. In addition, their bidding framework differs from Dozzi's model in that it allows 
the user to specify non-linear individual utility functions for the different bidding criteria 
that define their model. The bidding model developed by Marzouk and Moselhi (2003) has 
the same drawbacks of that by Dozzi and et al.(1996). In other words, although it uses non-
linear utility functions to reflect the preferences of the contractor about the different bidding 
criteria, their model uses an additive approach to determine the multi-attribute utility value 
which does not capture the interdependence among bidding criteria and simplifies the com-
plex interdependent bidding decisions excessively. Additionally, Marzouk and Moselhi's 
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model lacks the probability of winning factor in their model which is a main component in 
determining the optimum markup. 
Furthermore, Wang and et al. (2007) developed a hybrid bid price determination pro-
cedure that combines a simulation-based cost model and a multicriteria evaluation model 
to help contractors determine the optimal bid price to use for a project. Similar to Dozzi's 
model, Wang and et al. (2007) divided the bidding criteria into environmental, company 
and project-related criteria. First, they conducted an assessment of the distribution of each 
cost item (direct, indirect or markup) of the project and then used Monte Carlo simulation 
to generate random costs of each cost item based on its distribution parameters. This pro-
cess was replicated for several times resulting in a cumulative distribution for the project 
total bid price. Then, the utility function of the bid price is constructed such that the min-
imum bid price corresponds to a utility of 1 and a probability of winning equal to 1 and 
the maximum bid price corresponds to a utility of 0 and a probability of winning equal 
to 0. After determining the multi-attribute value obtained by adding the individual utility 
values for the three bidding criteria, it is matched to the corresponding bid price through 
its predetermined utility function. This bid price is considered to be the optimal bid price 
for the project. Again, this model by Wang and et al.(2007) can not be considered as a 
multi-attribute utility model since it relies on the additive approach which is not suitable 
for complex situations such as bidding decisions. Additionally, this model defines the prob-
ability of winning of the contractor in relation to the uncertainty in its bid price which is 
not very accurate because a winning chance should rather be measured against potential 
opponents. Moreover, this bidding model recommends an optimum bid price instead of an 
optimum markup which means that it has to be tailored for each project according to the 
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distribution of its price. 
In summary, the set of multi-attribute bidding models developed in the literature rec-
ognized the importance of considering different bidding criteria or objectives beside profit 
maximization, however, they failed to correctly apply multi-attribute utility theory to their 
models. They assumed an additive approach that is more suitable to economic analyses 
and can not express the value of any interaction between the several attributes which is 
very likely under complex decision-making processes such as construction bidding. 
In addition, among all the above described multi-criteria bidding models, Seydel and 
Olson's model (1990) is the only one that used the probability of winning factor in their 
multi-attribute optimization function and relied on previous bidding data to determine its 
distribution parameters given a low bid tendering scenario. All other models determined 
the combined multi-attribute utility value (based on an additive approach) for the project in 
question and then used the contractor's markup utility curve to obtain the optimum markup 
corresponding to that project without any attention to the probability of winning given that 
chosen markup and irrespective of any specific bid selection approach. 
Applying the right form of multi-attribute utility theory to a multi-criteria bidding 
model such that it accounts for all dependencies or interactions among the different bid-
ding criteria is cumbersome and requires a large amount of computations that increase 
exponentially with the increase in the number of attributes. However, this number of 
computations can decrease significantly if these two assumptions hold: 1) preferential in-
dependence which assumes that the ranking of preferences over any pair of attributes is 
independent of the other attributes, and 2) utility independence which assumes that the 
indifference between a lottery and a certain equivalent for any attribute does not depend 
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on the levels of other attributes. Thus, these assumptions should be verified for any de-
veloped multi-attribute utility bidding model in order to have practical means for obtaining 
the multi-attribute utility value for a certain project while still accounting for the interaction 
between attributes (DeNeufville 1990). 
3.5 Neural Networks Based Models 
Along with the development of multi-attribute utility bidding models, some researchers 
were exploring the use of artificial neural networks(ANN) to model the optimum markup 
decision. Artificial neural networks, an artificial intelligence based technique, are a form of 
regression analysis where a network of interconnected neurons takes a set of input values, 
processes information flowing through the network, and produces one or a set of output 
values. Each node or neuron receives inputs through connections with other elements. The 
initial input data could come from different sources such as an existing database of observa-
tions, a set of training examples prepared by domain experts, or a collection of experimental 
simulation results. Each input factor is assigned a certain weight to indicate its importance 
relatively to the other parameters. Then, the sum of all weighted inputs is modified by a 
transfer function to produce an output signal. Neural networks have a remarkable ability 
to derive meaning from complicated or imprecise data and hence can be used to detect 
trends and extract patterns that are too complex for humans or other computer techniques 
to notice. 
Carr and Sandahl (1978) were the first to use multiple regression analysis (MRA), a 
similar concept to ANN, to model the two main bidding decisions a contractor has to make: 
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whether to bid or not on a project, and which markup to use in case of bidding. Multiple 
regression analysis is a tool of statistical analysis that can be used to examine the relation-
ship between a single variable and a group of other variables. Carr and Sandahl (1978) 
presented two models for the bid decision and the optimum markup decision respectively. 
These models relied on previous bidding data to predict the value of the lowest bid to cost 
ratio which in turn is used to compute the probability of winning for the contractor given 
a certain markup. The independent variables considered in the MRA fell into three cate-
gories: the character of the particular job including the different work mixes and ownership 
category, its economic environment, and the makeup of the competition. However, the two 
bidding models developed by Carr and Sandahl (1978) did not account for the risk attitude 
of a contractor and were rather based on maximizing the expected value of profit. 
Then, and since early 1990s, many researchers (Moselhi and et al. 1993; Hegazi and 
Moselhi 1994; Fayek 1998; Li and et al. 1999; Liu and Ling 2003, 2005; Han and et al. 
2005; Chao 2007) investigated the use of neural networks approach to help contractors esti-
mate their optimum markups for new projects by building analogy with similar past projects 
and estimating the optimum markup for new projects accordingly. They argued that the op-
timal markup decision is a complicated, unstructured, and analogy-intensive problem and 
therefore, it lends itself into an artificial neural network setting. A number of input data and 
their associated output results are fed to the system as training examples. Consequently, 
the trained network learns to generalize the process by which the output correlates to the 
input, encodes the corresponding knowledge in its database, and refers to it as a means to 
evaluate the input about new projects in order to estimate the output, or in this case, the 
optimum markup. 
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The artifical neural network bidding models developed by (Moselhi and et al. 1993; 
Hegazi and Moselhi 1994; Fayek 1998) presented recommendations not only about the op-
timum markup to use for the project but also provided output about its implications such 
as the associated win/lose possibility, the estimated difference in dollars between the win-
ner and second-lowest bidder, the anticipated actual profitability, the project potential for 
change orders and claims, and the expected extension of duration. This is all based on the 
information of previous projects performed by the contractor and which are fed to train the 
network so that it learns the corresponding input-output correlation and acquires the ability 
to generalize to new bidding situations. 
However, some practitioners and researchers in the construction industry had their sus-
picions about the practicality of applying artificial neural networks concept to the optimum 
markup decision problem (Boussabaine 1996). And that is mainly due to the fact that neu-
ral network systems perform their computations and analysis through hidden layers of the 
network and thus do not provide explanation about how the problem is solved, which raises 
the user's concerns about the validity of the results. This is known as the "black box" na-
ture of artificial neural networks where data go into the system and recommendations come 
out without any interpretation, which affects their acceptability and credibility to the user 
(Dikmen and Birgonul 2004). 
In an attempt to remedy the aforementioned drawback of artificial neural networks, 
some researchers (Li and et al. 1999; Liu and Ling 2003, 2005; Han and et al. 2005; Chao 
2007) tried to ameliorate their neural network models for optimal markup estimation by ex-
tracting a set of "IF-THEN" rules to interpret the system's recommendations and to increase 
its credibility to the user. However, a set of if-then rules that provides an output recommen-
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dation to each possible combination of input parameters does not have by any means the 
associative knowledge required to cover all the complexities and the interdependence of 
bidding decisions. 
Another limitation of ANN models is that there is no guarantee that the network will 
train to the best configuration possible and therefore, even if the neural network is func-
tioning correctly, it can still be prone to errors (Boussabaine 1996). In fact, data fitting is a 
sensitive issue when building artificial neural networks. A network that is not sufficiently 
trained might fail to fully detect the signal in a complicated data set and hence might not 
be able to match the right output to the fed input. On the other hand, if a network is over 
trained, the risk of memorizing rather than learning the true input-output relationships in-
creases, and hence the system would not be able to generalize to situations that are not 
present in the training examples. Therefore, deciding when to stop training the network is 
crucial to the success of the system and the authenticity of its output results. 
Last, a major drawback of ANN bidding models is that they are subjective in the sense 
that they are designed to suit the preferences and work strategies of one specific contrac-
tor. And therefore if another contractor were to use this model, the inference rules and the 
membership functions would have to be computed all over again in order to accommodate 
the characteristics, the policy of this contractor, and his own rules for determining the op-
timum markup. Moreover, the bidding model of a specific contractor is specialized to the 
type, location, size, and scope of a project and thus it needs to be retrained with each new 
project which implies a high number of complex computations. 
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3.6 Summary 
Developing a general bidding model that can help a contractor determine its optimum 
markup for a project has been the concern of many researchers and the subject of many 
papers in the construction engineering and management literature. 
The very first set of models presented the bidding problem as a single-objective (profit) 
maximization and were mainly concerned with developing the formula for the probability 
of winning of a contractor against its opponents given a particular markup and under a low 
bid tendering scenario. 
Then, with the development of utility theory, researchers were focusing more on the 
importance of formulating the objective function for a bidding decision in terms of util-
ity instead of monetary values to reflect the risk attitude of a contractor. There was also 
a parallel emphasis on considering a multi-attribute bidding model that takes into consid-
eration several objectives beside profit such as maximizing volume of work, keeping the 
business running continuously, and others. However, the multi-attribute bidding models in 
the literature did not apply the multi-attribute utility theory correctly and hence, they just 
contributed to emphasize that bidding decisions should be based on several attributes of 
which profit is one criterion. 
A third set of developed bidding models were based on artificial neural networks, a 
form of regression technique where networks are trained through a set of input projects 
and associated output results(markups). Consequently the trained network learns to gen-
eralize the input-output correlation, encodes the corresponding knowledge in its database 
and then uses it to build an analogy with similar past projects and accordingly estimate the 
71 
optimum markup for new projects. The main disadvantage of such models is that they just 
provide recommendations without any explanation or justification and therefore they lack 
credibility in the user's eyes. 
Thus, a main objective of this research is to develop a competitive bidding model for 
optimal markup decision that takes into consideration the risk behavior of a contractor, the 
uncertainty in the winning probability, and the uncertainty in the estimated and final costs 
of the project considered for bidding. 
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Chapter 4 
Review of Average Bid Method 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the low bid method has been the most common 
bid selection process worldwide and over the years. However, awarding the project to the 
lowest bidder can lead to the selection of unrealistic low bids with a higher risk of dis-
putes, increased costs, schedule delays, and consequently dissatisfaction of both owners 
and contractors. 
To address this problem, some countries such as Taiwan, Peru, Italy and others have 
investigated and experimented with alternative bidding procedures that are average-based, 
i.e., that define the winning bid in relation to the average of all submitted bids. The ratio-
nale behind these methods is that a price close to the average should improve quality, offer 
a fair price to the owner, and allow the contractor to perform the work at a reasonable profit 
(Ioannou and Awwad 2009). 
Furthermore, in 1996, the Florida Legislature passed a law that authorized Florida's 
department of transportation (FDOT) to use alternative contracting techniques to the low 
bid method in order to assess their impact on reducing schedule delays and cost overruns 
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(ASCE 1998, AASHTO 2001). Among these alternatives is the bid-average method which 
awards the project to the contractor who submits the closest bid to the average of all sub-
mitted ones. According to FDOT, this method should give an incentive to contractors to 
bid reasonable prices and consequently reduce cost overruns and improve project quality 
(Florida DOT 2000). 
Based on their statistical data for years 1994-1999, FDOT had concerns about time 
and cost overruns of highway construction projects awarded through the low bid method 
and one of the steps they took to address this problem is experimenting with alternative 
contracting techniques on some projects. An FDOT's January 2000 report presented the 
statistics for 137 projects let by the department's central office since 1996 based on inno-
vative bidding methods and reported a decrease in cost and time overruns as opposed to the 
traditional low bid method. 
The analysis showed that contracts awarded through innovative contracting methods 
including the average bid method resulted in 3.6% cost overrun and 7.1% time overrun 
whereas contracts awarded through the low bid method had 12.4% cost and 30.7% time 
overruns. FDOT's December 2002 report also supported the same conclusion based on data 
for 68 projects awarded through alternative contracting techniques in the year 2000-2001. 
It is true that the statistical analysis conducted by FDOT to assess the impact of inno-
vative contracting techniques on reducing cost and time overruns is still preliminary and 
based on a small sample of projects, however, it is promising and provides an incentive to 
experiment further with alternatives to the low bid method. 
Under a low bid tendering scenario, a contractor is only interested in the order of sub-
mitted bids since underbidding the lowest opposing bid ensures the highest chance to win 
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the job. However, under an average bid method, the order and magnitude of bids affect the 
winner's identity. That is because each contractor's bid value contributes to determining 
the average of all submitted bids and therefore it has a greater impact on the bidding results 
than under a low bid method scenario. Therefore, a change in any of the bid amounts or in 
the number of competitors can affect any particular bidder's chance of winning. 
The selection criteria under average-based bidding methods can take several forms such 
as awarding the project to the bid that is closest to the average, or that is closest to the 
average after eliminating the extreme bids, or closest to but below the average, etc. For 
example, the Peruvian regulations devised a procedure for awarding projects with three 
or more bidders which requires calculating the average of all submitted bids and the base 
budget. Then, after eliminating the bids that lie 10 percent above and below the average, a 
second average of the remaining bids and the base budget is calculated, and the bid closest 
to, but below the second average is awarded the contract. In the case where none of the 
bids lies below the second average, the winner is defined to be the bid closest to, but above 
the average (Henriod and Lantran 2000). 
On the other hand, one of the bidding methods described in the Italian procurement law 
for public projects is an average-based bid-awarding process that can be applied for projects 
with a budget below one Million Euro and with more than ten bidders. This method first 
eliminates the top and bottom 10 percent of the submitted bids, and then computes the av-
erage of the remaining ones. After that, the average difference between the first average 
and all greater bids is computed. This average difference is then added to the first average 
to form the second average. According to this method, the winner is defined to be the one 
whose bid is closest to and lower than the second average. 
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Ioannou and Leu (1993) were the first and only authors to address optimal bidding 
using the average bid method where the selection criterion is set to award the job to the 
contractor whose bid is closest to the arithmetic average of all submitted bids. They de-
veloped an algorithm to determine the probability of winning in function of the bid-to-cost 
ratio and given a particular number of opponents. Modeling the average bid method proved 
to be complicated since a closed-form competitive model was only reached in the case of 
a contractor facing two opponents. For a higher number of opponents, Ioannou and Leu 
(1993) used Monte-Carlo simulation approach to model the average bid method, and to 
consequently determine the probability of winning, the optimum markup and the expected 
profit corresponding to a particular bid-to-cost ratio. 
The research documented in this dissertation expands on the research on the Average 
Bid Method that appears in (Ioannou and Leu 1993). As a result, the following are taken 
directly from (Ioannou and Leu 1993) with permission: 
• The overall modeling approach 
• The modeling variables and standardizations, 
• The mathematical notation, symbols and their meaning, 
• The formatting and notation for the bidding model nomograms, and 
• The Friedman assumptions of independence. 
This provides the necessary continuity and facilitates the direct comparison between 
the results in (Ioannou and Leu 1993) and this research. For the same purpose, this chapter 
presents the model developed by Ioannou and Leu (1993) for the average bid method and 
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describes its merits and shortcomings relative to the low bid method as per their analysis. 
Ioannou and Leu(1993) presented the simulation results for the average bid method in four 
easy-to-use nomograms that allow a contractor to select an optimal markup for a lump-
sum bid without the need for complicated mathematics. These nomograms are reproduced 
in this chapter to allow comparison with the nomograms corresponding to the alternative 
bidding methods that will be studied in this research. 
4.2 Basic Definitions 
As stated previously, the modeling approach, the variables, and the mathematical symbols 
and their meaning in this and following sections are taken from (Ioannou and Leu 1993) 
to allow direct comparison of past and present results. Thus, the notation adopted in this 
research is to indicate random variables and the identity of contractors using capitalized 
symbols; decision variables and the values of random variables are shown using lower-case 
symbols. 
We shall examine the bidding process from the perspective of a particular contractor A$ 
who is bidding on a new project against n competitors A\ ,Ai, • • • ,An. Let Q be the project 
cost estimate and Bt the bid price for competitor A-t, i = 0 , 1 , . . . , n. 
Additionally, we shall assume that contractor AQ has already determined a cost estimate 
Co for a particular project and needs to determine its optimal bid price bo- It is important 
to note here that co and bo are decision variables that are under the control of contractor AQ 
and that must be determined prior to bidding, however, the actual cost of the project is only 
known upon completion in case AQ ends up to be the winner. 
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To prepare the cost estimate of a project, contractor Ao's estimating department has to 
conduct a thorough review of the project specifications and conditions, evaluate the ground 
conditions and the job-site surroundings, and accordingly estimate quantities of work, re-
quired labor crews, and the necessary production rates to match the project end deadline. 
The amount of project information available to the contractor has a direct effect on the ac-
curacy of the cost estimate CQ. After the cost estimate is established, contractor AQ must 
choose a markup mo to arrive at a bid price bo = CQ + rriQ. Equivalently, contractor AQ may 
select a bid-to-cost ratio xo = 1 +mn/co and multiply it by its cost estimate CQ to arrive at 
its bid price bo'. 
b0 = x0co (4.1) 
Note that contractor AQ is responsible for choosing the values for CQ, mo, XQ, and bo, 
which are considered to be decision variables even if their values have not yet been deter-
mined. Similarly, every opposing contractor A; has complete control over its cost estimate 
C, and its bid price Bj, which are unknown to contractor AQ while preparing its bid proposal 
and thus are considered by him as random variables. In fact, Ao might know his competi-
tors' bid prices 5, only when it is time for bid opening and the bid prices are announced 
publicly, but he can never get access to their cost estimates Q neither before nor after bid-
ding. In this and following sections, the ratio of contractor A,'s bid B, to contractor Ao's 
own cost estimate CQ will be named the apparent bid-to-cost ratio used by opponent A, and 
will be represented as X,-: 
Xi = ^- i = l ,2 , . . . ,n (4.2) 
co 
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From AQ 'S perspective, the apparent bid-to-cost ratios Xi of competitors At (i = 1, . . . , n) 
are referred to as such because they are based on Ao's cost estimate CQ and not on Q which 
is the true cost estimate that is used by A; and that is unknown to AQ. Therefore, the X,- are 
considered as random variables by AQ where as the ratio XQ = &o/co is a decision variable, 
equal to his firms bid-to-cost ratio fbc0. 
Hence, each of the n opponents' bids Bt is equal to: 
Bi = FBCiQ I = 1 , 2 , . . . , / J (4.3) 
And this results in: 
Xi = FBd— i = l , 2 , . . . , / i (4.4) 
co 
According to (4.4), the random variable X,- is the product of the two random variables 
FBCt and C, divided by the already determined cost estimate CQ, which means that the vari-
ability of its distribution includes both the variability of competitor A,'s markup, FBCi, and 
the variability of his unknown (to AQ) cost estimate C,(Ioannou 1988). 
4.3 Standardized Assumptions 
Since the objective of any bidding model is to help contractor AQ select the value of its bid 
bo to maximize its profit, it is typically assumed that the value of the cost estimate CQ for 
the new project AQ is about to bid on is already determined. This is an implicit assumption 
that is necessary for the ratios X-t to exist. 
The average bid method modeled by (Ioannou and Leu 1993) is based on the same two 
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assumptions for Friedman's low bid method model (Friedman 1956; Ioannou 1988). As 
stated previously, these assumptions will form the basis for all bidding models that will be 
developed and analyzed in the coming chapters of this research. This allows the compar-
ison of all bidding methods on an equal basis. Below we state these assumptions as they 
appear in Ioannou and Leu (1993): 
1. In order to eliminate the effect of the project size, each opponent's bid Bt (i = 
1,2,... ,n) is standardized by taking its ratio to contractor AQ'S cost estimate CQ. The 
resulting ratios X, {i = 1,2,..., n) are assumed to be mutually independent. 
2. The probability distribution of each apparent bid-to-cost ratio Xi(i= 1,2,..., n) does 
not depend on the values of XQ and c$ that AQ chooses {I.e., the distribution of Xj 
exists before the new project is announced): 
P[Xi < xi\xo, c0] = P[Xi <xi] i = 1,2,..., n (4-5) 
No bidding model can capture all the complexities of the real world environment and 
hence, it is important to understand the underlying assumptions of each model and the 
context within which it can be applied. In fact, bid values of Ao's opponents, Bu are not 
independent in reality since they are submitted by different bidders for the same project 
and thus they are expected to be of the same order of magnitude. Each fi, is a product of 
the apparent bid-to-cost ratio Xi and of Ao's estimated cost CQ. Hence, the estimated cost 
of Ao is its only indicator of the range of expected bid prices. In this sense, the opponents' 
bids Bi are not independent (Ioannou 1988). 
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However, this interdependence has not been studied in the literature and has not been 
proved or determined in practice. Thus, in the absence of information about the distinct bid-
ding strategies of different opponents, a simplifying assumption needs to be made which is 
that Ao faces equivalent opponents. In this case, the X, ratios are assumed to be indepen-
dently and identically distributed. 
In order to eliminate the dependency between the different Bt, Friedman (1956) sug-
gested dividing them by the cost estimate of Ao. The resulting ratios have a probability 
distribution that is independent of the particular value of CQ determined before bidding on 
the project. 
4.4 Mathematical Formulation 
The average bid method awards the project to the contractor whose bid is closest to the av-
erage of all submitted bids. Hence, the formal definition for the event "Contractor Ao wins" 
can be expressed as follows: 
n 
{A0wins|M = {f](\b0-B\<\Bi-B\)} (4.6) 
( = 1 
where B is the average of all bid prices including bo. Hence, B is also a random variable 
whose value is affected by the decision variable bo. Equation (4.6) does not apply to the 
case of only two bidders (Ao and A\) because the average in such a case will be at equal dis-
tance from both bids and hence there will be a tie with no final winner for the project. The 
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general probability of winning under the average bid method can be expressed as follows: 
P[A0wms\b0} = P[(\b0-B\<\B1-B\)n...n(\bQ-B\<\Bn-B\)] (4.7) 
n 
P[A0wms\b0) = P[f](\b0-B\<\Bi-B\)} (4.8) 
( = 1 
n 
P[A0wins|xo,c0] = P[f\{\xQ-X\<\Xi-X\)} (4.9) 
Ioannou and Leu (1993) showed that the above expression for the probability of win-
ning under an average bid method has a closed-form solution only in the simple case of two 
opponents. Assuming X; follow a common distribution Fx{xi), the probability of winning 
given n = 2 can be expressed as follows: 
P(A0wins|&0) = 2Fx(xo)[l-Fx(xo)] (4.10) 
However, for n > 2, determining a closed-form expression for the probability of win-
ning becomes a tedious task that requires complex numerical integrations and therefore 
analyzing the bidding method through simulation is a much easier approach. 
4.5 Simulation Approach 
This section describes the simulation algorithm developed by (Ioannou and Leu 1993) to 
model the average bid method. As aforementioned, we make the same assumption that the 
apparent bid-to-cost ratios X\,X2,... ,Xn are i.i.d. and follow a normal distribution with 
mean mx, and variance ax. Obviously if there is a reason to believe that the X,- follow a 
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different distribution, the analysis methodology remains the same. In order to arrive at a 
numerical solution that is independent of mx and ax, the standardized variables m'x and X'Q 
were defined by Ioannou and Leu (1993), and will be used in this chapter and for all other 
bidding methods that will be presented in the following chapters of this research: 
m ' X - ^ (4.11) 
ox 
, xo-mx 
xQ = (4.12) 
Ox 
The Monte Carlo simulation approach was used to determine the probability of win-
ning as a function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio X'Q. Below we summarize in steps 
the algorithm devised by Ioannou and Leu (1993) to model the average bid method: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of opponents n. 
Step 2: Initialize the simulation set counter k=\. 
Step 3: In simulation set k, sample m vectors *i ,£,*2rt' • • •,*>,;•* fr°m t n e standard 
normal distribution N(0,1). Each vector represents one of the m projects 
in simulation set k. The n values in each vector represent the standardized 
apparent bid-to-cost ratios of the n opponents in the j l h project. 
Step 4: For each sampled vector x/1,x/2,...,x'n corresponding to one of the m 
projects, 
1. Compute its average X jk-
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2. Identify the winning region for each project [ljk,hjk\ within which xlQ 
would win the project. The lower and upper bounds of the winning 
region are determined as follows: 
n-\- \ 
hjk = min(xjk + d+,x'jk-\ -d~) (4.13) 
ljk = min(j?Jk -d~,x'jk - -—-d~) (4.14) 
where 
d+ = absolute value of the distance from the average x!-k to the next 
h i g h e r ^ . 
d~ = absolute value of the distance from the average x>:k to the next 
lower jdijk. 
The derivation of the winning region bounds is explained in detail in 
(Ioannou and Leu 1993). 
After defining the winning region [ljk, hjk] for each of the m generated 
projects, any value X'Q^ in this region wins project (j, k). However, 
•
xo/yt= hjk is the optimum value to choose for the standardized bid-to-
cost ratio because it ensures winning the project and at the same time 
it maximizes profit. Therefore, the candidate values that will be con-
sidered for X!Q are the upper bound values hjk of all m projects. 
Step 5: For every x'0 in the candidate set [h\k, fi2k, • • •, hmk\. 
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1. Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values x?0 
and n for the current simulation set k, Wk{x!Q,n) = 0. 
2. Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set k). 
If X'Q belongs to the region [Ijk, hjk\ defined in Substep 2 of Step 4, 
then project j is won: increase w/((x'0,n) by 1; otherwise do nothing. 
Repeat this sub-step for all m projects in the current simulation step k. 
3. Compute the ratio Pk(xQ,n) of the total number of projects won 
W^(XQ, n) over the total number of projects m within simulation set k: 
,i N wk(xcnn) number of projects won in simulation set k 
Pk{XQ,n) — =
 : : — : -
m total number of projects in simulation set k 
(4.15) 
This is the ]ih estimate of the probability of winning at x!Q and n. 
Step 6: If the index k equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 7. 
Otherwise, increase A: by 1 and go back to Step 3. 
Step 7: Calculate the final estimate for the probability of winning at X!Q and n by 
averaging Pki^n) over all simulation sets s: 
P[Win|^,n] = pi^n) = - £ pk{x'0,n) (4.16) 
The next section shows the simulation results obtained from running the formerly de-
scribed algorithm for 1000 simulation sets, each consisting of 1000 projects. The assigned 
values for the number of opponents n are 2, 4, and 8. 
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4.6 Simulation Results and Comparison with Low Bid 
Method 
This section presents four nomograms that reflect the simulation results for the average 
bid method along with those for the low bid method. These nomograms were studied in 
(Ioannou and Leu 1993) and the analysis is reported here to shed light on the advantages 
and shortcomings of the average bid method relative to the low bid method and to other 
alternative bidding methods that will be modeled and discussed later in this research. 
4.6.1 Comparison of Nomograms for Different Bidding Methods 
The probability of winning nomogram is the essence of comparison between the different 
bidding methods and at the heart of deriving all other nomograms. It is the basis on which 
a contractor can approach the problem of unknown number of opponents. The fact that 
several probability of winning curves corresponding to different bidding methods are pre-
sented in the same nomogram should not lead to confusion because the X-axis is a decision 
variable and not a purely statistical quantity such as m'x. 
For the remaining three nomograms, the most important is the one that relates m'x to the 
standardized optimum bid-to-cost ratio (jcj-J — I)/Ox- That is because this nomogram pro-
vides the optimum markup a contractor should use on a project given certain estimates of 
mx and Ox- Clearly, these estimates would be different for historical bid-to-cost ratios that 
come from projects that have used different bidding methods such as the low bid method, 
the average bid method, and so forth. Thus, there is no reason to assume that a contractor 
would enter this nomogram at the same value of m'x under different bidding methods that 
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might be used to award the project he is bidding on. 
The curves for multiple bidding methods are shown in the same nomogram to allow 
the overall comparison of the general characteristics and trends of optimal behavior that 
different bidding methods would induce on a typical bidder. The same is true for the last 
two nomograms which again give a sense of relative magnitude and trends from one bid-
ding method to the other for optimum expected profit and for the probability of winning at 
the optimum XQ. An analysis of the long-term behavior of each of the investigated bidding 
methods is conducted in Chapter 11 of this thesis. 
4.6.2 Analysis of Simulation Results 
Figure 4.1 shows the probability of winning given a standardized bid-to-cost ratio x'Q. In 
contrast to the low bid method curves, the average bid method ones are symmetrical around 
X!Q = 0. The maximum probability of winning always occurs at x^ = 0 irrespective of the 
number of opponents n, which is expected since bidding closer to the mean (xo = mx) 
guarantees a higher winning probability under the average bid method. Furthermore, the 
maximum value for the probability of winning is equal to 0.5 for the case of two oppo-
nents, which is another difference with the low bid method where the maximum value for 
the probability of winning approaches 1.0 at very low values of XQ. This is the case because 
the low bid method allows a very low bid to win the project. In contrast, for the average 
bid method, the bid value that maximizes the chance of winning is the mean of Xj. Never-
theless, it does not make this chance arbitrarily high. Figure 4.1 shows how the average bid 
method protects owners against very low bid prices by indicating a winning probability of 
zero for low values of x^. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the standardized optimum markup as a function of the standardized 
bid-to-cost ratio mean m'x. To determine the optimum bid-to-cost ratio which maximizes 
profit, m'x must be selected first and then the m expected profits (v,*) corresponding to the 
m generated projects in simulation set k are computed based on the following equations: 
"* _
 p.t^JizA (4.17) 
co ox ax 
^ r = Pjk(x0jk + m'x) (4.18) 
coax 
vJk 
coax 
= Pjk(hjk + m'x) (4.19) 
where j = 1, . . . , m. After computing the m profits, the maximum one determines the opti-
mum standardized bid-to-cost ratio that corresponds to the value selected initially for m'x: 
(*o*-l) 
= Pjk{h*jk+m'x) (4.20) 
ox 
Therefore, to create the graphs shown in Figure 4.2, values of m'x were selected within 
the range [—1,3] and the corresponding standardized bid-to-cost ratios, (XQ — \)/ax, were 
determined and averaged over all simulation sets. 
The main observation about Figure 4.2 is that given specific values for m'x and n, the 
optimum bid-to-cost ratio is always higher for the average bid method. It is also observed 
that as the number of opponents becomes very large and as m'x increases, the optimum bid-
to-cost ratio approaches the mean mx for the average bid method. This happens because a 
large value for m^implies a very small variance ax, which means that the opponents' bids 
are closely clustered around the mean. And therefore, in order to win given a high number 
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Figure 4.3 Average and Low Bid— Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x, n 
of opponents, a contractor has to bid the closest to the mean bid-to-cost ratio. However, 
the low bid method curves indicate that as the number of opponents increases, and given 
a certain m'x, the optimum bid-to-cost ratio decreases and approaches the X-axis, which 
implies that the contractor tends to bid the project at cost. This means that, if a project 
attracts a large number of competitors then the owner should expect a fair price if using 
the average bid method as opposed to an extremely low bid price most probably leading to 
problems and disputes if the low bid method is rather used. 
Figure 4.3 shows the standardized optimum expected profit corresponding to m'x. For 
the same number of opponents n, the profit for the average bid method is always higher than 
that for the low bid method. For this reason, the average bid method might be preferred by 
contractors over the low bid method. Note that as the number of opponents becomes very 
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large, the optimum expected profit for both methods approaches zero. In the case of the 
low bid method, this happens because both probability of winning and optimum markup 
reach zero. This means that for the low bid method with a high number of competitors, a 
contractor has to further lower its bid price to ensure a higher chance of winning and hence 
might end up bidding the project at cost, specially if he is urgent need for work. However, 
for large n under the average bid tendering scenario, the optimum standardized profit ap-
proaches zero because only the probability of winning does so. In this case, the bid-to-cost 
ratio approaches mx as shown in Figure 4.2 and hence the owner should still expect a fair 
bid price in contrary to the low bid method. 
Figure 4.4 shows the probability of winning at the optimum bid-to-cost ratio (XQ — 1 )/ox 
for a given m'x. For small values of m'x, this probability is larger for the average-bid method, 
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whereas for high values, it is larger for the low-bid method. This is again as expected, since 
a large variance favors winning under the average-bid method, while a small variance favors 
winning when using the low-bid method (Ioannou and Leu 1993). 
4.7 Effect of mx and Gx on Optimum Markup 
The figures presented above in this chapter were based on the standardized values m'x and 
X!Q introduced by Ioannou and Leu (1993) in order to obtain general graphs that can be used 
for optimal bidding decisions irrespective of the numerical values of mx and ax- Particu-
larly, Figure 4.2 shows the standardized optimum bid-to-cost ratio (XQ — 1) fax in function 
of the standardized mean m'x without having to specify the values of mx and ax. This 
section investigates the effect of varying the values of these two variables, mx and ax, on 
the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ for the case of Ao facing two opponents under both low 
and average bid methods. Table 4.1 lists the values of mx and ax that will be used in this 
section along with corresponding m'x and ax/mx. 
Varying the values of mx and ax mainly affects Ao's probability of winning against its 
opponents and consequently it impacts the expected value for profit. Note that the estimated 
profit value, (xo — 1 )co, is not affected by either of the two former variables. 
Figure 4.5 shows in each of its rows two graphs depicting the probability of winning 
and the expected profit value versus the bid-to-cost ratio for a given value of mx under a 
low bid tendering scenario. Each row of the figure reflects the results for a given value of 
mx as listed in Table 4.1, and on the other hand, the six curves shown in each of the six 
graphs of Figure 4.5 correspond to the different considered values of ax- The range for 
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mx 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
ox 
0.02 
0.05 
0.08 
0.1 
0.13 
0.16 
0.02 
0.05 
0.08 
0.1 
0.13 
0.16 
0.02 
0.05 
0.08 
0.1 
0.13 
0.16 
m'x=(mx-l)/ox 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.00 
2.00 
1.25 
1.00 
0.77 
0.63 
10.00 
4.00 
2.50 
2.00 
1.54 
1.25 
ox/mx(%) 
2.00 
5.00 
8.00 
10.00 
13.00 
16.00 
1.82 
4.55 
7.27 
9.09 
11.82 
14.55 
1.67 
4.17 
6.67 
8.33 
10.83 
13.33 
Table 4.1 Values of mx and Ox 
xo starts at 1 which implies bidding at cost with no profit and that is because there is no 
point in investigating lower markup values since a contractor would not bid lower than its 
estimated cost for the project. 
If we consider the first two graphs corresponding to mx = 1, the optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio, which is the value of XQ that maximizes the expected profit value, is higher as Ox 
increases. And note that all optimum markup values are higher than 1 since bidding lower 
than that means losing money on the project which is undesirable by any contractor. For 
any value of XQ and given mx = 1, the probability of winning is higher for a higher variance 
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in the apparent bid-to-cost ratios which means that Ao can afford a higher optimum markup. 
This is clearly shown in the second graph of the first row of Figure 4.5 where the maximum 
of the expected profit curve shifts to the right as Ox increases. 
If we now consider the graphs in the second row of Figure 4.5 which correspond to a 
higher value of mx equal to 1.1, we observe a different behavior where as 0"x takes higher 
values, the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ decreases and then increases again. Contrary to the 
graphs corresponding to mx = 1, all optimum markups are now lower than the mean for the 
apparent bid-to-cost ratios mx which is now equal to 1.1. That is expected since the mean 
for the opponents' bids is higher than the estimated cost of contractor Ao and therefore he 
can afford bidding lower than that in order to increase its chance of winning the project. 
Notice that the curves for the probability of winning corresponding to different values of 
o"x cross at XQ = mx = 1.1. If Ao chooses to bid lower than mx, then he would have a higher 
winning probability as Cx takes lower values. That is because a small variance indicates 
that the opposing bids are narrowly clustered around their mean which provides Ao with a 
higher opportunity to underbid them. On the other hand, if Ao's bid-to-cost ratio is higher 
than mx, then Ao's winning probability decreases significantly because ranking the lowest 
becomes less likely. Furthermore, and as expected, this probability of winning decreases 
further as the variance in the opposing bids takes lower values. 
To explain the downward and then upward curvature of the optimum markup as Ox 
increases, let us consider the winning probability curve corresponding to o"x = 0.02. This 
curve is significantly higher then the other curves and additionally it remains equal to 1 for a 
wider range of XQ (1 < xo < 1.04). And that is because as mx takes higher values such as 1.1 
and as the variance in the apparent bid-to-cost ratios reaches small values such as 0.02, the 
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apparent bid-to-cost ratios of opponents will then fall in the range [mx — 3ox,mx + 3ox] 
with a confidence level of 99.7% and that is equivalent to [1.04,1.16] in this case. This 
means that as long as AQ bids lower than this range he can guarantee winning the job. This 
explains why the probability of winning curve corresponding to Ox = 0.02 maintains a flat 
shape below that range and remains close to 1 as xo gets a little past that range. That is the 
reason why A$ can afford a higher optimum markup as Ox takes relatively small values and 
as mx takes higher values. 
The same behavior applies to and is even more obvious in the last row of graphs in 
Figure 4.5 which correspond to mx = 1.2. It is interesting to note that the curve for the 
probability of winning for ax = 0.02 is equal to 1 for an XQ range of [1,1.13]. This means 
that Ao can choose a markup as high as 1.13 and yet secure winning the job. That is because 
as the opposing bids' mean gets significantly higher than Ao's estimated cost and as they 
get all grouped closely around the mean, Ao can afford a higher markup because of its high 
winning probability. 
On the other hand, Figure 4.6, similar to Figure 4.5, shows in each of its rows two 
graphs depicting the probability of winning and the expected profit value versus the bid-
to-cost ratio given a particular value of mx under an average bid tendering scenario. The 
probability of winning curves are symmetrical around mx as expected and as depicted in 
the simulation graphs shown in Figure 4.1. 
The main observation about Figure 4.6 is that as Ox increases the optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio, XQ, strictly increases for any value ofmx- This is expected since AQ has to bid closer 
to the mean of the opposing bids in order to maximize his chance of winning the project 
and therefore the higher the variance in the opponents' bids the higher is Ao's chance of 
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winning and the higher is its optimum markup. Note that the highest probability of winning 
always occurs at xo = mx • 
On the other hand, as mx increases from 1 to 1.2, we observe that the optimum markup 
increases for any given value of Gx- And this is again expected because the average bid 
method requires a contractor to bid close to the bids' average in order to increase its win-
ning chance and hence as the mean of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios increases, Ao has to 
bid closer to that mean which explains why its optimum markup increases. 
Hence, varying mx and Cx has different effect on the optimum markup for both the 
low and the average bid methods. For the low bid method, and given higher values of mx, 
the optimum markup decreases and then increases as ax increases. However, this does 
not apply to the average bid method which shows a constantly increasing XQ as mx and Gx 
increase. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that the low bid method incites a fiercer 
competition than the average bid method which drives lower optimum bid-to-cost ratios as 
well as lower bids. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The main advantage of the average-bid method over the low bid method from an owner's 
perspective is that it helps him avoid entering into contract with bidders who might delib-
erately submit unrealistically low bid prices with the intention to make profit later through 
change orders and claims after the construction begins. Thus, it helps reduce time and 
cost overruns resulting from very low bids as suggested and demonstrated through FDOT's 
preliminary analysis described at the beginning of this chapter. Also, from a contractor's 
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perspective, the average bid method means higher potential profit margins than the low bid 
method specially when the number of competitors is relatively high. 
However, awarding the project to the closest bid to the average does not promote price 
competition that leads to lower costs for the owner and thus might result in bid price creep 
over time. This does not mean that the average bid method discourages innovation and 
development of cost-saving technologies, but only when all bidders are aware of these 
techniques, bid prices are expected to gradually fall and the savings are eventually passed 
to owners. This is made clearer in Chapter 11 of this research which models the behavior 
of investigated bidding methods on the long-term. 
This mechanism suggests that it might be more effective to award the project to the bid 
closest to, but less than the average. Contrary to the average bid method, this approach 
would lead to optimum bid-to-cost ratios that are slightly less than the mean mx- Hence, 
it would result in lower bid prices for owners and would still imply relatively high profits 
for contractors. Therefore, awarding the project to the contractor whose bid is lower than 
and closest to the average is an alternative bidding method that is worth investigating, and 
therefore it is modeled and studied in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Below-Average Bid Method 
5.1 Introduction 
One form of the average-based bidding methods is to award the contract to the bid that is 
closest to but lower than the arithmetic mean of submitted bids. This method is named 
the below-average bid method and is explored and analyzed in detail in this chapter. The 
below-average bidding method not only protects owners and other contractors from ex-
tremely low bid prices, but it also results in lower bid-to-cost ratios and thus lower bid 
prices than the average bid method. 
Figure 5.1 shows three bidding examples that will be used in this section to illustrate the 
below-average bidding method and compare it to the average and low bid methods. Part 
(a) of that figure shows six contractors that have submitted the following bid prices: 83, 
85, 87, 92, 95, and 98. The average bid price is 90, and the bid at 92 is the closest to the 
average and therefore it would win the project under the average bid method. However, the 
bid at 87 would be the winning one if the below-average bid method is rather used. On the 
other hand, the low-bid winner is the bid at 83. Clearly, the bidding outcome is different as 
we move from one tendering method to the other. 
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Figure 5.1 Below-Average Bidding Method Examples 
The example we just considered represented a symmetry in the arrangement of bid 
prices: three bids above the average and three below. Part(b) of Figure 5.1 represents an 
example of asymmetrical bids and a case where the winning bid is the same under both 
average and below-average bid methods. It shows three contractors that have submitted the 
bid prices: 96, 97, and 99 where the average bid price is equal to 97.3. In this case, the 
low bid winner is the bid at 96 however, the bid at 97 is clearly the closest to and below 
the average and would win the project under both the below-average and the average bid 
methods. 
Let us now consider a fourth contractor that is about to submit a bid. Clearly, if the 
fourth bid happens to be in the narrow range between 97 and 97.3, it will indeed be the 
winner. However, this is not the only possibility. Figure 5.1(c) shows the example consid-
ered in part (b) but with an additional fourth bid equal to 91 which is much lower than the 
other three bids. In this case, the average of the four bids drops to 95.8, which is below all 
three original bids. Hence, the winner under the below-average bid method is now the bid at 
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91 which is at the same time the winner under the low bid method. This example illustrates 
a very important aspect of the below-average bidding method which is that a contractor can 
win by submitting a very low bid (91) such that the resulting bid average (95.8) is below the 
minimum of its competitors' bid prices (96). This characteristic makes the below-average 
bidding method similar to the low-bid method. This and other possibilities for a contractor 
to win under the below average bid method are discussed in detail in this chapter. 
It is clear from these examples that both average bid methods are significantly more 
complex and thus more difficult to model than the low-bid method. For the low-bid method, 
the main variable of interest, from a contractor's perspective, is the minimum of the bid 
prices submitted by the other competitors. The contractor's own bid price is the constant 
value to which the opponents' bids are compared whereas the average bid price depends 
on the contractor's own bid price (Ioannou and Awwad 2009). Furthermore, any change in 
one of the bid amounts or the number of bidders under average-based bidding methods can 
have a profound effect on any particular bidder's chance of winning. 
This chapter presents a competitive bidding model for the below-average bid method 
and discusses its merits and shortcomings relative to the average bid and to the low bid 
methods. The bidding process is investigated analytically first and then through Monte 
Carlo simulation. The simulation results are then presented in four nomograms that are 
similar to the ones presented in the previous chapter for the low and average bid methods. 
The nomograms presented in this chapter include the curves corresponding to the average-
bid method (Ioannou and Leu 1993) and the low bid method (Friedman 1956; Ioannou 
1988) in order to compare the three models and study their relative merits. 
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5.2 Mathematical Formulation 
This section derives the analytical expression for the probability of winning under the 
below-average bid method, and considers as an example the specific case of two opponents. 
We note again that the same modeling approach, variables, and mathematical symbols 
declared in (Ioannou and Leu 1993) are used to model this and following bidding meth-
ods. Additionally, it is important to state that the bidding model for the below-average 
bid method is based on the same two assumptions as Friedman's low-bid model (Fried-
man 1956; Ioannou 1988) and the average-bid model (Ioannou and Leu 1993) to allow 
comparison of all three bidding methods on an equal basis. 
5.2.1 Probability of Winning—Analytical Form 
The winning contractor under the below-average bid method is the one whose bid is closest 
to but less than the average of all submitted bids. With B defined previously as the average 
of all bids including bo, the formal definition for the event "Contractor AQ wins" can be 
expressed in several different ways as follows: 
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{A0wins|&0} = { f) (B-b0<B-Bi)n(bo<B)} (5.1) 
Bj<B 
= {n(fl/<feo)n(fco<5)} (5.2) 
Bi<B 
n 
= {f][{Bi<bo)U(B<Bi)}n(b0<B)} (5.3) 
;= l 
n 
= {f](bo<B<Bi)U{Bi<bo<B)} (5.4) 
;= i 
= {f|Po-JB/)(fi-fi /)>0]n(6o<5)} (5.5) 
(=i 
Notice that the opposing bids B, in (5.1) and (5.2) are only those that satisfy: Bt < B. 
The remaining expressions involve all opposing bids Bt. Moreover, since B\ ,B2,... ,Bn are 
random variables, so is the average B. At the same time, since bo is a decision variable, the 
average B is also influenced by contractor Ao-
An alternative definition for the event "Contractor AQ wins" involves the use of or-
der statistics to highlight the ranking nature of the process. Given the random variables 
B\,B2,...,Bn, the order statistics B^,B^2),- • •>#(«) a r e a l s o random variables, defined by 
sorting the values of B\ ,B2,... ,Bn in an increasing order. Important order statistics, for 
example, are the low bid #(i) = min(5,-), and the high bid B^ — max(5,). 
Hence, the conditional event that contractor Ao wins, given that the average bid B is 
between order statistics B^ and #(*+i) is: 
{Ao wins|fc0, (BW <B< % H ) ) } = {(B{k) < b0 < B)\(B{k) <B< B{k+l))} (5.6) 
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In the simple case of only two bidders (n = 1), Ao and A \, the below-average bid method 
is equivalent to the low-bid method and that is because the low bid in this case would be the 
only one below the average and thus would win the project. For this reason, the analysis 
conducted in this chapter assumes contractor Ao faces two or more competitors. 
The above expressions for the event "Contractor Ao wins" can also be rewritten in terms 
of bid-to-cost ratios by dividing all bids by the cost estimate CQ, i.e., by substituting the 
symbol B with the symbol X. For example, 
{A0wins|x0,c0} = { p| (X-xo<X-Xi)n(x0<X)} (5.7) 
x,<x 
in whichX,- = BI/CQ, and X = {x0 +X\ + .. . + Xn)/(n + 1). 
Similarly, the general formula for the probability that contractor Ao wins can be ex-
pressed in a variety of ways, such as: 
P[A0 wins|fc0] = P[ D & < M n (bQ < B)} (5.8) 
Bj<B 
P[A0 wins|x0, co] = P[ p) {Xi < x0} n (x0 < X)] (5.9) 
Xj<X 
On the other hand, and using order statistics, we can express the conditional probability 
that contractor Ao wins, given that the average bid B is between B^ and 5(*+i) as follows: 
P[A0 wins|fc0, ( % < B < B{k+l))} = P[(B{k) <b0< B)\(B{k) <B< B{k+1))} (5.10) 
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P[A0 mns\x0,c0,(X{k)<X<X{k+l))} = P[(X(k) < x0 < X)\(X{k) < X < X{k+i))] (5.11) 
5.2.2 The Case of Two Opponents 
The complexity of determining the probability that contractor AQ wins when using the 
below-average bidding method is illustrated clearly even in the simplest case of facing only 
two opponents, A\ and A2. For AQ to win, given that it has selected a bid-to-cost ratio xo, 
one of the following four compound events (inequalities) must be true: 
xQ<X<X{ <X2 (5.12) 
Xl<x0<X<X2 (5.13) 
x 0 < X < X 2 < A : i (5.14) 
X2<x0<X<Xi (5.15) 
The above events inequalities are expressed below after replacing X with its equivalent 
value (x 0 +Xi+X 2 ) /3 : 
(2x0 < *i + X2) n (x0 + X2 < 2Xi )n(Xi<X2) (5.16) 
106 
^A-fl ^% ^V ^ » -A'l ^ s A - i 
A « ^ * ^V *•* ^ . - I ^«» ^ i 
•T-T ^"» •'Vfl ^"^ «A ^ > •'Vl 
Figure 5.2 Winning Regions Against Two Opponents 
(X, < x0) n (2x0 < Xi + X2) n (x0 +Xi < 2X2) (5.17) 
(2x0 < Xi + X2) n (x0 + Xi < 2X2) n (X2 < Xx) (5.18) 
(X2 < x0) n (2x0 < Xi +X2) n (x0 +X2 < 2X,) (5.19) 
Figure 5.2 shows the values of the opponents' apparent bid-to-cost ratios (xi,X2) that 
are defined by each of the aforementioned four events (5.12), (5.13), (5.14), and (5.15), 
or equivalently, events (5.16), (5.17), (5.18), and (5.19).These inequalities are shown in 
shaded areas and represent the winning regions of Ao's bid-to-cost ratio. 
As stated before, the below-average bidding model is based on Friedman's assumptions 
and hence X\ and X2 are assumed to be iid (independent and identically distributed) with a 
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common probability density function, fx{x), and a common cumulative distribution func-
tion, Fx(x). We can take advantage of symmetry to integrate fx(x) over areas (b) and (a) 
to produce the following probability of winning: 
«o r+°° r+°° r2x\-xo 
P[A0 wms|x0] = 2 fx(xl)[t'x{x2)dx2]dxl+2 fx(xx)[ kx{x2)dx2]dxl (5.20) 
J— °° J2XQ—X\ JXn fx\ 
rxQ /•+«> 
= 2 fx (*i) [1 - FX (2x0 - xi )}dXi + 2 fx (x,) [Fx (2x, - x0) - Fx {xx )}dxx (5.21 ] 
= 2Fx(x0) - (Fx(x0))2-2 fx{x)Fx(2x0-x)dx + 2 fx(x)Fx(2x-x0)dx (5.22) 
As can be seen from the expression reached above, it is necessary to make specific as-
sumptions about fx (x) and evaluate the integrals using numerical techniques in order to 
reach a final expression for the probability of winning given XQ and given two opponents. 
Hence, the solution for any number of opponents n can be achieved much easier using 
simulation as described in the following sections. 
5.3 Determining Winning Regions for xf0 
This section considers a generic project with n standardized apparent bid-to-cost ratios x) 
(/ = 1,.. .,n), and aims at determining the conditions that must be satisfied for XQ to win 
this project. First, we start by computing the average x' of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios x) 
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as follows: 
1 " 1 
x =-Yx'i = -((/i + 1)XQ-XO) (5.23) 
Notice thatx' is different from X'Q, the average of all standardized bid-to-cost ratios, includ-
ing the currently selected value of X'Q. 
*° = "TT E x'' = "XT ^  + n*) (5-24) 
First, we will show that there is no need to consider values of XQ that are higher than 
x
7
 in our analysis because in this case the average of all bids x!Q will be lower than x^ and 
thus AQ would not have any chance to win the project. This is proved through the set of 
inequalities below: 
x
1
 < X'Q => (5.25) 
nx
1
 + X'Q < nx'Q + XQ =>• (5.26) 
nx
1
 +xlQ<{n + \)xlQ => (5.27) 
X'Q < X'Q (5.28) 
We now show that values of X'Q greater than x! produce an average of all bids x!Q that is 
also greater than x'\ 
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X'KX'Q =» (5.29) 
nx! + x' < X'Q + nx1 =» (5.30) 
(n+l)^ <xf0 + nx' => (5.31) 
Jt' < jfo (5.32) 
Then by combining (5.28) and (5.32) we obtain the following: 
x' < X'Q => it < 4 < x'0 (5.33) 
Thus, values of X'Q greater than x1 are of no interest since they are greater than the 
average of all standardized bid-to-cost ratios and hence cannot win. 
On the other hand, reversing the direction of inequalities and following the same line 
of reasoning leads to the important result: 
X'Q < x' => x'Q < X'Q < x' (5.34) 
Note that the condition expressed in (5.34) which requires that X'Q be less than x!, so 
that it may also be less than X'Q, is necessary but not sufficient for X'Q to win the project. In 
order to find the sufficient conditions for X'Q to win, let us sort the standardized bid-to-cost 
ratios x) of the n opponents in ascending order to form the order statistics x|,wx|2w.. •,x/,y 
Clearly, the value of the average x! must be greater than x', j <. and less than x1,-,. However, 
the average X'Q can have any value because it depends also on the selected XQ, and therefore, 
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it can be less than jcj^ or greater than x1,,. 
For the sake of notation, let us assume that the average of the opponents' standardized 
bid-cost-ratios x' lies between order statistics x7,^ and rth+ly 
x(h) < x <x{h+\) (5.35) 
It is clear that any selected value X'Q between x1,^ and x! is certain to win the project 
because from (5.34) we have: 
x'{h) < X'Q < x1 => (5.36) 
x'{h)<x!0<xlQ<x' (5.37) 
Thus, x'0 is closest and less than the average and wins over x1,^ which is the next value 
closest to and less than X'Q. Now (5.36) constitutes one possibility for winning the project 
but it is not the only one. On the contrary, there are several potential winning regions forx^ 
under the below-average bidding method which depend on the location of X'Q and X'Q among 
the order statistics corresponding to the apparent bid-to-cost ratios as shown below. 
Let us now assume that X'Q lies between order statistics x1,-. and ^ir+x\ where x1,-. < x1,^ 
{i.e., r < h). For X'Q to win, it is sufficient that: 
X(r) ^ X0 <*() < X(r+\) (5.38) 
For the rightmost inequality to be true we have: 
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*o <*(,+,) => (5-39) 
( « + l ) 4 < ( / i + l ) y ( | . + 1 ) => (5.40) 
x
/
0 + «x'<y ( ; .+ 1 )+«x / ( r + 1 ) =• (5.41) 
^o<4+1)-"(x'-4+1)) (5.42) 
Combining (5.38) and (5.42) gives the following sufficient condition for x'Q to win the 
project for any r < h: 
Notice that the upper bound of this range is *( r+1\ reduced by n times its difference 
from the sample average £'. Depending on the particular sample values xft, it is possible 
that the region defined by the two bounds in (5.43) may not exist because the upper bound 
may be less than the lower bound, xf,,. In other words, not all intervals between successive 
order statistics xf, <, and xf,.1* may include a subinterval of values where xf0 is guaranteed 
to win the project. 
In the final case where XQ is less than xf,^ the sufficient condition for xf0 to win the 
project is: 
4 < x ' ( 1 ) - n ( x ' - y ( 1 ) ) (5.44) 
Based on the above conducted analysis, we can conclude that there are h + 1 potential 
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regions defined by inequalities (5.37), (5.43), and (5.44) that are sufficient for X'Q to win 
the project. For example, in the case of n = 4, the average x1 may lie in any one of the 3 
intervals between the 4 order statistics, i.e., h = 1,2, or 3. If x! falls in the second region, 
i.e., h = 2, then there will be three potential regions for X'Q defined by inequalities (5.37), 
(5.43), and (5.44) that are sufficient for X'Q to win the project. 
In conclusion, one of the most important observations about the below-average bidding 
method is that for a given sample of apparent bid-to-cost ratios x'l,xl2,... ,x'n, there may be 
several discontinuous regions, i.e., up to h+ 1, that must be examined to find all values of 
X'Q that can win the project. 
5.4 Probability of Winning — Simulation Procedure 
This section presents the simulation procedure that was followed to determine the proba-
bility of winning as a function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio, X'Q based on the above 
winning regions. First, it must noted again that the below-average bidding model as well 
as the other bidding models that will be presented in the coming chapters use the same 
variables, notations and the overall modeling approach as the model for the average bid 
method developed by Ioannou and Leu (1993). 
The steps of the simulation procedure for the below-average bid method are the follow-
ing: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of opponents n. 
Step 2: Initialize the simulation set counter k = 1. 
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3: In simulation set k, sample m vectors x'1jk,x2jk, • •••>^n\k ^ r o m t n e standard 
normal distribution. 
Each vector represents one of the m projects in simulation set k. The n val-
ues in each vector represent the standardized apparent bid-to-cost ratios of 
the n opponents in the j t h project. 
4: For each sampled vector x'i,x'2,...,x'n, 
1. Compute its average x!. 
2. Sort the values x'j, x^,..., jc^ , in increasing order to form the correspond-
C(l)>-*(2)> • • • ' » • ing order statistics j :m,xj 2 ) , . . •,x/,y 
3. Compare x! to x/n),x',2\,- • •,x',n••. to identify h such that x1,^ < x1 < 
^(h+iy 
4. Use inequalities (5.37), (5.43), and (5.44) to identify all regions 
(lr,ur), (r = 0 , 1 , . . .,/z < n) where x/0 could win the project. Each 
region is defined by a lower bound / and an upper bound u such that 
/ < u. If inequalities (5.43) give I > u, then the corresponding region 
does not exist and is ignored. These regions are the only characteristic 
of each simulated project that is needed from now on. 
5: For x^ in the interval (—3,3) using a step of 0.001: 
1. Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values xfQ 
and n for the current simulation set k, Wk(x'0,n) = 0. 
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2. Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set k). 
If x!Q belongs to one of the regions (lr, ur), (r = 0 , 1 , . . . , h < n), then 
project j is won: increase w* (X'Q, n) by 1; otherwise do nothing. Repeat 
this sub-step for all m projects in the current simulation step k. 
3. Compute the ratio Pk(x?0,n) of the total number of projects won 
w/c(x'Q,n) over the total number of projects m within simulation set k: 
,i \ WkixftjU) number of projects won in simulation set k 
Pk\XQ,n) = — — 
m total number of projects in simulation set k 
(5.45) 
This is the kth estimate of the probability of winning at x?0 and n. 
Step 6: If the index k equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 7. 
Otherwise, increase k by 1 and go back to Step 3. 
Step 7: Calculate the final estimate for the probability of winning at xlQ and n by 
averaging p*(-«o,n) over all simulation sets s: 
1 * 
P[Wm\xl0,n] = p{x'0,n) = - £ pk{x'0,n) (5.46) 
It is important to note that the m vectors (projects) within each simulation set k must 
be generated first (Step 3) and then the winning regions for each project should be stored 
(Step 4) before the algorithm loops through all the possible values of X'Q (Step 5). This 
observation applies to all bidding methods modeled in this research. And this is mandatory 
so that in Step 5 the number of projects won at each value of X'Q is determined with all other 
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things being equal. In other words, the n bids submitted for each of the m projects and 
consequently their winning regions should be kept the same while incrementing X'Q over the 
range [-3,3] such that the change in the winning probability is only due to the change in 
X'Q and nothing else. It would be inappropriate to reverse the order of the loops and thus 
to generate a new set of m vectors for each new value of X'Q. This not only increases the 
computational effort and time significantly, it also produces estimates of the probability of 
winning /^(x^n) that jump up and down erratically as X'Q increases from one value to the 
next. Even averaging the estimates of the probability of winning over a large number of 
simulation sets cannot easily rectify this erratic behavior (Ioannou and Aw wad 2009). 
The simulation results for n — 2,4,8, 5 = 1000, and m = 1000 are shown in Figure 5.3 
which also includes the curves for the average and the low-bid methods for the sake of 
comparison. 
5.5 Simulation Results 
This section presents the simulation results for the below-average bid method obtained 
through running the above simulation procedure. The probability of winning for a given 
standardized bid-to-cost ratio X'Q is averaged over 1000 replications and displayed in Fig-
ure 5.3. Then, the graphs in Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 are produced after determining the 
optimum bid-to-cost ratio that maximizes the expected profit. 
The expression for the expected profit v (in dollars) given a particular bid-to-cost ratio, 
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xo, is given by: 
v = p(x>0,n)(xo-\)(c0) (5.47) 
This expression for expected profit cannot be evaluated directly because it depends on 
CQ and requires the bid-to-cost standardized value X'Q in order to determine the winning 
probability. To proceed further, we need to introduce the standardized expected profit v' 
that uses only standardized values: 
v = =p(x0,n) = p{xQ,n)(x0 + mx) (5.48) 
co Ox Ox 
And now based on the above expression, we can determine the optimum standardized 
bid-to-cost ratio x0* which is the value of XQ that maximizes the standardized expected profit 
v' for a given value of the standardized mean m'x. The values used for m'x were chosen in 
the interval (—1,3) using a step of 0.01. For each value of m'x we determined the value x0* 
that maximized the standardized profit v' given a specific number of opponents n. 
Figure 5.4 shows the results for this optimal markup process by depicting X'Q +m'x = 
(x^ — l)/o"x for any standardized mean m'x. Then, Figure 5.5 shows the corresponding 
standardized profit E\V*]/(CQGX) and Figure 5.6 shows the corresponding probability of 
winning P[Win|x0*, n]. Note that all four nomograms include the results for the average and 
the low-bid method in order to compare the three bidding methods. 
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5.6 Example Application 
This section uses a numerical example to illustrate how a contractor can determine its op-
timum markup using Figure 5.4 and given a particular bidding method used for awarding 
the new project. 
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are samples of Ao's bidding history grouped by bidding method 
and correspond to the low bid method, the average bid method and the below average bid 
method respectively. Each table contains information about all the previous projects Ao 
bid on under the corresponding bid-awarding method, whether he ended up as the winner 
or not. For each past project, the tables include Ao's estimated cost CQ, and the bid values 
submitted by all opponents. Indeed, previous bidding data can also be grouped by type of 
project (highways, bridges, tunnels, buildings, etc.) or by particular opponents if the con-
tractor tends to bid against the same opponents. Also, there could be additional groupings 
if enough data are available. 
Before bidding on a new project, a contractor needs to determine the standardized mean 
m'x, which requires him to determine the estimates mx and ax for the mean and variance 
of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios that correspond to the previous projects awarded through 
the same bidding method as the new project that Ao is going to bid on. For that purpose the 
following equations are used: 
mx = -*—„ (5.49) 
120 
e\ = J '-}, (5.50) 
hj=\nj 
The historical bid-to-cost ratios are given by Xy = BJJ/CQJ, where, for each past project 
j , Bjj is the bid submitted by the ith contractor, CQJ is the estimated cost for contractor A0, 
and rij is the number of competitors facing AQ. N is the total number of past projects for 
which the above data is available. 
The data from Table 5.1 indicate that for eight projects awarded through the low bid 
method, the estimated values for the mean and standard deviation of apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios are mx = 1.039 and ax = 0.098. Accordingly, the standardized mean is equal to: 
m'x = (1.039 — l)/0.098 = 0.397. This value is used as the entry point to read the nomo-
gram in Figure 5.4. Assuming AQ is bidding against four opponents (n = 4) under a low-bid 
tendering scenario, the corresponding standardized optimum bid-to-cost ratio is equal to 
(XQ-1)/OX = 0.32, which for ax = 0.098 gives the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ = 1.031, 
or a markup of 3.1%. 
If the average bid method is used instead, we obtain mx = 1.146 and Ox = 0.118 
based on data from Table 5.2 that shows six previous projects awarded through the average 
bidding method. This results in m'x — 1.237 which, according to Figure 5.4, indicates a 
standardized bid-to-cost ratio equal to 1.45 for n = 4. Given 0"x = 0.118, AQ should use an 
optimum bid-to-cost ratio equal toxg = 1.171, or a markup of 17.1%. 
If the below-average bid method is rather used, Ao would consider the values from Ta-
ble 5.3 that shows another six projects awarded through this method. The estimates for 
the mean and variance obtained from this table are mx — 1.108 and o~x = 0.12, and con-
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Previous Bidding Data ~ Low Bid Method 
Project 
J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A0's estimated 
cost, coj ($1,000) 
50,546 
86,570 
150,542 
106,349 
96,230 
125,300 
90,395 
57,639 
Opponents' Bids, Bij ($1,000) 
B,j B2j B3j B4j Bsj 
53,073 
69,256 
155,058 
111,666 
103,928 
106,505 
99,435 
61,674 
52,062 
77,913 
159,575 
107,412 
102,966 
111,517 
97,627 
59,945 
48,019 
99,556 
162,585 
94,651 
105,853 
122,794 
103,954 
63,403 
51,051 
95,227 
108,474 
97,824 
106,666 
Table 5.1 AQ'S Bidding History for the Low Bid Method 
Previous Bidding Data - Average Bid Method 
Project 
J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A„'s estimated 
cost, coj ($1,000) 
46,798 
110,452 
65,759 
64,035 
86,420 
109,492 
Opponents' Bids, Bij ($1,000) 
B,j B2j B3j B4j B5j 
51,478 
114,870 
78,911 
65,956 
96,790 
131,390 
50,542 
99,407 
88,775 
73,640 
116,667 
129,201 
52,414 
108,243 
108,025 
134,675 
58,498 
115,975 
55,690 
Table 5.2 Ao's Bidding History for the Average Bid Method 
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Previous Bidding Data -- Below Average Bid Method 
Project 
J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A0's estimated 
cost, COJ ($1,000) 
100,657 
145,320 
45,653 
134,632 
69,242 
89,965 
Opponents' Bids, Bij ($1,000) 
Bij B2j B3j B4j B5j 
120,788 
167,118 
50,218 
130,593 
76,166 
85,467 
125,821 
142,414 
46,566 
148,095 
78,936 
103,460 
130,854 
159,852 
41,088 
175,022 
174,384 
43,370 
161,558 
Table 5.3 Ao's Bidding History for the Below-Average Bid Method 
sequently m'x = 0.9. Then, based on Figure 5.4 and given n = 4, this corresponds to a 
standardized bid-to-cost ratio equal to 0.87 and hence to XQ = 1.104, or a markup of 10.4%. 
Last, we will use the below-average bid method scenario to illustrate the use of the other 
three nomograms shown in the previous section. If we observe through Figure 5.5 the value 
corresponding to the standardized mean m'x = 0.9 we see that the expected profit at the 
optimum markup is E[V*} = 0.26oxco = 0.0312c0 which is equivalent to 3.12% of the esti-
mated cost. Also, we can use Figure 5.6 to obtain the probability of winning corresponding 
to the optimum markup of 1.104, and that is equal to P[Wm\xQ,m'x,n] = 0.305. Notice that 
the same probability can also be obtained from Figure 5.3 for XQ = (1.104 — 1.108)/0.12 = 
-0.033. 
5.7 Comparison of Bidding Methods 
It is clear from the results shown in Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, that the bidding models 
for the below-average, average, and low-bid methods are significantly different from each 
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other. This section compares the characteristics of the three bidding methods through the 
following four aspects: 
5.7.1 Probability of Winning 
The first difference between the three bidding methods is reflected in Figure 5.3 which 
shows the probability of winning in function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio XQ and 
given a number of opponents n. As shown and discussed in the previous chapter, the low 
bid method curves are asymmetrical and approach 1.0 as x^ decreases irrespective of the 
number of opponents. On the contrary, the curves for the average bid method are sym-
metrical around x^ = 0, with a maximum at x^ = 0 for any number of opponents n. This 
maximum probability of winning does not exceed 50% and this value occurs only when 
n = 2. On the other hand, the below-average bid method curves show a different behavior 
from the low and average bid method curves. 
The curves for 4 and 8 opponents are not far from symmetrical and bell-shaped like the 
curves for the average bid method. Additionally, the curves for the same number of oppo-
nents are shifted to the left of the corresponding curves for the average bid method because 
now the winning bid cannot be greater than the average. The main characteristic of those 
curves which is also the main difference with the average bid method curves is that the left 
tail of these curves rises as XQ decreases. Clearly, the tendency of the left tail to rise is most 
pronounced for n — 2 where the curve increases monotonically as x^ decreases, however 
this trend becomes less obvious as the number of opponents increases to n = 4 and then to 
n = S. 
This left-tail behavior reflects the characteristic of the below-average bidding method 
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that was described in the previous section where a contractor can win the project by sub-
mitting a bid that is so low such that it lowers the average of the n opponents' bids to form 
a new average over n + 1 values that is less than all the other n competing bids. When a 
contractor submits such a low bid, it essentially pulls the average of the opponents' bids 
towards it, to form a new average that lies below all the other bids and wins the job. This 
possibility was described by inequality (5.44). Moreover, the winning regions described by 
inequalities (5.43) contribute to this behavior, too, and help raise the left tail of the prob-
ability of winning. The left tail is more raised as the number of opponents decreases and 
that is logical since the effect of a single bid on the bids' average is most pronounced when 
the number of opponents is small (n — 2) and this influence decreases as the number of 
opponents increases. 
We can conclude with the observation that the probability of winning for the below-
average bidding method combines the characteristics of the average bid method with those 
of the low-bid method. The characteristics of the average bid method dominate for large n 
and middle and large values of X'Q, whereas the characteristics of the low-bid method come 
into play for small n and small values of x!Q. 
5.7.2 Optimum Bid-to-Cost Ratio 
In this section, we analyze the observations from Figure 5.4 which shows the optimum bid-
to-cost ratio given by (XQ — l)/<Jx as a function of the standardized mean m'x. Similarly to 
the curves for the low and the average bid methods, the below-average bid method curves 
also rise monotonically as m'x increases. This is as expected, because, as the mean of the 
opponents' bids increases, so should the optimal markup for contractor AQ. 
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Given the same number of opponents n, the curves for the below-average bid method 
are above those for the low-bid method and below the average bid method ones. Again, 
this is expected, because, other things being equal, the average bid method should lead to 
the largest optimal bid-to-cost ratios and the low-bid-method to the smallest. The below-
average method produces optimal bid-to-cost ratios that are in between. 
Another main observation about Figure 5.4 is that in contrary to the low and average 
bid method curves, the below-average bid method curves corresponding to different values 
for the number of opponents n cross each other at around m'x = 1.25 and reverse their or-
der. For values of the standardized mean mx < 1.25, the curves for the below-average bid 
method appear in the same order and behave like those for the other two methods. That 
is, for a given standardized mean m'x, the optimum bid-to-cost ratio, XQ, decreases as the 
number of opponents, n, increases. However, for values m'x > 1.25, the opposite is true and 
the optimum bid-to-cost ratio, XQ, decreases as the number of opponents, n, decreases. 
The reason for this surprising behavior is rooted in the shape of the probability of 
winning for the below-average bid method shown in Figure 5.3. A large value for the 
standardized mean m'x implies that the standard deviation of the opponents' apparent bid-
to-cost ratios, ax, is small, and this implies that the opponents' bids are likely to be 
clustered closely around their mean mx- The smaller the number of opponents, n, and the 
more their bids are clustered together, the easier it is for contractor Ao to win by submitting 
a low bid that pulls the average below the bids of its opponents. As the number of oppo-
nents becomes large, it becomes difficult for a single bid to have a substantial effect and 
lower the average of all bids significantly. Thus, for large n, the best strategy for contractor 
AQ is to select a higher bid-to-cost ratio, XQ, but still stay below the opponents' mean, mx. 
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This behavior is expected based on common sense and was predicted in (Ioannou and Leu 
1993). 
Figure 5.4 also includes a 45° straight line through the origin labeled n = <» which has 
the points that satisfy the equality XQ = mx- As shown in this figure and as explained in the 
previous chapter, the average bid method curves approach the 45° straight line from above 
as the number of opponents n increases and as m'x takes larger values. Similarly, the curves 
for the below-average method also approach the 45° straight line but from below. Thus, for 
both methods, as the number of opponents, n, becomes very large, a contractor should se-
lect an optimum bid-to-cost ratio, XQ, close to the mean of its opponents' bid-to-cost ratios, 
mx. That is because as the competition increases and as the variance in the opposing bids 
decreases, i.e., as they get closely clustered around the mean, a contractor has to bid very 
close to the bids' mean in order to increase its chance of winning. And the fact that the 
below-average bid method requires the winning bid to be below the average bid explains 
why the corresponding curves approach the 45° straight line from below. 
On the other hand, Figure 5.4 shows that for small values of the standardized mean m'x, 
the curves for all three bidding methods including the low-bid method, call for bid-to-cost 
ratios that are greater than the mean mx- That is because small values of m'x, and in par-
ticular m'x < 0, imply that the mean of the opponents' bid-to-cost ratios must be mx < 1, 
i.e., the mean for the opponents' bids is expected to be lower than Ao's estimated cost for 
the project. In this case, it would be unwise for contractor AQ to select a bid-to-cost ratio, 
XQ < 1 (i.e., bid below cost), and should select a bid-to-cost ratio XQ > mx, or equivalently, 
should select a value X'Q* > 0. That is because contractors are better off bidding higher than 
their estimated cost even if it is at the expense of a lower winning probability than to bid 
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lower than their estimated cost and risk losing money after winning the job. This is the 
reason why, for small values of m'x, the curves for the below-average bidding method as 
well as those for the average and the low bid methods have to be above the diagonal. 
5.7.3 Maximum Expected Profit 
Figure 5.5 shows the maximum expected standardized profit as a function of the standard-
ized mean, m'x. The first observation about this figure is that for the same number of 
opponents, n, the expected profit for the below-average bid method is always less than that 
for the average bid method. This is expected and can be implied from Figures 5.3 and 5.4 
which showed that the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ for the average bid method is always 
greater than for the below-average bid method, as is the probability of winning for most 
of that region. This explains why on the basis of profit, the average bid method might be 
favored by contractors over the below-average bid method while the opposite might be true 
from an owner's perspective. 
However, the expected profit for the below-average and the low-bid methods behave 
differently. In fact, the expected profit for the below-average bid method is greater than that 
for the low-bid method for mx < 2, however, the opposite holds for larger values of m'x. 
This is because large values of m'x imply a small standard deviation Gx, which means that 
the opposing bids are clustered together around the mean, which results in higher winning 
probability under the low-bid method. This behavior is shown clearly in Figure 5.6 where 
for large values of m'x the probability of winning is greatest under the low-bid method. 
The last observation about Figure 5.5 is that as the number of opponents n increases, 
the optimum expected profit for all three bidding methods approaches zero. But this does 
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not mean that the owner should expect to sign a contract at cost. For the below-average 
and the average bid methods the expected profit approaches zero because the probability 
of winning does so while the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ approaches the mean mx- This 
implies that average-based bidding methods have the advantage that the owner can still 
expect a fair bid price and the contractor can make a reasonable profit even with a large 
number of competing bids. However, this is not the case for the low-bid method where 
both the probability of winning and the optimum markup approach zero as the number of 
opponents increases, which leaves the contractor with a difficult task of performing the 
work at a profit. 
5.7.4 Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup 
Figure 5.6 shows the probability of winning at the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ as a func-
tion of m'x. For small values m'x this probability is largest for the average bid method, 
whereas for high values m'x it is largest for the low-bid method. This is again as expected 
because small values of m'x imply a large variance, which favors winning under the aver-
age bid method, whereas large values of m'x imply a small variance, which makes it easy 
to underbid all opponents when using the low-bid method. 
At the optimum, the probability of winning under the below-average bid method is al-
most always less than for the average bid method except for large values of m'x when n = 2. 
If we look at Figure 5.3, we notice that the probability of winning for the below-average 
bid method is higher than that for the average bid method when X!Q takes negative values. 
This reduces the corresponding standardized bid-to-cost ratio xl0 + m'x and hence reduces 
the standardized profit that would be realized if the project is won. Hence, this reduced 
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standardized profit needs to be multiplied by a large probability of winning in order for the 
reduced standardized markup (x?0 + m'x) to be optimal. This happens only for negative val-
ues of X'Q and given two opponents. This is because a negative x'Q means that AQ is bidding 
lower than the mean and as xfQ takes lower negative values, it implies that xo is becoming 
further lower than m\ or that o"x is taking lower values. In such cases, and given two op-
ponents, Ao has a higher winning probability by underbidding the two opposing bids and 
bringing the overall bids' average below them. This explains why for n = 2 and for large 
values of m'x, the winning probability at the optimum markup under the below-average bid 
method is higher than that for the average bid method. 
5.8 Conclusion 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the basic advantage of the average bid method is that 
it protects owners against bidders who might deliberately submit unrealistically low bid 
prices that usually lead to delays, cost overruns and disputes between the different involved 
parties. Similarly, contractors are protected from having to compete with such opponents. 
The basic drawback of the average bid method is that it does not necessarily promote 
price competition that leads to lower costs for the owner. This means that a technological 
or managerial breakthrough that results in major cost savings for contractors help them 
achieve higher profits however these innovative technologies only get passed on to owners 
in the form of lower prices, if they are available to all bidders. 
The below-average bid method shares some of the advantages and drawbacks of both 
the average and the low bid method. It has the advantage that as the number of competitors 
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increases, the owner should expect to sign a contract for a price a little below the average 
and be protected from an unrealistically low bid price. Moreover, since the optimum bid-
to-cost ratio is below the mean, it induces more competition than the average bid method, 
and thus helps limit bid price creep over time as will be shown in the stability analysis 
conducted in Chapter 11 of this thesis. 
However, for projects with a relatively small number of competitors, the below-average 
bid method shares the same drawback as the low bid method in that it allows a deliberately 
or accidentally very low bid price to win the project. This possibility is even more proba-
ble for low-risk projects where the opponents' apparent bid-to-cost variance is small which 
makes it easier to underbid the opposing bids in a way to bring the average underneath 
them. On the flip side, in the case of projects with large bid-to-cost variance caused by 
significant differences in technological or managerial development among the competitors, 
the below-average bid method has the drawback of the average bid method in that it cannot 
recognize the superior ability of just a few of the competitors. 
Similarly to the average bid method, the below-average one does not discourage inno-
vation, technology development, and cost reduction. Such savings imply higher profits for 
contractors and lower bid prices for owners on the long-run. 
Although attractive, both average-based bidding methods share a main disadvantage 
with the low bid method which is the possibility of collusion among bidders which can 
be intensified in the absence of prequalification and enhanced contractor selection proce-
dures. For example, some contractors try to dominate and share the market by coordinating 
their bids for the same projects in a way to control the process outcome and divide these 
projects among themselves. Another collusive practice can happen through forming sev-
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eral dummy construction companies who submit bid prices that are very close to each other 
and thus pull the overall average towards their own price. If a dummy company wins, it 
simply passes the entire project to the affiliated parent contractor. Or, if this is not possible, 
dummy companies submit very low and very high prices so that their average is close to the 
price of the parent contractor. Here, we should note that there has been some effort by gov-
ernment procuring agencies to limit such practices through prequalifying all competitors, 
requiring a list of major subcontractors to be submitted along with each bid, and requiring 
that contractors supply performance and payment bonds. 
Another alternative that might help limit the aforementioned collusive practices is to 
eliminate the lowest and highest bids before computing the average of the remaining bids. 
In this case, the winner will be defined as the bid closest to, but below the average com-
puted after excluding the extreme bids. For instance, Italy and Peru eliminate the lowest 
and highest 10% of the submitted bids before determining the average. The advantage of 
this approach is that it makes it impossible for a bid that is extremely low to win. Similarly, 
it prevents a bid that is much higher than the other bids to affect the outcome of the com-
petitive process. This variation can also be applied to the average bid method where the 
winner will be defined similarly as the closest bid to the average obtained after excluding 
the two extreme bids. The next chapter models and studies these interesting variants of 
both average and below-average bidding methods. 
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Chapter 6 
Truncated Average-Based Bidding 
Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
Average-based bidding methods allow a contractor's bid to have a greater impact on the 
project's winner identity. To benefit from this fact, some contractors might affiliate to-
gether and bid extremely high or low bids in order to pull the average to their side and win 
the project. Therefore, some owners might prefer excluding the lowest and highest submit-
ted bids before determining the bid average and awarding the project. Another alternative 
is to exclude the highest and lowest ten percent of the bids (or any other percentage value). 
This chapter will apply the former alternative to the average and the below-average bidding 
methods. 
Excluding the lowest and highest bids prior to determining the average is especially 
helpful in the case of the below-average bid method because it will prevent a contractor 
from winning a job through submitting a very low bid that can pull the average below all 
opponents' bids. 
Figure 6.1 shows two bidding examples to illustrate this process. Part (a) shows five 
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Figure 6.1 Examples of Average Bid Methods without Extreme Bids 
contractors bidding on the same project with the following bids: 80, 87, 90, 92 and 115. 
Note that the highest bid is significantly higher than the other four bids which are relatively 
close to each other. And hence, this high bid at 115 pulls the average of the submitted bids, 
equal to 92.8, to its side. The winner according to the average bid and the below-average 
bid methods is the bid at 92. However, if the two extreme bids, 80 and 115, are excluded 
beforehand, the average comes down to 89.67. And in this case the winners under both 
average-based bidding methods change. The bid at 90 is now the winner under the average 
bid method since it is the closest bid to the average, and on the other hand, the bid at 87 
becomes the winner under the below-average bid method since it falls directly below the 
new average. 
The conclusion from this example is that excluding the highest and lowest bids for 
average-based bidding methods can affect the outcome of the bidding process especially 
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if the extreme bids are far away from the remaining ones. Part (b) of Figure 6.1 shows 
another set of five contractors bidding on a project but now with the lowest bid being much 
lower than the other ones. The bid values are 70, 105, 109, 115, and 120. The average is 
equal to 103.8. This shows how such a low bid at 70 can bring the average down below all 
opponents' bids. This is beneficial to the low bid contractor when the below-average bid 
method is used since it allows the bid at 70 to be the winner. In the case of the average 
bid method, the bid at 105 is the closest to the average and hence, is the winner. However, 
if the lowest (70) and highest (120) bids were excluded, the average of the remaining bids 
would go up to 109.67. This would make the bid at 109 the winner under both average bid 
methods. 
This example illustrates the advantage of excluding extreme bids for both average bid 
methods. For instance, if the below-average bid method is used, a contractor might submit 
a very low bid in order to bring the average below all other bids and consequently win the 
project. Excluding the lowest and highest submitted bids is particularly helpful in this case 
because it prevents such a behavior. 
This chapter models and studies both the average and below-average bid methods where 
the bids' mean is determined after excluding the lowest and highest submitted bids. Monte 
Carlo simulation approach is used to model both variants of the average bidding methods. 
Then, the obtained results are presented to show the effect of excluding the highest and low-
est bids on a contractor's probability of winning, optimum markup and maximum profit. 
The simulation results for the average bid method without extreme bids are presented in 
four nomograms along with those for the average bid method to allow comparison. Sim-
ilarly, the simulation graphs for the below-average bid method with and without extreme 
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bids are presented together to study the difference. 
6.2 Truncated Average Bid Method 
6.2.1 Mathematical Formulation 
This variant of the average bid method awards the project to the contractor whose bid is 
closest to the average of all submitted bids, determined after excluding the lowest and high-
est ones. As defined in the previous chapters, B\,B2,...,Bn are the random variables that 
represent the bids submitted by n opponents. Additionally, B/^,B(2), • • • >#(«) were defined 
as the corresponding order statistics where B^ is the low bid submitted by the opponents 
and 5(n) is the high bid. Let BT be the average of all bids, determined after excluding the 
lowest and highest ones. BT includes Ao's bid, bo,. Hence, the formerly defined expression 
for the event "Contractor AQ wins" under the average bid method is now modified to reflect 
the exclusion of extreme bids: 
n 
{A0wins|fco} = { n ( l f e o - 5 r | < | f i , - - f i r | ) } (6.1) 
Consequently, the general probability of winning under the truncated average bid 
method can be expressed as follows: 
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P[A0wms\b0} = P[f](\b0-BT\<\Bi-BT\)} (6.2) 
( = 1 
n 
P[A0wins|xo,c0] = P[f](\x0-XT\<\Xi-XT\)] (6.3) 
( = 1 
where 
Bi 
Xi = - (6.4) 
and 
(x0 + Xl + ...+Xn)-mm(Xw,xo)-max(X{n),x0) 
XT = : (6-5) 
n— 1 
For n < 4 
The above expression for the winning probability does not apply to the case of only two 
bidders (Ao and A \) or equivalently n — 1, since they will be excluded for being the extreme 
bids and hence there will be no remaining bid to win the project. 
As for the case of three bidders including Ao (n = 2), the above expression applies 
but this case is identical to the regular average bid method for n = 2, since both scenarios 
require Ao to bid between the two opponents' bids in order to win the project. 
On the other hand, this aforementioned expression for the winning probability does not 
hold for the case of a total number of four bidders (n = 3) because in such a case, the 
average after excluding the two extreme bids is at equal distance from the remaining two 
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bids and hence there is a tie. In this situation, there are different alternatives that can be 
followed to define the project winner. One option is to have a random selection between 
the two remaining bidders or to choose between the two candidates based on some criteria 
other than price. Another option is to choose the bid that is higher than the determined 
average. Similarly, a third option is to define the bid that is lower than the average as the 
winning one, and that is the alternative that was adopted in this chapter. 
For n > 4 
The probability of winning has a closed-form solution only in the case of four opponents 
(n = 4). That is because after excluding the two extreme bids, AQ has to bid between the 
two remaining bids in order to be closest to the average and win the project. This means 
that bo has to be higher than two of the bids and lower than the remaining two. Similarly, 
XQ has to fall at the middle of the opponents' X,. This is identical to the winning condition 
for n — 4 under a median bid method. Note that under Friedman's assumptions, X, are in-
dependent and identically distributed with a common probability density function, fx{xt), 
and a common cumulative distribution function, Fx(xf). Hence, in the case of four oppo-
nents, the probability of winning under the average bid method without extreme bids can 
be expressed as follows: 
P[Aowms\xo,c0] = 2&[Fx(xo)]2[l-Fx(xo)]2 (6.6) 
/>[i4owins|jto,c0] = 6[Fx(xo)}2[l-Fx{xo)}2 (6.7) 
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However, for n > 4, determining a closed-form expression for the probability of win-
ning becomes a tedious task that requires complex numerical integrations and therefore 
analyzing the bidding method through simulation is a much easier approach. 
6.2.2 Probability of Winning — Simulation Procedure 
This section describes the simulation procedure followed to model the truncated average 
bid method. Below, we describe the algorithm steps followed to determine the probability 
of winning as a function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio x^: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of opponents n. 
Step 2: Initialize the simulation set counter k=\. 
Step 3: In simulation set k, sample m vectors x!x jk,^2jv • • •>-*/!/* ^ r o m t n e s tandard 
normal distribution. Each vector represents one of the m projects in simula-
tion set k. The n values in each vector represent the standardized apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios of the n opponents in the j ' h project. 
Step 4: For x!0 in the interval (—3,3) using a step of 0.001: 
1. Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values X'Q 
and n for the current simulation set k, Wk{^Q,n) = 0. 
2. For each project j out of the m projects in simulation set k: 
(a) Sort the values x^,Xj ,x!2i • • • >•*« m increasing order to form the cor-
responding order statistics xl,lyX/,2yx',3y.. .,x/,+ly 
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(b) Compute x!TQ which is the bid average after excluding the lowest 
and highest bids, i.e., x1,^ and tin+i\ respectively. Note that there 
are (n+1) order statistics because Ao's standardized bid-to-cost ra-
tio is included too. 
(c) Compare x'T0 to -Xfn,*^,• • -,x'tn+\\ to identify h such as xf. (*) < 
XT0 <•*( / ,+ !)• 
IS (d) If \x'0~x'T0\ = mm(\x'(h) -x'T0\, |xjfc+1) -x!T0\), then project j i 
won: increase w^(j^,n) by 1; otherwise do nothing. 
3. Compute the ratio Pk(x?Q,n) of the total number of projects won 
Wfc(^ ), n) over the total number of projects m within simulation set k: 
m 
This is the Uh estimate of the probability of winning at x'0 and n. 
Step 5: If the index k equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 6. 
Otherwise, increase k by 1 and go back to Step 3. 
Step 6: Calculate the final estimate for the probability of winning at x>0 and n by 
averaging pki^n) over all simulation sets s: 
1 s 
P[Win|xo,n] = p(x'0,n) = - ]T pk(x'0,n) (6.9) 
140 
The results obtained from running the above described simulation algorithm are pre-
sented and discussed in the next section. The code was executed for 1000 simulation sets, 
each consisting of 1000 projects. The assigned values for the number of opponents n, are 
2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. 
6.2.3 Comparison of Simulation Results 
This section studies the differences and similarities between the regular average bid method 
and the average bid method after excluding the extreme bids. 
First, we start with Figure 6.2 which shows the probability of winning corresponding 
to a given standardized bid-to-cost ratio x'Q. As expected, the curves for the average bid 
method for n > 4 remain symmetrical around x!Q — 0 even after excluding the extreme bids. 
Note that the curves for both methods for n — 2 are identical and that is expected because 
in order to win under the truncated average bid method, AQ has to bid between its two com-
petitors which is the same requirement for winning under the regular average bid method. 
For the case of three opponents (n = 3), we defined the winning bid under the truncated 
average bid method as the bid that is lower and closest to the average. Therefore, the cor-
responding curve is shifted to the left of the curve for the average bid method. In fact, the 
curve for n = 3 under the truncated average bid method is identical to the curve for n = 3 
under a median bid method since both require XQ to rank as the second lowest bid in order 
to win the project. 
For n > 4, Figure 6.2 shows that excluding the lowest and highest bids under an aver-
age bid method leads to a slightly lower winning probability around x*Q = 0, i.e., XQ = mx-
However, the truncated average bid method curves show a slightly higher winning prob-
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ability as xlQ moves away from 0, i.e., as XQ takes lower or higher values than mx- This 
is a reasonable observation because as the extreme bids are removed from the sample of 
submitted bids, the updated average deviates further from the estimated bids' mean mx 
which is based on historical data. Therefore, when a contractor bids closer to the mean, 
i.e., XQ — mx, he has a higher chance of winning under the average bid method and as he 
bids farther from the mean he has a higher chance to win under the truncated average bid 
method. That is because after the elimination of the low and high bids, the size of the 
sample of bid-to-cost ratios decreases and hence there is a higher probability for the bids' 
average to be lower or higher than mx • This means that as XQ moves away from mx in both 
directions, it has a higher chance to be closer to the average under a truncated average bid 
method and therefore it has a higher winning probability than under a regular average bid 
method. 
As the number of opponents increases the difference between the two curves becomes 
almost invisible. For instance, for n = 8, the curve for the average bid method without 
extreme bids is almost identical to that for the regular average bid method except for a very 
slight difference around XQ = 0. This is a common-sense observation because as the number 
of opponents increases, the effect of a contractor's bid on the average of the submitted bids 
decreases. And hence, excluding the lowest and highest bids does not lead to a significant 
difference in the winning probability. 
Secondly, we consider Figure 6.3 which shows the optimum bid-to-cost ratio given by 
(XQ — l)/o"x as a function of the standardized mean m'x. As expected, the curves for both 
methods match for the case of n = 2. As for n = 3, the average bid method curve indicates 
a higher optimum markup than the truncated average bid method and that is due to our 
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definition of the winning bid in this case. In other words, since the winner is defined as the 
one who bids closer and lower than the average for a truncated average bid method with 
n = 3, it is expected that the optimum bid-to-cost ratio will be lower than the mean mx in 
this case. 
On the other hand, for n > 4, the curves for both average bid methods with or without 
extreme bids are almost identical. Particularly for n = 4, excluding the lowest and highest 
bids leads to a slightly higher optimum bid-to-cost ratio for small m'x, but as m'x increases, 
i.e., as the bids' variance decreases, the two curves converge. That is because with a small 
number of opponents and a high variance in the bids' values, excluding the extreme bids 
results in a higher chance for the average of the remaining bids to be farther from mx which 
gives Ao more opportunity for adopting a higher markup. However, as Ox takes smaller val-
ues, the bids get closely clustered around the mean mx, and thus excluding the lowest and 
highest bids has a minimal effect on the bids' average and consequently on the optimum 
bid-to-cost ratio. Moreover, as the number of opponents n increases, the curves for both 
bidding methods match almost perfectly. This is expected since a high number of submitted 
bids lessens the impact of each on the bids' average and hence excluding the extreme bids 
in such a case does not change Ao's optimum bid-to-cost ratio. Additionally, note that the 
truncated average bid method generally follows the same trend as the regular average bid 
method in that the optimum bid-to-cost ratio approaches mx as the number of opponents 
increases. 
Thirdly, we shall move to Figure 6.4 which depicts the maximum expected standardized 
profit as a function of the standardized mean m'x. Again, the curves for n = 2 are identi-
cal for both methods. For the case of three opponents, the average bid method indicates 
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a higher expected profit than the truncated version of the method and that is because the 
optimum markup is higher as observed in Figure 6.3. Then, if we consider the curves cor-
responding to n > 4, the truncated average bid method indicates a slightly lower expected 
profit than the regular average bid method and that is observed mainly for high values of 
m'x. Since the optimum bid-to-cost ratio is almost the same for the average bid method 
with or without extreme bids, the difference in the maximum expected profit can then be 
attributed to the difference in winning probability between both methods which is shown 
in Figure 6.5. As stated previously, a large value of m'x indicates that the opponents' bids 
have a small variance and thus, they are closely clustered around the mean mx. This means 
that AQ has to bid close enough to mx in order to win the project, which implies a lower 
winning probability for the truncated average bid method as shown in Figure 6.2 around 
x*0 = 0. This explains why excluding the lowest and highest bids under an average bid 
method leads to slightly lower standardized expected profits. 
Last, we consider Figure 6.5 which shows the probability of winning at the optimum 
markup versus the standardized mean of apparent bid-to-cost ratios m'x. As observed in the 
former three figures, the curves for n — 2 match for both methods. As for n = 3, the average 
bid method indicates a higher winning probability for small m'x but the opposite is true as 
m'x takes larger values. This shift in behavior is due to the fact that as m'x increases , the op-
timum markup goes below mx for a truncated average bid method which provides AQ with a 
winning probability that is higher than that under a regular average bid method. Then, if we 
consider the curves corresponding to n > 4, we observe that both bidding methods indicate 
the same probability of winning for negative values of m'x, however the truncated average 
bid method shows a slightly lower winning probability as m'x takes positive values. That is 
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expected because according to Figure 6.3, both methods indicate an optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio that is close to mx for larger values of m'x or equivalently smaller values of Ox- And 
based on Figure 6.2, the truncated average bid method depicts a lower winning probability 
than the average bid method in the region whereXQ approaches mx-
6.3 Truncated Below-Average Bid Method 
6.3.1 Mathematical Formulation 
This section studies the variant of the below-average bid method which eliminates the low-
est and highest submitted bids, and then awards the project to the contractor whose bid 
is closest to but lower than the average of the remaining bids. As previously defined, Bj 
is a random variable that represents the average of all submitted bids, determined after 
excluding the lowest and highest ones. Bj includes Ao's bid, bo, unless it is one of the 
extreme bids. Under this variant of the below-average bid method, Ao has to satisfy two 
requirements in order to win the project: 1) bid higher than the low bid submitted by the 
opponents, and 2) bid lower but closest to the average, Bj. To reflect the additional con-
dition for Ao to win, the formerly defined expression for the event "Contractor AQ wins" 
under the below-average bid method should be modified as follows: 
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{A0wins|60} = { D (BT-b0<BT-Bi)n(bo<BT)} (6.10) 
Bi<BT 
= { f | (Bi<b0)r\(b0<BT)} (6.11) 
Bj<BT 
= { f| \{Bi < bo) U (BT < Bi)] n (bo < BT)} (6.12) 
AllB; 
= {{\[{Bw<bQ<BT<Bi)U{Bi<b0<BT)\} (6.13) 
AUBi 
= { n [ ( ^ o - f i « ) ( 5 r - i ? « ) > 0 ] n ( f l ( 1 ) < f c o < 5 r ) } (6.14) 
AUBi 
The above expressions for the event "Contractor Ao wins" can also be rewritten in terms 
of bid-to-cost ratios by dividing all bids by the cost estimate CQ, i.e., by substituting the 
symbol B with the symbol X: 
{A0 wins|xo,co} = { 0 [(xo-Xi){XT -Xfi > 0] n(X (1 ) <x0< XT)} (6.15) 
AUXi 
where 
Xi = — (6.16) 
and 
(xo+X1 + ...+Xn)-mm(X{1),x0)-max(X{n),xo) 
xT = (o.i/) 
n—\ 
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The above set of expressions for the event "Contractor AQ wins" can be substituted 
with only one expression that involves the use of order statistics. As previously defined, 
f?(i),fl(2),. • •>#(„) are random variables that represent the order statistics corresponding to 
the submitted bids Bt, and are defined by sorting the values of B\,B2, • • .,Bn in increasing 
order. The conditional event that contractor Ao wins, given that the bids' average Bj is 
between order statistics B^ and 5(*+i) can be expressed as follows: 
{Ao w i n s | M % ) < BT < % H ) ) } = {{B{k) < b0 <BT)\(B{k) <BT <B{M))} (6.18) 
{A0 wins|x0,c0, (X{k) <XT< X{k+l))} = {{X{k) <x0< XT)\(X{k) <XT< X{k+l))} 
(6.19) 
Note that the above two expressions are the same as those defined for the regular below-
average bid method, i.e, the one without excluding the lowest and highest submitted bids. 
Based on the aforementioned, the general formula for the winning probability of con-
tractor Ao under the truncated below-average bid method can be expressed in a variety of 
ways, such as: 
P[A0 wins|&o] = /»[ f l (*' < bo)n (B(i) < bo < &)} ( 6" 2 0 ) 
Bi<BT 
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P[A0 wins|x0lc0] = P[ f j (X; < x0) n (X(1) < JC0 < * r ) ] (6.21) 
X,<XT 
P[A0 wins|&o, ( % < BT < B{k+1))} = P[(B{k) <b0< BT)\{B{k) <BT< B{k+l))\ (6.22) 
P[A0 wms\xo,c0,(X{k)<XT<X{k+l))}=P[{X{k)<xo<XT)\{X{k)<XT<X{k+l))} 
(6.23) 
Less than Five Competitors (n < 4) 
The below-average bid method without extreme bids does not apply to the situation of only 
two bidders, Ao and A\, because the two bids will be considered extreme bids in this case 
and will be eliminated leaving no other bidder to win the project. As for the trivial case 
of three competitors, i.e., n = 2, AQ will have to bid between A\ and Ai so that it does not 
get eliminated as an extreme bid. Consequently, Ao wins the project for being the only 
remaining bidder after excluding the lowest and highest bids. In this case, the truncated 
below-average bid method is equivalent to the average bid method with three bidders. 
For the case of a total number of four bidders, i.e., n = 3, the probability of winning of 
contractor Ao has a closed-form solution. That is because the only way for Ao to win in this 
case is if it submits a bid that ranks the second among all four competitors. In other words, 
Ao's bid has to be higher than one of the opponents' bids and lower than the other two. This 
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means that after excluding the two extreme bids, Ao's bid will be the lowest among the two 
remaining bids which are equidistant from the average in this case. As a result, AQ will win 
the project since it is the only bid lower and closest to the average. This is identical to the 
winning condition for n — 3 under a median bid method. Therefore, in the case of three op-
ponents and assuming Xj are independent and identically distributed following a common 
distribution function Fx(xi), the probability of winning under the truncated below-average 
bid method can be expressed as follows: 
P[A0wins|x0,co] = ~[Fx(xo)}l[l-Fx(x0)}2 (6.24) 
P[A0wins|x0,c0] = 3[Fx{xo)}[\-Fx(x0)}2 (6.25) 
For Five Competitors (n = 4) 
In the case of four opponents (n = 4), determining the analytic form for the probability of 
winning is much more complicated. For Ao to win the project, given that it has selected a 
bid-to-cost ratio xo, one of the following two inequalities must be true: 
X{2)<xo<XT<Xi3) (6.26) 
X ( 1 ) < x 0 < X r < * ( 2 ) (6-27> 
where 
X(,-) = the ith lowest apparent bid-to-cost ratio among the n opponents. 
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and 
(xQ+Xi + ...+Xn)-ndn(Xw,xo)-max{Xfn),xo) A 7 = (6.28) 
n — l 
Replacing XT by its equivalent value in the former two inequalities, we obtain: 
X(2) +X(3) 
X(2) <*o< ~ \ U (6.29) 
Xw<xo<2X{2)-X{3) (6.30) 
Assuming that Ao's bid does not rank as the lowest or highest among the competing 
bids, the lowest bid-to-cost ratio, X^, and the highest one, X^ are eliminated. That leaves 
two opposing bids X(2) and X^) that AQ has to compete with in order to win. This is 
now similar to the case of two opponents (n = 2) under the regular below-average bidding 
method, but with the difference that XQ can not be lower than X^ or otherwise it will be 
considered the lowest extreme and will be excluded. Ao's first option is to bid between the 
two middle apparent bid-to-cost ratios X(2) and X@) such that xo remains lower than the 
average. This reflects the winning condition expressed in (6.26). 
The second situation where AQ can win the project is if it bids higher than the lowest 
bid but at the same time low enough to pull the average below the remaining two opposing 
bids. In this case, bo will be the only remaining bid below the average and thus will win 
the project. Inequality (6.27) expresses this condition by requiring xo to be higher than the 
lowest submitted bid-to-cost ratio, X(j), but at the same time it has to be lower than the 
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average XT, which in turn has to be lower than the second and the third lowest bid-to-cost 
ratios X(2)) andX(3). 
The complexity of inequalities (6.26) and (6.27) resides in the fact that each of them 
has to be translated into 24 inequalities. That is because each of the order statistics X^ in 
those expressions can have four possibilities. For example, the order statistic Xn\ in (6.27), 
defines the lowest submitted apparent bid-to-cost ratio and hence can be equal to X\, X2, 
XT,, orXj. Now if X^ happens to be equal toXi, then there are six possible permutations to 
reflect the order of the three remaining bid-to-cost ratios X2, X^, and X4, which are supposed 
to be higher than XQ and XT, always according to inequality (6.27). 
Based on the aforementioned, and although the case of n = 4 for a truncated below-
average bid method resembles the case of n = 2 for the regular below-average bid method, it 
is much more difficult to analytically determine the winning regions for the former. Hence, 
determining a closed-form expression for the probability of winning for n > 4 is a tedious 
task that requires complex numerical integrations and therefore analyzing the truncated 
below-average bidding method can be achieved much easier using simulation as described 
in the next section. 
6.3.2 Probability of Winning—Simulation Approach 
Defining Winning Regions for X'Q 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 5 to determine the winning regions of X'Q for the below-
average bid method is replicated here to define the new winning regions given that the 
lowest and highest bids are excluded. For this purpose, we define the following two stan-
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dardized variables: 
1 " 
*™ = r r r K E * / ) _ min(y0,y(1)) - min(y0,y(n))] (6.32) 
" * ,=o 
We shall consider a generic project with n standardized apparent bid-to-cost ratios xj 
(i=l,...,n). Their corresponding order statistics are defined as x',^,. . . ,xf,ny Additionally, 
~x!T represents the average of submitted xj. after excluding the lowest, xj^, and the highest, 
xf, -,. However, x'TQ represents the average of submitted x[- including x'Q after excluding the 
lowest and highest xj. 
Note that x^ does not exist for n — 2. In this case, x/0 has to rank between the two 
opponents so they get eliminated and it remains the only bid to win the project. Thus, the 
following analysis applies to n > 3. 
The first and obvious condition that xfQ has to satisfy in order to win is to be higher than 
y,, * and lower than xf, •> because otherwise it will be considered an extreme bid and will be 
(i) w 
excluded from the competition. Therefore, the following analysis assumes that: 
x' (1 )<x()<x' (n ) (6.33) 
Another necessary condition for x>0 to win the project was proved and explained in 
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Chapter 5, which is that x!Q should be less than x'T so that it may also be less than x?T0: 
X'Q < XTQ < x'T (6.34) 
Assume that the average x'T lies between order statistics x!,^ and JCC/I+1-) such that 
Ah) < ^T — Ah+i) f°r h= 1,. • .,n— \. It follows that any selected value X'Q between x1,^ 
and x'r is certain to win the project because in this case X'Q would win over x1,^ and would 
be the closest to and lowest than the average X'TQ. 
Ah) < *0 < XT => ( 6 ' 3 5 ) 
Ah) <A< *T0 < XT (6-36) 
Let us now assume that X'Q lies between order statistics xf,, and V, j , where x1,, < xf,^. 
For X'Q to win the project, it should satisfy the condition below: 
(r) ^ A 0 ^ - A r 0 *- A(r+1) 
For the rightmost inequality to be true, we have: 
X(A < XQ < XT0 < X(r4-U (6.37) 
*T0<Ar+l) ^ ( 6 ' 3 8 ) 
(n-l)3c'7 .0<(/i-l)jc / ( r + 1 ) (6.39) 
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Given (6.33), inequality (6.39) can be expressed as follows: 
x
/
0 + ( n - 2 ) x / r < ( n - 2 ) x ' ( r + 1 ) + 4 + 1 ) =» (6.40) 
A < 4 + 1 ) - («-2)(3c'r - ^ + 1 ) ) (6.41) 
Combining (6.37) and (6.41) gives the following sufficient condition for X'Q to win the 
project for any r < h: 
x[r) <x'0< x[r+,) - (n - 2) (x'r - x[r+,}) (6.42) 
In the final case where x*Q is less than x',^, AQ will be excluded from the competition 
for being the extreme lowest bidder and therefore it will not have any chance to win the 
project. This condition is expressed in (6.33). 
Based on the aforementioned, there are h potential regions defined by inequalities (6.36) 
and (6.42) that are sufficient for x/0 to win the project. 
The analysis for the below-average bid method in Chapter 5 determined up to h + 1 
winning regions for x^. However, after excluding the lowest and highest bids, the option to 
bid very low such that the overall average is pulled below all opponents does not guarantee 
any chance of winning anymore, since in this case x/0 will be excluded for being the lowest 
extreme. Therefore, given a set of opponents' bid-to-cost ratios x*x, x,2, . •., x'n, and under 
the truncated below-average bid method, there is a maximum of h discontinuous regions 
that must be examined to find all values of x/0 that can win the project. 
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Simulation Procedure for n > 3 
This section describes the simulation procedure followed to model the below-average bid 
method after excluding extreme bids. This algorithm is similar in its steps to the regu-
lar below-average bid method algorithm except for Step 4, which is modified to reflect 
the exclusion of the extreme bids. Described below are the steps of the simulation pro-
cedure followed to determine the probability of winning as a function of the standardized 
bid-to-cost ratio x*Q, under a truncated below-average bid method: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of opponents n > 3. 
Step 2: Initialize the simulation set counter k=\. 
Step 3: In simulation set k, sample m vectors x*xjk,^2jh • • -^njk ^ r o m t n e s tandard 
normal distribution. Each vector represents one of the m projects in simula-
tion set k. The n values in each vector represent the standardized apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios of the n opponents in the j ' h project. 
Step 4: For each sampled vector x7, ,x^, • • • ,xfn, 
1. Sort the values x[, x^,...,x!n in increasing order to form the correspond-
ing order statistics x'nyx'ny • • • '•*(«)• 
2. Compute the average x!T of all bid-to-cost ratios x) except the mini-
mum, xjjy and the maximum, xj w 
3. Compare x?T to ^lyy^ijy • • • iAn) t 0 identify h such as xj^ < x'T < 
4>+ir 
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4. Use inequalities (6.36), and (6.42) to identify all regions (lnur), 
(r = \,...,h < n — 1) where x!Q could win the project. Each region 
is defined by a lower bound / and an upper bound u such that lr < ur. 
If inequality (6.42) gives lr > ur, then the winning region for the cor-
responding r does not exist and is ignored. These regions are the only 
characteristic of each simulated project that is needed from now on. 
Step 5: For XQ in the interval (-3,3) using a step of 0.001: 
1. Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values x?0 
and n for the current simulation set k, W^XQ, n) = 0. 
2. Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set A:). 
If XQ belongs to one of the regions (lr, ur), (r= l,...,h<n — \), then 
project j is won: increase Wk (XQ, n) by 1; otherwise do nothing. Repeat 
this sub-step for all m projects in the current simulation step k. 
3. Compute the ratio pk(x'0,n) of the total number of projects won 
wic(x'Q, n) over the total number of projects m within simulation set k: 
w r t , „ ) = ^ ^ l (6.43) 
m 
This is the kth estimate of the probability of winning at x^ and n. 
Step 6: If the index k equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 7. 
Otherwise, increase k by 1 and go back to Step 3. 
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Step 7: Calculate the final estimate for the probability of winning at XQ and n by 
averaging Pk(^Q,n) over all simulation sets s: 
1 s 
P[Wn\x'0,n] = p(x'0,n) = - £ pk{x0,n) (6.44) 
s
 k=i 
The results obtained from running the above described simulation algorithm are pre-
sented in four nomograms shown and discussed in the next section. The code was executed 
for 1000 simulation sets, each consisting of 1000 projects. The assigned values for the 
number of opponents, n, are 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The simulation results for the regular below-
average bid method are also presented in the same nomograms to allow comparison. 
6.3.3 Comparison of Simulation Results 
This section analyzes the simulation nomograms and draws a comparison between the reg-
ular below-average bid method and the one without extreme bids. 
Figure 6.6 shows the probability of winning corresponding to a given standardized bid-
to-cost ratio X'Q. The main effect of excluding the lowest and highest bids is reflected in the 
difference in the left tail behavior between the curves for the below-average bid method 
and for the same method but without extreme bids. The left tail rise is a characteristic of 
the below-average bid method that has already been explained in Chapter 5, and is caused 
by the fact that in the case of a low number of competitors, Ao can submit a very low bid 
such that it pulls the overall average below all opposing bids. Consequently, by submitting 
an extremely low bid, AQ wins the project since it has the sole bid below the average. How-
ever, if the extreme bids are excluded, this will not happen because the two extreme bids 
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and particularly the lowest bid, which is of interest in this case, will be excluded and hence 
will have a zero chance of winning the project. That is depicted clearly in Figure 6.6 since 
all the curves corresponding to the truncated below-average bid method show a winning 
probability approaching zero as x*0 takes negative values. 
Excluding the lowest and highest bids has a greater impact on the winner's identity if 
the number of opponents is relatively small. That is shown clearly in Figure 6.6, because as 
the number of opponents n increases, the curves for both bidding methods approach each 
other until they become identical at n — 8. That is expected since with a large number of 
competitors, it becomes harder to underbid all opponents and bring the average below all 
opposing bids. Therefore, the left tail rise is less pronounced as n increases and as a result, 
the curves for the regular below-average bid method and the truncated below-average bid 
method match almost perfectly. 
The last observation about Figure 6.6 is that for the cases of two and three opponents, 
the truncated below-average bid method indicates a higher winning probability than the reg-
ular below-average bid method for positive values of x^. This can be explained by the fact 
that excluding extreme bids leads to a higher chance of having the average of the remaining 
bids away from the estimated mean mx- Thus, it means that if A$ adopts a bid-to-cost ratio 
that is higher than mx, it will have a higher chance to be closer to the average under the 
truncated below-average bid method and consequently a higher winning probability. How-
ever, as the number of opponents increases, the curves for both bidding methods match for 
positive values of X'Q and that is because excluding the extreme bids from a large sample of 
bids does not have a significant impact on the bids' average value. 
Note that the truncated below-average bid method curve for n = 2 is the only one in 
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Figure 6.6 that is symmetrical around X'Q = 0 and that is because it behaves like an average 
bid method as explained in the previous section. 
Then, we shall move to Figure 6.7 which shows the optimum bid-to-cost ratio given 
by (XQ - l)/o"x as a function of the standardized mean m'x. Note that the truncated below-
average bid method curve for n = 2 behaves like an average bid method and thus it indicates 
an optimum bid-to-cost ratio higher than mx contrary to all the other curves which fall be-
low the 45° line as m'x increases. In the case of n — 3, and given a particular value for m'x, 
the optimum bid-to-cost ratio is always higher for the below-average bid method without 
extreme bids. That is expected since the below-average bid method incites a contractor to 
bid low enough to pull the average below all other bids, which is easier to achieve in the 
case of a relatively small number of competitors. However, if the lowest and highest bids 
are excluded, AQ would have only one remaining bidder to compete with and thus it can 
afford to use a higher bid-to-cost ratio especially that underbidding all opposing bids is not 
an option anymore. As explained previously, the truncated below average bid method is 
equivalent to the median bid method in the case where n = 3. 
Note that as the number of opponents increases, the curves corresponding to the two 
bidding methods approach each other and gradually indicate the same optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio as m'x increases. That is again expected since as the number of bidders increases, 
excluding the two extreme bids would not have a substantial impact on the bids' average 
particularly for a small variance in the competitors' bids. That is because as the opposing 
bids get closely clustered around the mean, excluding the lowest and highest bids does not 
lead to a largely deviated average from mx and hence both bidding methods result in almost 
the same optimum bid-to-cost ratio. On the flip side, as the number of opponents decreases 
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and as m'x takes lower values,there is a higher variance in the submitted bids and thus ex-
cluding the extreme bids might deviate the updated average from mx. In this case, the 
truncated below-average bid method indicates a higher optimum bid-to-cost ratio than the 
regular below-average bid method. Additionally, we note that excluding the extreme bids 
does not prevent the optimum markup from approaching mx as the number of opponents 
increases and as m!x takes smaller values. 
Based on the aforementioned observations about Figure 6.7, we can conclude that in the 
case of relatively small number of competitors and large bids' variance, owners should ex-
pect slightly higher bid prices when the extreme bids are excluded under a below-average 
bidding method. However, as the number of opponents increases or the bids' variance 
decreases, bid prices are expected to be approximately the same for both bidding methods. 
We shall now consider Figure 6.8, which shows the maximum expected standardized 
profit as a function of the standardized mean m'x. For n = 2 and n — 3, this figure indi-
cates an expected profit that is always higher for the truncated below-average bid method. 
That is because for the case of two and three opponents, both the optimum markup and the 
probability of winning at the optimum are higher after excluding extreme bids, as shown in 
Figures 6.7 and 6.9. On the other hand, as the number of opponents n increases, the curves 
for both bidding methods match perfectly for small values of m'x, and then slightly diverge 
as m'x increases. To be more specific, excluding the extreme bids under the below-average 
bidding method results in a slightly lower expected profit for high values of m'x and high 
n. Since the optimum bid-to-cost ratio is approximately the same for both bidding methods 
in the case of high m'x, the difference is due to the fact that the truncated below-average 
bidding method has a lower winning probability at the optimum, as Figure 6.9 shows. That 
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is expected because if the number of Ao's competitors is relatively large and their bids are 
closely grouped around the mean, it might be hard but not impossible for Ao to win by 
underbidding all opponents and pulling the average below their bids. However, this can 
not be achieved if the extreme bids are excluded simply because in this case, Ao will fall 
out of the competition for being the lowest bidder. That explains why the truncated below 
average bidding method shows a slightly lower winning probability in this case and thus a 
lower expected profit. 
Last, we consider Figure 6.9 which shows the probability of winning at the optimum 
markup versus the standardized mean of apparent bid-to-cost ratios m'x. For n = 2, this 
probability is mostly higher under the truncated below average bid method except for large 
values of m'x. This is because with just two competitors and given a very small variance 
in their bids, it becomes easier to underbid all opponents and bring the average below 
their bids, and thus this situation favors winning under the regular below average bidding 
method. On the other hand, for n = 3, the truncated below average bid method always 
shows a higher winning probability. However, as n increases the regular below average bid 
method shows a slightly higher winning probability for large values of m'x. 
As explained previously, a high value of m'x implies that the opponents' bids have a 
small variance and thus are narrowly clustered around the mean. If this situation occurs un-
der the regular below-average bidding method, there is a possibility that Ao submits a very 
low bid that pulls the average below all opposing bids, and hence wins the project. This 
might happen due to the definition of the winning rule under the former bidding method 
which awards the contract to the bid that is closest to and lower than the average of sub-
mitted bids. However, this can not be achieved if the extreme bids are excluded and that 
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is translated in Figure 6.9 through a slightly lower winning probability for the truncated 
below-average bid method. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter modeled and studied a variant of both average-based bid methods where the 
average is determined after eliminating the lowest and highest bids. A key characteristic of 
average-based bidding methods is that they allow contractors to alter the winner's identity. 
That is because the winner is determined with respect to the average of the submitted bids 
and therefore each of these bids contributes in defining the average value and consequently 
the winner of the project. Hence, a change in any of the bids' values or the number of 
bidders can impact the winner's identity. 
Contractors might sometimes use this characteristic to their advantage by affiliating 
with each other and submitting extremely low or high bids in order to shift the average 
to their side. Therefore, this chapter modeled and analyzed both the average bid and the 
below-average bid methods after excluding extreme bids. 
In the case of the average bid method, excluding the two extreme bids translated into a 
lower maximum winning probability at x*0 — 0. That is due to the fact that the bids' average 
has a higher chance to deviate from mx after the extreme bids are excluded and thus bidding 
closer to mx favors winning under the regular average bid method. Additionally, excluding 
extreme bids under the below-average bid method proved to be beneficial for both own-
ers and contractors since it protects them against other contractors who might submit very 
low bids such that the average is pulled below all other opponents' bids and consequently 
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enhance their chance of winning the project, as shown in Figure 6.6. 
Based on the simulation results for both truncated average-based bidding methods, we 
can conclude that excluding the lowest and highest submitted bids has a greater impact on 
the bidding outcome when the number of competitors is relatively small and when there is 
high variance in the bids. That is because with a large number of bidders, each bid price has 
a lower weight in determining the average and therefore it has less impact on the bidding 
results. 
For the case of a small number of competitors and a relatively high variance in the 
submitted bids, i.e., high-risk projects, excluding extreme bids under both average bidding 
methods implies slightly higher bid prices for owners. This slight increase in the bid prices 
is more obvious for the below-average bid method and that is expected since submitting 
extremely low prices is now prevented by the exclusion of extreme bids. 
To conclude, the variants of the average-based bidding methods discussed in this chap-
ter maintain the same advantages of their original versions, and at the same time provide 
more balanced bidding results by eliminating the effect of extremely high or low submitted 
bids on the average. However, as the number of opponents takes relatively large values or 
as the bids variance decreases, those variants provide similar results to the average bidding 
methods discussed in previous chapters. 
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Chapter 7 
Second Low Bid Method 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, construction projects in the United States and throughout the world 
are mostly delivered using the low bid method. This bidding method is usually accom-
panied with a pre-qualification process of the contractors prior to selecting the winner. 
Typically, the evaluation is done by a technical review committee that studies and evalu-
ates the professional qualifications of the bidders such as their financial status, their past 
performance on similar jobs, their personnel capabilities and, so forth. Additionally, the 
bidder's proposed technical approach for the project construction is also evaluated in or-
der to ensure that the selected winning bid is fully responsive to the requirements outlined 
in the request for proposal and that it fully satisfies the project's functional requirements. 
Then, after choosing the prequalified bidders, the project is awarded to the contractor who 
submits the lowest responsible and responsive bid. 
Nevertheless, the prequalification process is not always enough to ensure the best out-
come from a low bid tendering scenario because sometimes a bidder might get erroneously 
prequalified through submitting fraudulent statements and might then win the project by 
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deliberately submitting an unrealistic low bid. Hence, when a client awards the project to 
the lowest tender, he has to account for the risks that accompany his choice. 
It is true that a contractor might be the lowest bidder because of some cost-saving tech-
nology that allows him to reduce his estimated cost for the project. But it is also important 
to realize that a contractor might sometimes deliberately submit a very low bid price know-
ing that the project can not completed for that cost in order to secure a high chance of 
winning the project. This is likely to happen when a contractor is in a bad financial situa-
tion or is in urgent need for work to stay in business. This often results in several change 
orders and claims made by the contractor later on during the construction of the project 
to cover the extra incurred expenses. It also can lead to a delay in the completion of the 
project which means that the owner will have to miss part of the return money that he was 
supposed to earn from investing the completed project if it were finished on time. And the 
worst scenario that can happen in such a case is the failure of the contractor to finish the 
project where the owner has then to search again for another contractor qualified to take 
charge of the remaining parts of the project. Again, this results in delaying the completion 
of the project and in many disputes and claims that need to be solved between the owner 
and the initial contractor. 
In all of these possible scenarios, the owner usually has to bear those additional costs as 
a penalty for awarding the job to the lowest tender. Alternatively, an owner could have paid 
a little more and reduced these risks by eliminating the lowest bid and rather awarding the 
contract to the second lowest bidder. This can be considered as a truncated low bid method. 
This chapter models and analyzes the second-low bid method where the contractor 
whose bid is the second lowest one among submitted bids, is awarded the contract. An 
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analytic derivation of the probability of winning under the second-low bid method is pre-
sented. Additionally, Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the aforementioned bidding 
method. The simulation results are presented in four nomograms similar to the ones pro-
duced for the other bidding methods discussed in the previous chapters. At the end, a 
comparison between the second-low bid method, the low bid method and the average bid 
methods is conducted and conclusions are presented. 
7.2 Analytic Derivation of Winning Probability 
This section presents the analytic derivation of the probability of winning of contrac-
tor AQ when competing against n opponents under a second-low bid awarding method. 
This method awards the project to the contractor whose bid is ranked as the second low-
est bid. Because of its ranking nature, the use of order statistics to define the event 
"Contractor Ao wins" is of great help in this case. As previously defined, B\ ,#2, • • -,Bn 
are the random variables that represent the bids submitted by n opponents. The ordered 
values fi(i),fi(2))---)^(/i) a r e defined as the order statistics corresponding to the random 
variables B\,B2, • • • ,Bn. In other words, B^ is the smallest among the submitted bids and 
fi(„) is the largest. 
Note that the second-low bid method is also studied under the same two assumptions 
as Friedman's low-bid model. X^,X^2), • • • ,X^n\ are defined as the order statistics corre-
sponding to the apparent bid-to-cost ratios of opponents X\,X2,---,X„. For contractor Ao 
to win the project under a second-low bid method, its bid bo has to fall between B^ and 
5(2) and equivalently, its bid-to-cost ratio XQ has to lie between X^ and X^y Accordingly, 
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the formal definition for the event "Contractor AQ wins" can be expressed as follows: 
{A0wins|&o} = {B{1) < b0 < B{2)} (7.1) 
= {( fl Bi>b0)n{b0>mm(Bi))} (7.2) 
(B^minJL,*,) ' 
The above expression for the event "Contractor Ao wins" can also be rewritten in terms 
of bid-to-cost ratios by dividing all bids by Ao's cost estimate CQ, i.e., by substituting the 
symbol B with the symbol X. It follows that: 
{AQ wins|x0,c0} = {X(1) <x 0 <X( 2 ) } (7.3) 
= {( f) Xi>x0)n(xQ>mm(Xi))} (7.4) 
(X,#nin?=,Xi) 
Hence, in order for Ao to win the project, it is necessary for one of the n values 
X\,X2,... ,Xn, to be less than xo and (n - 1) of them to be greater than XQ. Given that 
Xj are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a distribution function 
Fx(xi), the probability that any given set of (n — 1) of the X,- are greater than XQ and the 
remaining one value is lower than xo equals [F^(xo)][l — Fx(xo)]n~l . And since there are 
, _"'•>,!, different partitions of the n random variables X\ ,X2,... ,Xn into the two sets (the 
first set containing [n - 1) values above xo and the second set containing only one value 
below xo), the probability of winning of contractor Ao given a certain bid-to-cost ratio xo 
can be expressed as follows: 
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P[A0wins|xo,c0] = / ^ " L ^ M ' l ' - ^ W r ' (7-5) 
P[A0wins|x0,co] = n[Fx(xo)][l-Fx(xo)]n-1 (7.6) 
As shown above, and contrary to the average bid methods, the probability of winning 
P[Aowins|xo] under a second-low bid method has a closed-form solution for any number of 
opponents n. Additionally, in contrast to the below-average bid method that depicts several 
discontinuous winning regions for Ao's standardized bid-to-cost ratio XQ, the second-low 
bid method has only one winning region forxQ, and that is K n ^ o ) ] ' ^e-'tne t w o l ° w e s t 
xj, where x\ is defined previously as the standardized apparent bid-to-cost ratio for opponent 
i. 
Since the probability of winning under a second-low bid method has a closed-form so-
lution, the optimum expected profit can have a closed-form expression too in function of 
XQ, CO, and n: 
E[V\xo,co,n] = P[Aowins\xo,c0,n](x0-\)co (7.7) 
E[V\x0,cQ,n] = n[Fx(xo)][\-Fx(xo)]n-l(xo-\)cQ (7.8) 
Hence, in order to determine the value of xo that maximizes the expected profit 
£[V|xo, CQ, n], the first derivative of the profit expression with respect to XQ should be deter-
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mined and set equal to zero: 
dE[V\xp, cp, n) dP[A0wins\xo,co,n] . i n in o\ 
= _ (xo - \) + P[A0wins\xo,co,n\ = 0 (7.9) 
codxo dXQ 
First, the derivative of P[Aowins|xo,co,n] w i m respect to XQ must be determined: 
dP[A0wins\x0,c0,n} , 
i = nfx{xo)[\-Fx{xo)}n -nFx{xo){n-l) 
[\-Fx{xo)}n-2fx(xQ) (7.10) 
= n[\ -Fx{xQ)]n~2fx{xQ){[\ -Fx(x0)] -
(n-l)Fx(xo)} (7.11) 
= n[l-Fx(x0)}n-2fx(x0){l-nFx(x0)} (7.12) 
Then, by substituting (7.12) in (7.9), the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ can be determined 
based on the set of equations below: 
n[l-Fx(xo)}n-2fx(xo)[l-nFx(xo)](xo-l) = -nFx(x0)[l -Fx(x0)}n~] (7.13) 
fx(xo)[l-nFx(xo)](xo-l) = -Fx(xo){l-Fx(xo)} (7.14) 
XQ = 1 Fx(xo)[\-Fx(x0)} ( 7 1 5 ) 
fx{xo)[l-nFx(xo)] 
Note that the values for the mean, mx, and the standard deviation, Ox, of the apparent 
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bid-to-cost ratios need to be determined prior to evaluating /xC*o) and FX(XQ) in (7.15). 
Thus, in order to generalize the solution in (7.15), we express the latter in function of the 
standardized bid-to-cost ratio x'0 which is already defined in previous chapters as: 
x0 = (7.16) 
ox 
Thus, the standardized values for FX(XQ) and fx(xo) can be expressed as follows: 
Fu(x,0) = Fu(X-°-^*) = Fx(x0) (7.17) 
Ox 
MA) = M^-™) = exfx(x0) (7.18) 
Ox 
Substituting (7.17) and (7.18) into (7.15) results in the following expression: 
Then we introduce the standardized mean for apparent bid-to-cost ratios m'x, equal to 
(mx — l ) /ox , to obtain the following equation: 
' , ' ^ Q " 1 fi,(^0)[l-^(x/0)] 
X0 +mX = = - r I
 / U l r / M l (7-2 0) 
Ox / M ^ l - n F u y 0 ) 
^^/.wn-^f0 (7-21) 
Consequently, Equation (7.21) can be used to determine the standardized optimum 
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markup xfi that would make the leftmost expression of the equality equal to zero through 
an iterative numerical process. 
The next section verifies the aforementioned determined formula for f[i4owins|xo] in 
Equation (7.6) through modeling the second-low bid method using Monte Carlo simula-
tion approach. The simulation results are presented in four nomograms similar to those 
presented for the low, average and below-average bidding methods to allow for comparison 
between the different bidding methods. 
7.3 Probability of Winning-Simulation Procedure 
Described below are the steps of the simulation procedure followed to determine the prob-
ability of winning as a function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio x!Q: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of opponents n. 
Step 2: Initialize the simulation set counter k = 1. 
Step 3: In simulation set k, sample m vectors x!xjk,^2 ,-*> • • -^njk fr°m t n e standard 
normal distribution. Each vector represents one of the m projects in simula-
tion set k. The n values in each vector represent the standardized apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios of the n opponents in the j t h project. 
Step 4: For each sampled vector xf{ ,x?2, • •. ,x!n, sort these values in increasing order 
to form the corresponding order statistics *m,*J2)> • • • )*(„)• 
Step 5: For every x*Q in the interval [-3,3] using an increment of 0.001: 
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1. Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values X'Q 
and n for the current simulation set k, W^JCQ, n) = 0. 
2. Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set k). 
If X'Q belongs to its winning region [xj^ ., xLs.], then project j is won: 
increase vv^x^rc) by 1; otherwise do nothing. Repeat this sub-step for 
all m projects in the current simulation step k. 
3. Compute the ratio p^x^n) of the total number of projects won 
W^Q, n) over the total number of projects m within simulation set k: 
Pk{xQ,n) = 5i— (7.22) 
m 
This is the Wh estimate of the probability of winning at X'Q and n. 
Step 6: If the index A: equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 7. 
Otherwise, increase £ by 1 and go back to Step 3. 
Step 7: Calculate the final estimate for the probability of winning at X'Q and n by 
averaging /^(x^n) over all simulation sets s: 
1 s 
P[Wm\xQ,n) = p(x'0,n) = -Y Pk(x'o,n) (7.23) 
sk=\ 
The results obtained from running the above described simulation algorithm are pre-
sented and discussed in the next section. The code was executed for 1000 simulation sets, 
each consisting of 1000 projects. The assigned values for the number of opponents, n, are 
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2, 4, and 8. 
7.4 Simulation Graphs and Comparison with Low Bid 
Method 
This section presents similar nomograms to those that were studied for the low bid and the 
average bid methods but now depicting the results for the second-low bid method. Figure 
7.1 shows the probability of winning corresponding to a standardized bid-to-cost ratio XQ 
in the range [-3, 3]. 
The same procedure used to determine the optimum markup for all the bidding models 
developed in previous chapters of this research is used again here for the same purpose: 
E[V\x0,c0,n) , XQ-mx+mx-l , , ,. 
= p{x0,n) = p(x0,n){x0 + mx) (7.24) COOx Ox 
Once the probability of winning p(x/0,n) is known from Figure 7.1 and based on (7.24), 
we can determine the optimum standardized bid-to-cost ratio, xfi, which is the value of 
x'0 that maximizes the standardized expected profit E\V\/CQOX for a given value of the 
standardized bid-to-cost mean m'x. 
Hence, Figure 7.2 shows the standardized optimum markup corresponding to a specific 
value of m'x in the range [-1, 3]. Then, Figure 7.3 shows the standardized expected profit 
and Figure 7.4 shows the probability of winning at the optimum standardized markup given 
a certain value of m'x in the range [-1,3]. To allow comparison and analyze the difference 
between the low bid and the second-low bid methods, all four figures show the results for 
both bid awarding methods. 
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Clearly, there are many differences between the low bid and the second-low bid meth-
ods as shown in the above four graphs. These differences essentially fall into four groups 
and are studied in detail in this section. 
The first concerns the probability of winning given a standardized bid-to-cost ratio, x*0, 
as shown in Figure 7.1. The curves for the low bid method indicate a probability of winning 
approaching 1 as X'Q decreases regardless of the value of n, and that is expected since the 
lower a contractor bids, the higher is its chance of winning. However, this is not the case 
for the second low bid method curves which indicate a probability of winning approaching 
zero as XQ decreases. And that is expected again because the second low bid method does 
not allow a very low submitted bid to be awarded the contract and rather assigns the second 
lowest bidder as the winner. Therefore, as XQ takes large negative values, XQ gets further 
below the mean bid-to-cost ratio and loses the chance of being the second lowest bidder, 
which translates into a zero probability of winning. Hence, the second-low bid method 
safeguards both owner and contractor against unreasonably low bids. 
Note that the curve for the second-low bid method for n = 2 is symmetrical around 
X'Q = 0 with a maximum probability of winning of 0.5 occurring at X'Q = 0. This curve is the 
same as the average bid method curve for n = 2. This is expected since in the case of two 
opponents, and in order to win, contractor Ao has to bid between the two competitors' bids 
to be ranked as the second lowest bidder. This means that Ao's bid will also be the closest 
to the average and therefore it will win under the average bid method, too. 
On the other hand, the second-low bid method curves for n = 4 and n = 8 remain bell-
shaped and symmetrical but as n increases they become more shifted to the left. This is 
explained by the fact that as the number of opponents increases, the second lowest bid is 
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expected to be further below the average and that explains why the maximum probability 
of winning occurs at a lower negative value of x!Q. 
Moreover, for the same number of opponents n, the curves for the low bid method are 
above those for the second-low bid method for low negative values of x^ and then they 
cross each other and reverse their order as x!Q increases. This is again as expected because 
as X'Q decreases, it has a higher chance to be ranked as the lowest and hence win under a 
low bid tendering scenario. However, as XQ increases, it has better chance to be ranked as 
the second lowest rather than the lowest and therefore it has a higher winning probability 
under a second-low bid tendering scenario. 
We shall now turn our attention to Figure 7.2 which depicts the optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio given by (XQ — l)/o"x as a function of the standardized mean m'x. Given the same m'x 
and n, this ratio is always larger when using the second-low bid method. This is as ex-
pected since the latter bid method relaxes the low bid method constraint "the lowest wins" 
and hence, it results in a higher optimum standardized bid-to-cost ratio for any value of 
m'x. Similar to the low bid method curves, the second-low bid method curves rise mono-
tonically as m'x increases. This is again as expected, because, as the mean of the opponents 
bids increases, so should the optimal markup for contractor AQ. 
Furthermore, both bidding methods, given a certain standardized mean m'x, indicate a 
larger optimum bid-to-cost ratio as the number of opponents decreases. That is explained 
by the fact that as the number of bidders increases, the competition gets more intense and 
contractor AQ has to bid lower to remain in the competitive zone. Similarly to the low bid 
method, the curves for the second-low bid method corresponding to different values for n 
become parallel straight lines as m'x increases. 
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Figure 7.2 also includes a 45° straight line through the origin, drawn as a fine dashed-
line. This line indicates the limit where the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ is equal to the 
mean bid-to-cost ratio mx. An interesting observation is that as m'x increases, all curves 
in the figure drop below the 45° straight line except for the second low bid method curve 
that corresponds to n — 2. As discussed in the previous section, this is expected since the 
second low bid method is identical to the average bid method in the case of two opponents. 
On the other hand, when m'x takes small values, the curves for both bidding methods 
fall above the 45° line and thus indicate optimum bid-to-cost ratios that are greater than the 
mean mx- A negative m'x means that the expected value of the competitors bids is below 
the cost estimate of AQ. In this case, to avoid losing money, A$ has no other choice but 
to bid above cost, which means to select a bid-to-cost ratio XQ above the mean mx- Also 
note that as the number of opponents increases and given a negative m'x, the two bidding 
methods match almost perfectly and approach the X-axis; as indicated by the case for n = 8 
in Figure 7.2. In such conditions, the second-low bid method behaves similarly to the low 
bid method and expects the contractor to bid the project at cost. 
Figure 7.3 shows the standardized expected profit as a function of mx. For n = 2, the ex-
pected profit for the second-low bid method is always greater than for the low bid method. 
But this is not the case for larger values of n such as n = 4 and n = 8 where for small values 
of m'x, the expected profit of the second-low bid method is greater than for the low bid 
method but for large values of m'x, the situation is reversed. This is because when m'x takes 
large values, it means that there is small variance in the opponents bids and hence they are 
clustered around their mean. In such a case, it is much easier to submit a very low bid 
and win under the low bid method than to rank as the second lowest bidder which requires 
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AQ to bid within the cluster of opposing bids around the mean. This is also illustrated in 
Figure 7.4 where for large values of m'x the probability of winning at optimum markup for 
the low bid method is much greater than that for the second-low bid method irrespective 
of n. Remember, this does not apply to n = 2 where the second-low bid method curve is 
always greater than that for the low bid method. That is because the optimum markup for 
the second low bid method is constantly above mx and is much greater than that for the 
low bid method which is always below mx, as shown in Figure 7.2. Therefore, contractors 
would favor the second-low bid method most of the time because it means higher expected 
profit; however, in the case of a very small variance in the opponents' bids or a high mx, 
and with n > 4, contractors would rather opt for the low bid method. 
The most important observation about Figure 7.3 is that similarly to the low bid method, 
the optimum profit approaches zero as the number of opponents increases under the second-
low bid tendering scenario. This is expected since as n increases, the optimum markup and 
the probability of winning for the second-low bid method tend to zero. Hence, as the num-
ber of opponents increases, the second-low bid method has the same drawback as the low 
bid method in the sense that the contractor is at a disadvantage of signing the project at 
cost with no expected profit, and the owner is at the risk of having to face a large amount 
of claims and disputes during construction of the project due to cost overruns. 
The last difference between the two bidding methods concerns the probability of win-
ning at the optimum bid-to-cost ratio (XQ — l)/o"x for a given m'x, as depicted in Figure 
7.4. For small values m'x, i.e., a large variance in the opponents' bids, it is easier to rank 
as the second lowest rather than the lowest bid and therefore the probability of winning 
for the second-low bid method is greater than that for the low bid method. However, as 
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m'x increases, the order is reversed. When m'x takes larger values, i.e., the variance of the 
opposing bids decreases, it becomes easier to underbid all opponents than to rank as the 
second lowest since all opposing bids are now clustered around the mean. This explains 
why the order of the curves gets reversed as m'x increases. 
7.5 Second Low Bid Method versus Average Bid Methods 
After comparing it with the low bid method in detail, this section compares the second-low 
bid method to the average bid methods, discussed in previous chapters, using the same four 
nomograms. This aims at providing a more comprehensive analysis of the second-low bid 
method and of its merits and shortcomings relative to other alternative bidding methods. 
The following four figures will be used to draw a comparison between the second-low 
bid, the average and below-average bid methods. The individual comparison between the 
average and below-average bid methods has already been studied in Chapter 5 and hence 
in this section we are only interested in the differences between the second-low bid method 
on one hand and the average-based bidding methods on the other hand. 
We start our discussion with Figure 7.5 which shows the probability of winning given 
a standardized bid-to-cost ratio x!Q. As mentioned earlier, in the case of two opponents 
(n = 2), the second-low bid method is identical to the average bid method since ranking the 
second lowest among three bidders is the same as bidding close to the average of the two 
opposing bids. Note that for n = 2 and small values of x'Q, the curve for the below-average 
bid method is greater than that for the second-low bid and the average bid methods, while 
for high values of x*Q, the order is reversed. 
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This is explained by the fact that using small values of X'Q decreases Ao's chance to be 
the second lowest bid or the closest to the average; however, it has a higher probability to 
be the one closest to but below the average since it can be so low that it pulls the average be-
low the two other competing bids. For n = 4 opponents, the below-average bid method still 
dominates for small values of x!Q but now within a narrower range of X'Q than that for n = 2, 
and that is because when the number of opponents increases it becomes harder to bring 
the average below all the opposing bids. However, for middle values of X'Q, the second-low 
bid method reflects the highest winning probability followed by the below-average method 
and then the average bid method. Then, while X'Q takes larger values, the order of the three 
curves is reversed. This is as expected because the range for X'Q where the second lowest 
bid method has the highest winning probability is [-1.7,-0.4], which implies that Ao is bid-
ding significantly below the average of the opposing bids and this favors winning under the 
second-low bid method. It is also expected that as x?0 takes positive values i.e. as Ao bids 
above the average of the opponents bids, the average bid method would guarantee a higher 
chance of winning the project. 
Now if we consider the case where n — 8 opponents, the second-low bid method pro-
vides the highest winning probability while X'Q takes a value within the range [-3,-0.6]. 
However, as X'Q moves to the range [-0.6,-0.15], the below-average bid method provides 
the highest winning probability. Then, as X'Q increases and takes positive values, the curve 
for the average bid method rises above the ones for the second-low and below-average bid 
methods. 
The conclusion from the aforementioned observations is that for small n and small val-
ues of X'Q, the below-average bid method guarantees the contractor a higher probability of 
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winning than the second-low bid method, while for large n, the opposite is true. On the 
other hand, for n > 2 and for large values of xlQ, both average bidding methods provide 
Ao with a higher chance of winning than the second-low bid method. A final observation 
about Figure 7.5 is that for any n > 2, the maximum probability of winning obtained under 
a second-low bid awarding scenario is higher than both average bid methods, and occurs at 
a lower X*Q. 
We shall continue the discussion now through analyzing the results from Figure 7.6 
which shows the standardized optimum bid-to-cost ratio as a function of the standardized 
mean m'x. Given the same values for n and m'x, the second-low bid method always indi-
cates an optimum markup that is lower than that for the below-average bid method, which 
in turn is lower than that for the average bid method. This is as expected since the average 
bid method requires Ao to bid closest to the average, i.e., XQ should be closest to mx in 
order to win while the second-low bid method requires Ao to be the second lowest among 
all submitted bids and equivalently XQ has to be significantly below mx. Therefore, the 
latter method always leads to a lower optimum markup than the former. The only excep-
tion to this observation is n = 2 and that is because, as explained earlier, the second-low 
bid method in this case behaves similarly to the average bid method. This is also obvi-
ous through the tendency of the second-low bid method curves to approach the 45° line 
(representing XQ = mx) as the number of opponents decreases. And eventually, when n 
becomes equal to two, the second-low bid curve matches perfectly with the average bid 
method curve and reflects an optimum markup that is close to but above the mean of the 
opposing apparent bid-to-cost ratios. 
The last observation about Figure 7.6 is that as the number of opponents n increases 
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the second-low bid method curve approaches the X-axis, while the below-average and av-
erage bid methods approach the 45° straight line from below and from above respectively. 
This means that for a large number of competitors, an owner using one of the average bid 
methods should expect to sign a contract for an average reasonable price where as an owner 
using the second-low bid method should expect to sign the contract for a much lower price 
but yet higher than the low bid method. 
Next, we consider Figure 7.7 which depicts the optimum standardized expected profit 
as a function of the standardized mean m'x. Note that for the same number of opponents, the 
profit corresponding to the second-low bid method is always lower than that for both aver-
age bid methods. This explains why, based on profit, contractors might prefer the average 
bid methods over both the second-low bid and the low bid methods. 
Another observation about Figure 7.7 is that as the number of opponents increases, 
both average-based bidding methods as well as the second-low bid method approach the 
X-axis, which means the expected profit approaches zero. This happens in the case of the 
second-low bid method because the probability of winning and the optimum markup tend 
to zero, whereas for the average bid methods, only the probability of winning approaches 
zero while the optimum markup gets closer to m\- This means that although the second-
low bid method protects the owner against extremely low bids and their resulting problems, 
it does not protect against signing the project at cost for large n, which is not a risk when 
dealing with average bid methods. 
The probability of winning at the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ as a function of the stan-
dardized mean, m'x, is shown in Figure 7.8. For a given number of opponents, and for 
small values of m'x, the probability of winning for the average bid methods is higher than 
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for the second-low bid method, while for high values of mx, the order is reversed. This 
is as expected since a large value of mx means a small variance in the opponents bids and 
therefore it is easier to underbid (n — 1) opponents and rank as the second lowest bidder 
than to be the closest to the average. However, in the case of two opponents, the results 
are different. As aforementioned, the second-low bid and the average bid methods behave 
exactly the same. And hence, for small values of m'x, the average as well as the second-
low bid method indicate a higher winning probability than the below-average bid method, 
while for high values of m'x, the opposite is true. As explained earlier, in the case of two 
opponents and a large m'x, the two opposing bids are closely clustered around the mean and 
therefore it is much easier for Ao to win by underbidding them and bringing the average 
below the two opponents bids. 
7.6 Conclusion 
Based on the simulation results presented in the previous sections and based on the con-
ducted comparisons, the second-low bid method seems to form a middle ground between 
the low bid method and the average-based bid methods. 
In fact, the second-low bid method remedies an important shortcoming of the low bid 
method which is awarding the project to unrealistically low bid prices that are likely to 
cause problems during construction. This is also a drawback of the below-average bid 
method when a project has relatively small number of competitors. 
Owners using the second-low bid method should expect to sign a contract for a higher 
price than using the low bid method, and contractors have the advantage of higher expected 
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profits. However, in some cases where the project has a small variance in its submitted bids, 
the low bid method provides the contractor with higher expected profit than the second-low 
bid method due to a higher winning probability. That is because when the opposing bids 
are narrowly grouped around their mean, it becomes easier to underbid them which favors 
winning under the low bid method. 
Furthermore, since the winner is now defined to be the second lowest bidder among all, 
it is obvious that the second low bid method induces more competition than average-based 
bid methods which leads to lower costs for the owner on the long-term. 
In conclusion, the second-low bid method presents itself as an interesting bid-awarding 
method that shares many of the advantages of the other bidding methods and remedies their 
drawbacks. It promotes price competition similar the low bid method but is a safer practice 
because it protects against unrealistic low bids. And, it benefits the owners with lower bid 
prices compared to the average-based bid methods. But, the second low bid method has the 
same drawback of the low bid method when the number of competitors is relatively high 
because the owner should again expect to sign the contract at cost which often leads to cost 
and time overruns. 
Additionally, and similar to all previously discussed bidding methods, the second-low 
bid method could be open to unethical collusion among bidders. It is possible that when 
bidding on a project, a contracting company will form a dummy partner and will let it sub-
mit an extremely low bid on the same project the real company is bidding on. This will 
lead to exclusion of the dummy's bid since it ranks as the lowest bid, and eventually will 
guarantee the original contracting firm a higher chance of winning the project no matter 
how low its bid is, as long as it is higher than the fake bid by the affiliated dummy com-
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pany. Therefore, it is crucial to monitor and limit such behavior through clear bidding rules 
and strict prequalification processes. 
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Chapter 8 
Median Bid Method 
8.1 Introduction 
The main advantage of average-based bidding methods is protecting owners from deliber-
ate or accidental extremely low bids that usually result in a lot of misunderstandings and 
disputes between the different contract parties and often leads to delays. 
However, the interdependence of all bid prices in determining the winner, a key charac-
teristic of the average and below-average bidding methods, can sometimes be an incentive 
for unethical collusive behavior by contractors. One type of collusion practice that can 
occur in countries where surety bonding does not exist yet is when the contractor affiliates 
with a group of dummy companies whose purpose is to coordinately bid high enough or 
low enough on the same project such that the bid average value is shifted to the benefit of 
the original contractor. 
Therefore, this chapter presents an alternative bid-awarding method that can remedy 
this drawback and that is the median bid method where the project winner is defined as the 
contractor whose bid ranks at the median of all submitted bids. In probability theory and 
statistics, a median of a sample is described as the number separating the higher half of a 
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sample from its lower half after the sample is orderly arranged. Accordingly, the benefit of 
a median bidding method over average-based bidding methods is that the median value is 
not affected by the magnitude of outliers, which helps limit collusion practices. 
As an illustration, Figure 8.1 shows seven contractors who have submitted the following 
bid prices: 81, 87, 91, 95, 100, 126, and 133. In reality, there are only five contractors bid-
ding on this project because the highest three bids correspond to the same parent company. 
In other words, the two highest bids submitted for this project 126 and 133 correspond to 
two dummy companies that were formed by the original contractor whose bid is equal to 
100, in order to pull the average toward its bid. The average of the seven submitted bids 
is equal to 101.86. As a result, the bid at 100 is closest to the average and would win the 
project under the average bid method. At the same time, this bid is lower than the average 
and hence it remains the winner if the below-average bid method is rather used. Thus, 
through affiliating with two dummy companies whose role is to bid high in order to shift 
the average, the contractor who bids at 100 ends up winning the project according to both 
average bid methods. However, if the dummy bids were not submitted, and the parent con-
tractor submitted solely its bid of 100, the average in this case would be equal to 90.8 and 
as a result, the winner would rather be the bid at 91 according to the average bid method, 
and the bid at 87 under the below-average bid method. 
However, if the median bid method is used instead of the average bid methods for that 
same example, the winner would be the bid at 95 and consequently the collusion between 
the highest three bids (100,126, and 133) would fail to achieve its purpose. 
The above example shown in Figure 8.1 illustrated the effect of collusion practice on 
altering the winner's identity under average-based bidding methods. On the other hand, 
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Figure 8.1 Example of Unethical Collusion among Contractors for Average Bid Methods 
Figure 8.2 presents the situation where collusion is not practiced but the winner's identity 
is affected by extreme outliers. First, part (a) of Figure 8.2 presents five contractors bid-
ding on the same project where the highest extreme bid is very high and hence pulls the 
average towards it. Thus, the average for the five bids is 78. According to the average bid 
method, the contractor whose bid is equal to 79 will win the project. However, the bid at 
76 wins under the median bid method. On the other hand, part (b) of Figure 8.2 shows the 
same four bids of 70, 73, 76, and 79 but now with a lower extreme bid of 57, which brings 
the average down to 71. Accordingly, the bid at 70 is now the winner under the average bid 
method while the bid at 73 wins under the median bid method. 
The conclusion from the example shown in Figure 8.2 in its two parts is that the pres-
ence of very high or low extreme bids can shift the average and affect the identity of the 
winner under an average bid method. Even though neither of the two bids at 92 in [a) and 
at 57 in (b) ever wins, their presence influences which of the other bids does win. However, 
this is not the case for the median bid method because whatever is the value of the extreme 
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Figure 8.2 Bidding Examples with High Extreme Bids 
high bid in (a), as long as it is above the current median, equal to 76, the winner identity 
will remain intact. Similarly for case (b), as long as the extreme low bid 57 takes any other 
value below the median value, the bid at 73 will always be the winner according to the 
median bid method. 
Clearly, a change in any of the bid amounts or the number of bidders in an average bid 
tendering scenario can affect any particular bidder's chance of winning. Hence, awarding 
the project to the median bid puts less weight on the value of the bids and their average and 
gives more importance to their number and order. 
It is important to realize that the median bid needs to be defined differently depending 
on whether the number of opponents n is odd or even. The median of a set of submitted 
bids is well-defined when the number of opponents n is even. In this case, the median bid 
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is the value that is greater than half of the opposing bids and lower than the other half. 
However, in the case where n takes odd values, i.e., an even number of competitors, the 
median, as formerly described, is not a well-defined value. In this situation, the median is 
usually defined in statistical terms to be the average of the two middle bids. Hence, there 
are three different possibilities to define the winning contractor. The first is to pick the win-
ner randomly among the two middle bids since both are at equal distance from the median 
value. The second option is to define the winning bid as the one directly above the median 
value, or in other words, the highest bid among the two middle ones. The third possibility, 
which we adopt and investigate in this chapter, is to define the winning contractor as the 
one whose bid is directly lower than the median value or equivalently the lowest among the 
two middle bids. The advantage of the last option in defining the winner over the first two 
possibilities is that it implies lower bid prices. Indeed, all the aforementioned is based on 
the assumption that the contractor knows or has an approximate estimate of the number of 
opponents prior to bidding on the project. 
This chapter models and analyzes the median bid-awarding method for even and odd 
number of competitors. First, an analytic derivation of the probability of winning for both 
cases is presented. Additionally, Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the aforemen-
tioned bidding method. The simulation results are presented in four nomograms similar 
to the ones produced for the other bidding methods discussed in the previous chapters. 
Along the ones for the median bid method, the nomograms corresponding to the average 
bid method are also depicted to show the difference between the two bidding methods. To 
be more specific, the median bid simulation results for even n where the median value is 
well-defined, are compared with those for the average bid method. On the other hand, the 
197 
simulation results for odd n are compared against the below-average bid method curves and 
that is because the winner definition under the median bid method in this case is closer to 
its definition under a below-average bidding method. At the end of this chapter, a compar-
ison between the median bid method, the low bid method and the average bid methods is 
conducted and conclusions are presented. 
8.2 Analytic Derivation of Winning Probability 
8.2.1 Odd Number of Competitors 
This section presents the analytic derivation of the probability of winning of contractor 
AQ when competing against an even number of opponents n under a median bid-awarding 
method. Similarly to the second-low bid method, the median bid method also has a rank-
ing nature where the winning contractor is defined to be the one whose bid is greater than 
half of the opposing bids and lower than the other half. Therefore, the use of order statis-
tics also proves beneficial to define the probability of winning for the median bid method. 
As defined in previous chapters, B\,B2,... ,Bn are the random variables that represent the 
bids submitted by n opponents, and consequently B^,B^2),•• •,#(«) are the order statis-
tics corresponding to them where B^ is the smallest submitted bid and B^ is the largest. 
Along the same lines, X^),X^), • • • ,X(„) were previously defined as the order statistics cor-
responding to the apparent bid-to-cost ratios of opponents X\ ,X2,... ,Xn. Note that, the two 
assumptions used in Friedman's low-bid model and stated in Chapter 4 are also at the basis 
of the median bid model developed in this chapter. This is important to allow a comparison 
between all bidding methods based on everything else being equal. 
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As stated previously, the median of a set of submitted bids is well-defined when the 
number of opponents n is even. In such a case, the number of contractors competing for 
the project including AQ is an odd number equal to n+ 1. Hence, the median is the bid 
value that ranks at (n/2 + 1). For example, if n = 4 then there will be five contractors, 
in total, bidding on the project and the median value will be the bid at (4/2 + 1), i.e., the 
third lowest bid. As a result, in order for AQ to win the project, it should submit a bid 
that will be ranked as the third lowest, or equivalently, it should be greater than two of the 
bids and lower than the other two. In general, given an even number of opponents n and 
under a median bid tendering scenario, AQ has to submit a bid £>o that falls between the 
two order statistics #(„/2) and #(„/2+i) in order to win the project. Accordingly, and using 
order statistics, the formal definition for the event "Contractor AQ wins" can be expressed 
as follows: 
{A0wms\b0} = {Bin/2) < b0 < B{n/2+l)} (8.1) 
The above expression for the event "Contractor AQ wins" can also be rewritten in terms 
of bid-to-cost ratios by dividing all bids by Ao's cost estimate CQ, i.e., by substituting the 
symbol B with the symbol X. It follows that: 
{AQ w ins |x 0 ,C 0 } = {X(n/2) < x0 < *(n/2+1)} ( 8 - 2 ) 
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As shown in (8.2), for AQ to win the project, n/2 of the opponents' apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios X\ ,X2,... ,Xn should be less than xo and n/2 of them greater than XQ. Note that X; 
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed following a distribution function 
FX(XJ). Hence, the probability that any given set of n/2 of the X; are greater than xo and 
the remaining set of n/2 values of X,- is lower than xo equals [/^(xo)]"/2^ — Fxixo))"/2. 
And since there are different partitions of the n random variables Xi,X2,...,Xn into the two 
formerly described sets, the probability of winning for contractor AQ given xo and given an 
even number of opponents or equivalently an odd number of competitors can be expressed 
as follows: 
P[A0wins|xo,co] = " ' 2][FX(xo)]n/2[l -Fx(x0)]n/2 (8.3) 
8.2.2 Even Number of Competitors 
In this section, we consider the case where the number of opponents n is odd and conse-
quently the total number of contractors bidding on the project (including Ao) is even. In 
such a case, the median of the submitted bids is not unique and is often defined to be the 
average of the two middle values. Using the statistical definition of a median, the two 
middle bids are equally close to the median and we have a tie. In this situation, we define 
the winning bid to be the lowest among the two middle bids. Therefore for AQ to win the 
project, bo has to be greater than (n — l ) /2 of the bids B\,B2,.. • ,Bn and lower than the 
remaining (n + l ) /2 bids. For instance, if AQ is competing against three opponents, then 
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it needs to bid higher than the lowest bid B^ and at the same time lower than the two 
highest bids B^2) and B^ in order to win the project. In general, given an odd number of 
opponents n, bo will guarantee winning the project only if it falls between the two middle 
bids #((n_i)/2) and Bun+iy2)- Therefore, the event "Contractor AQ wins" can be expressed 
using order statistics as follows: 
{A0 wins|fc0} = {S((„-i)/2) <bo< %„+i)/2)} (8-4) 
Let fl(m) be the median bid among the opponents' bids, i.e., the order statistic B^n+Xy2y 
The event "Contractor AQ wins" can now be expressed as follows: 
n 
{Aowins|Z70} = {f](Bi<bo<B{m))U(b0<B{m)<Bi)} (8.5) 
1=1 
n 
= {f][(Bi-B{m))(Bi-b0)>0}n(b0<B{m))} (8.6) 
i=\ 
In the above expression, the random variables Bt can be substituted with apparent bid-
to-cost ratios X-t. Let X<m\ be the order statistic that represents the median of the apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios X,-. This leads to the expression below: 
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n 
P[A0 wins|x0,c0] = { f | (Xi <xQ< X(m)) U (x0 < X{m) < X()} (8.7) 
1=1 
n 
= {P\[(Xi-X{m))(Xi-x0)>0)n(x0<X{m))} (8.8) 
1=1 
The random variables X,- are assumed to be independent and identically distributed fol-
lowing a distribution function Fx{xi). Consequently, the probability that any given set of 
(n — l ) /2 of Xi values are lower than xo and the remaining set of (n + l ) /2 values of Xt 
are greater than x$ equals [i^(^o)]^"_1^2[l — Fx(xo)](n+1^2. And since there are different 
partitions of the n random variables X\ ,X2, • • • ,Xn into the two formerly described sets, the 
probability of winning for contractor Ao given xo and given an odd number of opponents 
can be expressed as follows: 
/>[A0wins|*o,co] - ( n _ 1 ) / 2 ^ + 1 ) / 2 ! [ ^ ( x o ) ] ( " - 1 ) / 2 [ l - F x ( x 0 ) ] ( " + 1 ) / 2 (8.9) 
Similar to the second-low bid method and in contrast with the previously discussed 
average bid methods, the median bid method defines a closed-form solution for the proba-
bility of winning for Ao given a certain number of opponents n, a bid-to-cost ratio XQ, and 
an estimated project cost CQ. 
The next section models the median bid method using Monte Carlo simulation ap-
proach. It presents the algorithm designed to compute the probability of winning for Ao in 
function of AQ'S standardized bid-to-cost ratio xfQ. The simulation results are presented in 
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four nomograms similar to the ones presented for all bidding methods analyzed so far in 
this research. 
8.3 Probability of Winning—Simulation Procedure 
The steps followed to simulate the median bid process are exactly the same as those for the 
second-low bid method except the step that determines the winning region of X'Q which is 
Substep (2) of Step (5) in section 3 of Chapter 7. Below is the modified version of that 
step which is in accordance with the median bid method: 
Step 5: For every X'Q in the interval [-3,3] using an increment of 0.001: 
• Initialize to zero the number of projects won at the current values X'Q and n for the 
current simulation set k, W^X'Q.U) = 0. 
For even n 
• Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set k). The win-
ning region for that project is anywhere between the highest value *[„/2) among the 
lowest half of bids and the lowest value x/(n/2+\) among the highest half of bids. If 
X'Q belongs to its winning region W(n/2)j^x'(n/2+]) ]> m e n P r oJe c t J *s won: increase 
w>;t(;tQ,n) by 1; otherwise do nothing. Repeat this sub-step for all m projects in the 
current simulation step k. 
For odd n 
• Consider the next project j (out of the m projects in simulation set k). The win-
ning region in this case is anywhere between the median of the opponents and the 
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standardized apparent bid-to-cost ratio xj that is directly below. If x'Q belongs to 
its winning region [^un_\\i2)p^tin+x) 12)^ m e n P r 0Je c t J 1S w o n : increase Wk{x!Q,n) 
by 1; otherwise do nothing. Repeat this sub-step for all m projects in the current 
simulation step k. 
Again, the code was executed for 1000 simulation sets, each consisting of 1000 projects. 
We used for the number of opponents n, odd values of 3, 5, and 7 and even values equal to 
2, 4, and 8. The next section discusses the results obtained from simulating the median bid 
method along with the graphs corresponding to average bid methods to allow comparison 
of both on equal basis. 
8.4 Comparison of Median and Average Bid Methods 
8.4.1 Median versus Average Bid Method for Even n 
This section presents the simulation results for the median bid method for an even number 
of opponents n. The chosen values for n are 2, 4, and 8. The same four nomograms pre-
sented for the previously discussed bidding methods, are used in this section to analyze the 
difference between the median bid method and the average bid method. 
We start with Figure 8.3 which shows the probability of winning corresponding to a 
given standardized bid-to-cost ratio x'0. Note that for the case of two opponents, the curves 
for the median bid and the average bid methods match perfectly. This is logical because AQ 
has to bid between the two opposing bids in order to win under a median bid method, which 
is also a requirement if AQ wants to be the closest to the average required to win under an 
average bid method. Similar to the average bid method curves, the ones for the median bid 
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method are also bell-shaped and symmetrical around xlQ = 0. Another similarity between 
the two bidding methods is that the maximum probability of winning for any number of 
opponents occurs at x'Q = 0, i.e., at XQ = mx- This is expected because as AQ bids closer 
to the mean of the opposing bids, it has a higher chance to rank around the middle of the 
submitted bids and hence to equal the median. And as Ao bids further from the mean of 
the opponents' bids, it has less chance to equal the median and hence the probability of 
winning decreases. 
On the other hand, the median bid method curves for 4 and 8 opponents indicate a lower 
probability of winning than the average bid method ones for values of xl0 around 0, and a 
higher winning probability around the tails. This is as expected because as the number of 
opponents increases, there is a higher probability that the median of submitted bids might 
be different or away from their average. Therefore, Ao guarantees a higher chance of win-
ning the project by bidding around the mean if the average bid method is used rather than 
the median bid method. On the other hand, Figure 8.3 shows a slightly higher winning 
probability for the median bid method over the average bid method as xo moves farther 
from the apparent bid-to-cost ratio mean mx- This is again as expected. The median bid 
is by definition the value that is lower than half of the bids and higher than the other half. 
And therefore, it does not necessarily match the average of the bids. In other words, a bid 
that is far from the average of the opposing bids would still have a chance to be the median 
and win the project. This explains why a contractor whose bid is lower or higher than the 
average of the opposing bids has a low chance of winning under the average bid method but 
has a higher probability to win under the median bid method. Therefore, contractors might 
prefer the average bid method if they plan to bid around the apparent bid-to-cost ratios' 
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mean, and would rather prefer the median bid method if they bid away from the average. 
We shall now move to Figure 8.4 which shows the optimum bid-to-cost ratio given by 
(XQ — \)/ox as a function of the standardized mean m'x. As previously explained, it is ex-
pected that for the case of two opponents (n = 2), the curves for the average bid and the 
median bid method match perfectly. 
Similarly to all the bidding methods discussed so far, the optimum markup increases 
as m!x increases. Figure 8.4 shows that as the number of opponents increases beyond 2, 
the curves for the median bid method become slightly higher than those for the average 
bid method. This small difference between the two curves is more obvious when m'x takes 
small values and gradually disappears with large values of m'x. This means that for large 
variance in the opponents' bids, contractor Ao is expected to adopt a slightly higher bid-
to-cost ratio if the median bid method is used instead of the average bid method. Based 
on available previous bidding data, contractor Ao can have an estimate about the expected 
mean of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios mx and their standard deviation ax- However, with 
a high variance in the opponents' bids, it is hard to expect the median of the bids and 
therefore it is logical for Ao to select a higher bid-to-cost ratio than the one used under an 
average bid method. 
On the other hand, a large value of the standardized mean m'x implies a small variance 
in the opponents' apparent bid-to-cost ratios, which means that their bids are closely clus-
tered around the mean mx. In this case, the median has to be within this narrow cluster of 
bids and therefore has a higher chance to be closer to the average. This explains why, for 
the same number of opponents n, the curves for the average and the median bid methods 
converge as mx increases. 
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In addition, Figure 8.4 shows that the curves for the median bid method approach the 
45° straight line as both n and m'x increase. It follows that as the number of opponents n 
increases and as the variance in the apparent bid-to-cost ratios decreases, AQ is expected to 
bid closer to the mean under both bid tendering scenarios: the average bid method and the 
median bid method. 
Figure 8.5 shows the maximum expected standardized profit as a function of the stan-
dardized mean m'x for both average and median bid methods. Similarly to the two previous 
nomograms, the curves for n = 2 for both bidding methods are identical. However, for the 
case of 4 and 8 opponents, the curves for the median bid method indicate a lower expected 
profit than the ones for the average bid method. In fact, these curves match for small values 
of mx and then they diverge as m'xtakes larger values. The difference in the expected profit 
between the two bidding methods is due to the difference in the probability of winning 
since Figure 8.5 reflects the same optimum markup under both methods for high values of 
m'x. This is expected because a small variance in the opposing bids implies that the bids 
are forming a narrow cluster around their mean and therefore contractor Ao is expected to 
bid close to the mean in order to win. The latter statement is clearly depicted in Figure 8.5 
through the tendency of both median and average bid method curves to approach the 45° 
line (XQ = mx) as the number of opponents increases and as m'x takes larger values. As a 
result, and according to Figure 8.5, bidding closer to the mean results in higher probability 
to win under the average bid method. This explains why the median bid method leads to 
lower profits than the average bid method and consequently contractors might rather prefer 
the latter method in the case of small variance in the opposing bids. However, for small val-
ues of m'x, i.e., for high variance in the opponents' bids, the contractor would be indifferent 
209 
between the two bidding methods since they lead to almost the same expected profit. 
Another observation about Figure 8.5, which is also a similarity with the average bid 
method, is that the maximum expected profit under the median bid method approaches zero 
as the number of opponents becomes very large. This is expected because the probability 
of winning also approaches zero as shown in Figure 8.6 although the optimum bid-to-cost 
ratio XQ remains above mx. This means that as n increases, the expected profit approaches 
zero under a median bid method because the probability of winning does so, however, the 
contractor is still expected to make good profit if the project is won. 
The fourth nomogram presented in this section shows the probability of winning at 
the optimum markup versus the standardized mean of apparent bid-to-cost ratios m'x, as 
depicted in Figure 8.6. Needless to say, the curves for both bidding methods correspond-
ing to two opponents match perfectly. But for n greater than two, the median bid method 
shows a slightly higher winning probability for negative values of m'x, while the average bid 
method dominates as mx increases. This is again as expected because a negative value for 
m'x means that the mean of opposing bids is less than Ao's estimated cost and consequently 
AQ would bid higher than mx which favors winning under the median bid method. On the 
flip side, a larger m'x indicates a smaller variance in the submitted bids. As a result, AQ 
tends to bid closer to the opposing bids' average, which favors winning under the average 
bid method. 
8.4.2 Median versus Below-Average Bid Method for Odd n 
In the previous section, we presented the simulation results for the median bid method 
when the number of opponents n is even. In this case, the number of bidders including AQ 
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is odd and hence the median is well defined. A comparison between the average bid and 
the median bid method was studied because of the resemblance between the corresponding 
curves. 
This section presents the simulation results for the median bid method when n takes 
odd values. In such a case, the total number of bidders is even and therefore the median 
value is defined as the average of the two middle submitted bids. Hence, the definition 
of the winning bid under a median bid tendering scenario is altered to accommodate this 
situation. As previously defined, the lowest among the two middle bids is considered the 
winner under the median bid method for an odd number of opponents. 
Additionally, this section includes a comparison between the median bid method for 
odd n and the below-average bid method. The reason for comparing the median bid method 
with the below-average rather than the average bid method is the similarity in the definition 
of the project winner. In other words, the median bid method for an odd n computes the 
average of the two middle bids and considers the bid below as the winner, which is similar 
to the below-average bid method that defines the winner to be the contractor whose bid is 
closest to and lower than the average. The figures presented below depict the simulation 
results for both bidding methods for n equal to 3, 5, and 7. 
We start our discussion with Figure 8.7 that shows the probability of winning given a 
specific standardized bid-to-cost ratio x!0. The median bid curves remain bell-shaped and 
almost symmetrical but are skewed to the left. The maximum probability of winning occurs 
at a negative x"Q, i.e., at an xo < mx for any odd n, and this is expected since the winning 
bid is now defined to be the lowest of the two middle bids. 
For the same n and x!Q, the median bid method results in a lower probability of winning 
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than the below-average bid method for small values of X*Q\ however, the opposite holds as 
x!Q takes large values. This is again expected because the below-average bidding method 
allows a contractor to submit a bid that is so low such that it brings the average below all 
opposing bids and consequently wins the project for being the only bid lower than the av-
erage. However, this can not happen under a median bid tendering scenario because a very 
low bid has minimal chance to be ranked among the two middle bids and hence has a low 
winning probability. On the other hand, for high values of x*Q, i.e., for XQ > mx, AQ has less 
chance to be the one whose bid is lower and closest to the mean but has a higher chance to 
be the lowest among the two middle bids. That's why for positive x!Q, Figure 8.7 shows that 
the median bid method curves are higher than the ones for the below-average bid method. 
This means that in the case of an even number of bidders, the median bid method is 
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more beneficial to owners than the below-average bid method because it safeguards them 
against extremely low bids; which constitutes a main drawback of the below-average ten-
dering approach. On the other hand, if a contractor plans to bid higher than the expected 
mean of its opposing bids, it will have a better chance of winning the project if the median 
bid method is used. In such a situation, the median bid method works to the advantage of 
contractors. 
Second, we consider Figure 8.8 which shows the optimum bid-to-cost ratio given by 
(XQ — 1 )/ox as a function of the standardized mean m'x. It is interesting to observe that 
the curves for the median bid method corresponding to different values for n behave simi-
larly to the below-average bid method ones in the sense that they cross each other around 
m'x = 1.25. That is, for a given standardized mean m'x < 1.25, the optimum bid-to-cost 
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ratio, XQ, decreases as the number of opponents, n, increases; however, the opposite holds 
as m'x takes values larger than 1.25. In fact, a large m'x implies a small standard devia-
tion Gx for the apparent bid-to-cost ratios of opponents, which means that their bids are 
grouped together around the mean. And with such a small variance, it is most likely that 
the two middle bids would be closer to the average. And as the number of opponents in-
creases, the lowest among the two middle bids has a higher chance to be closer to the mean 
mx and thus the optimum markup approaches mx- Therefore, the optimal bid-to-cost ratio 
increases with an increase in n, for large mx. 
On the other hand, note that XQ remains below mx, which is again another similarity 
with the below-average bid method. This happens because, with very small variance in 
the submitted bids and with a large number of opponents, it is expected that the median 
and average values of bids will be close to each other and hence the lowest among the two 
middle bids will most probably be below the average. 
Another main observation about Figure 8.8 is that, given m'x and n, the median bid 
method always indicates a higher optimum markup than the below-average bid method. 
This is due to the difference in the winner definition between the two bidding methods. 
The winner under a below-average bid method is determined to be the one whose bid is 
closest to but lower than the average. However, the median bid method considers the low-
est among the two middle bids to be the winner and does not necessarily have to be below 
the average; hence, it allows for higher bid-to-cost ratios. This means that owners should 
expect higher bid prices if the median bid method is used instead of the below-average one. 
The third nomogram to study is depicted in Figure 8.9 which shows the maximum ex-
pected profit given a particular m'x. For the same number of opponents, the median bid 
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method indicates a higher profit than the below-average bid method. However, note that as 
the number of opponents increases, the gap between the curves for the two bidding methods 
gradually disappears and reaches a state, at n = 7, where both methods lead to almost the 
same expected profit. This happens because the probability of winning at the optimum un-
der a median bid method is higher than that for the below-average bid method for small n, 
but the order is reversed when the number of opponents increases, as shown in Figure 8.10. 
For instance, for n = 7, the probability of winning is lower under the median bid method 
but the optimum bid-to-cost ratio is higher, which results in an expected profit almost equal 
to that under a below-average bid method. The conclusion drawn from Figure 8.9 is that as 
the number of opponents increases, both methods result in the same expected profit for con-
tractors. Note again that as n increases, the maximum expected profit approaches zero for 
the median bid method. Similarly to the below-average bid method, this happens because 
the probability of winning does so, however, the optimum markup approaches mx. 
Figure 8.10 shows the probability of winning at the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ as a 
function of m'x. This winning probability is higher under the median bid method for small 
n, and under the below-average bid method for high n. But note that as the number of op-
ponents increases, the probability of winning remains higher under the median bid method 
for small m'x but the order gets reversed as m'x increases, which is the case for n = 5 and 
n = 7 as shown in Figure 8.10. This means that a large variance in the submitted bids favors 
winning under the median bid method irrespective of the number of opponents. However, 
as the bids' variance decreases and n increases, the below-average bid method implies a 
higher winning probability. 
Another observation to note about Figure 8.10 and which was mentioned previously, is 
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that the median bid method is similar to the below-average bid method in the fact that the 
probability of winning at the optimum markup approaches zero as the number of opponents 
increases. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The median bid method was presented in two forms in this chapter. The first applies to the 
case where the total number of bidders is odd and defines the bid at the median to be the 
winner, simply as indicated by the name of this bidding method. The second form applies 
to the situation where there is an even number of contractors bidding for the project and 
consequently there is no unique median bid. In such a case, the median value is defined 
as the average of the two middle bids and the winner is assumed to be the one lower than 
the average. Accordingly, the first version of the median bid method where the median is 
well-defined was compared to the average bid method, and the second version defined for 
an odd n resembles more the below-average bid method and hence was compared to it. 
The main advantage of the median bid method is that it does not allow the magnitude 
of the lowest and highest bids to influence the bidding process and determine the winning 
bid. Hence, it protects owners and contractors against bidders who tend to abuse average-
based bidding methods through submitting abnormally low or high bids in hopes of altering 
the average. Additionally, it remedies the basic drawback for the low bid and the below-
average bidding method with small n, which allow for extremely low bidders to win the 
project. 
Whether n is odd or even, the median bid method implies slightly higher bid prices 
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than average bid methods, which is not economical for owners. However, this increase is 
small. Moreover, as the number of opponents increases or the bid variance decreases, the 
optimum markup under a median bid method approaches the apparent bid-to-cost ratios' 
mean mj from above for even n, and from below for odd n. This means that in the limit, 
the bid prices obtained under a median bid method and under average bid methods are very 
close, with the difference that extremely low and high bids have less effect on the winner's 
identity under a median bid method. 
The simulation results presented throughout this chapter confirmed our introductory 
statement that the median bid method is more sensitive to the variance of the submitted 
bids than to their actual values. For high-risk projects which depict a large variance in the 
submitted bids, contractors would most probably favor the median bid method over average 
bid methods because it leads to a greater winning probability and consequently higher ex-
pected profits. This is more obvious in the case of an odd number of opponents as shown in 
Figures 8.9 and 8.10. On the flip side, for low-risk projects with small bid-to-cost variance, 
the average bid method leads to higher profits than the median bid method except in the 
trivial case of two opponents where both methods become equivalent. Similarly, for odd n, 
it can be obviously concluded from Figure 8.9 that the median bid method leads to lower 
profit than the below-average bid method as the number of opponents increases. Based 
on the aforementioned, the median bid method is more beneficial to contractors for high-
risk projects where a high variance in the submitted bids is anticipated, however, average 
bid methods are preferable in the case of small bid-to-cost variance and large number of 
competitors. 
The main advantage of the median bid method over average-based bid methods is that 
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it safeguards owners and contractors against extremely low or high bids and against col-
lusive behavior among some contractors which usually aim at pulling the bids' average to 
their side in order to guarantee a higher chance of winning the project. Hence, the median 
bid method is best used when the owner expects to have highly variable bids for a cer-
tain project. This is to the advantage of both parties because it protects the owner against 
collusion practice, and results in greater expected profit for the contractor. However, if the 
owner is tendering a low-risk project and hence, expects a small variability in the submitted 
bids with a large number of opponents, the chance of having abnormally high or low bids 
is consequently minimal. In this case, it might be better to use an average-based bidding 
method which will lead to a higher expected profit for the contractor and to a lower bid 
price for the owner. 
Last, the median bid method shares the basic drawback of the average bid method in 
that it does not promote intense price competition which results in lower costs for owners. 
However, it is important to realize that this does not mean that the median bid method dis-
courages contractors to develop and adopt cost-saving technologies. The real shortcoming 
of the median bid method in this concern is that these technical innovations and cost re-
duction techniques are now passed to the owners in the form of lower bid prices at a much 
lower pace than all the other bidding methods studied in this research. 
Finally, the greatest shortcoming of the median bid method is that the median must be 
defined differently for even and odd number of competitors. This makes it difficult to de-
fine the bidding process in practice and presents the contractors with two different optimal 
policies in case the number of opponents n is completely unpredictable prior to bidding. 
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Chapter 9 
Effect of Bidding Methods on the 
Adoption of Cost-Saving Innovations 
9.1 Introduction 
The low bid method has been the most commonly used bid-awarding method for public 
projects because it induces strong competition which incites contractors to look for innova-
tive cost saving technologies that would lower their costs and provide owners with the best 
return on investment. Thus, the low bid method allows the cost-savings achieved by a con-
tractor through adopting innovative technical and managerial developments to be passed to 
the owner in the form of lower bid prices. 
It is obvious that adopting a cost-saving technology by any contractor provides him 
with higher expected profits for any bid-awarding method. But, whether and if yes, how 
much of these savings translate into lower bid prices for the owners varies under different 
bid selection approaches. 
Therefore, this chapter studies the effect of each competitive bidding method studied in 
this thesis on the variation of bid prices that follows the adoption of cost-saving innovations 
by contractors. A numerical example is used to illustrate the results. 
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9.2 Change in m'x Resulting from a Cost-Saving Technol-
ogy 
The bidding models developed in this research are considered from the perspective of a spe-
cific contractor A$. Hence, the nomograms presented for the bidding methods studied in 
the previous chapters require that Ao uses past available bidding data to produce estimates 
mx and ax for the normal distribution's mean and variance of his opponents' apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios. These estimates are determined according to the following equations: 
LN r " i v. • 
LU»J 
mx = -^j (9.1) 
.2_Z7=iE£i(*tt-fo)2 6X = ~ ' = , " ~ v " ' (9.2) 
Where 
Bij = the bid submitted by the ith contractor for the previous project j . 
CQJ = the estimated cost of contractor AQ for project j . 
Xij - Bij/cQj = Apparent Bid-to-Cost Ratio for Opponent / on project j . 
rij = the number of competitors facing contractor AQ on project j . 
N = the total number of previous projects for which the bidding data is available. 
Let us now assume that contractor Ao has a technological or managerial advantage over 
its competitors, which would reduce its estimated cost COJ for all previous and upcoming 
projects by a fixed ratio, p(0 < p < l) . This means m a t e ' s updated cost estimate for each 
previous project j , used in (9.1) and (9.2), is now equal to (l — P)CQJ. Accordingly, the new 
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estimates mxnew and 6^ for the normal distribution's mean and variance of the apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios are now determined as follows: 
mxnew =
 7 = 1 7 Jnm (9.3) L
N \^nj v. 
( 1 - / > ) % • J 
[l/(l-p)]g. llg|g,7Aoj 
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(9.4) 
(9.5) 
LUnj 
mx (9.6) 
ai = 7" '~ ^ "w -^— (9.7) 
(9.8) 
= [ 7 T - T ^ (9-9) 
Hence, 
Consequently, the new value for the standardized bid-to-cost ratio mean, m'x , can be 
computed as follows: 
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m'x = - 4 F (9.11) 
A- new 
= J (9.12) 
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Hence, by adopting cost-saving technologies, AQ would have lower cost estimates CQJ 
for past projects j = 1,2,...,N, which leads to higher apparent bid-to-cost ratios Xij. Ac-
cording to (9.6) and (9.10), this results in higher estimates for the apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios' mean rhx, and standard deviation &x- It is shown through (9.14) that higher rhx and 
dx result in a higher standardized mean m'Y . 
The following section shows a numerical example to illustrate how this difference in 
m'x resulting from a cost-reduction technique affects the optimum markup and bid price of 
a contractor under the different investigated bidding methods. 
9.3 Example Application 
We shall consider a project where contractor AQ is facing four opponents (n = 4). AQ has 
already determined its cost estimate for the project CQ, and aims at determining the opti-
mum markup XQ and consequently its bid price bo = XQCQ, that would maximize its expected 
profit. Based on historical bidding data, AQ estimated the mean for apparent bid-to-cost ra-
tios, mx, to be equal to 1.05 and their standard deviation, o"x — 0.1. Hence, the standardized 
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Figure 9.1 Optimum Standardized Markup as a function of m'x given n = 4 for All Studied 
Bidding Methods 
mean mj,. is equal to (1.05 - l)/0.1 =0 .5 . 
Figure 9.1 shows the optimum bid-to-cost ratio given by (XQ — \)/ox as a function of 
the standardized mean m'x for all the studied bidding methods. Table 9.1, presented below, 
uses Figure 9.1 to determine the optimum markup XQ corresponding to m'x = 0.5 for each 
of the considered methods. It also shows Ao's bid price bo and his expected profit £[V|XQ] 
(based on Figure 9.2) as a function of its already determined cost estimate for the project, 
c0. 
Let us now assume that contractor AQ has a technological or managerial advantage over 
its competitors which would reduce its cost estimate CQ for all previous and upcoming 
projects by 1%, i.e., by a factor p = 0.01. Thus, Ao's new estimated cost for the project 
would take into account the advantage of adopting this cost-saving technology and thus 
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Figure 9.2 Optimum Standardized Expected Profit as a function of m'x given n = 4 for All 
Studied Bidding Methods 
will be equal to 0.99co-
Similarly, the new values for the estimates of the mean and the standard deviation of 
the apparent bid-to-cost ratios are determined based on (9.6) and (9.10) as follows: 
1 
m
xnew = 1-0.01 
]1.05= 1.0606 (9.15) 
°Xnew = [ 
1 
1-0.01 
0.1=0.101 (9.16) 
Hence, based on (9.14) the new value of m'x is determined to be: 
m' = 0.5 + ^ ° i = 0.6 (9.17) 
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Bid Awarding Method 
Low Bid 
Second Low Bid 
Average Bid 
Below-Average Bid 
Median Bid 
Truncated Average Bid 
Truncated Below-Average Bid 
(x„*-l)/ox 
0.3536 
0.5664 
0.8915 
0.6342 
0.9265 
0.9276 
0.6593 
x0* 
1.0354 
1.0566 
1.0892 
1.0634 
1.0927 
1.0928 
1.0659 
E[Vlx0*]/c0ox 
0.0343 
0.1266 
0.2788 
0.1583 
0.2750 
0.2759 
0.1618 
b0 (multiplied by 
Co) 
1.0354 
1.0566 
1.0892 
1.0634 
1.0927 
1.0928 
1.0659 
E[VI xu*] (multiplied 
byc„) 
0.0034 
0.0127 
0.0279 
0.0158 
0.0275 
0.0276 
0.0162 
Table 9.1 Ao's Optimum Bid-to-Cost Ratio and Optimum Expected Profit Corresponding to 
Different Bidding Methods given m'x = 0.5 and n = 4 
Bid Awarding Method 
Low Bid 
Second Low Bid 
Average Bid 
Below-Average Bid 
Median Bid 
Truncated Average Bid 
Truncated Below-Average Bid 
(x„*-l)/ax 
0.3777 
0.6146 
0.9619 
0.6916 
0.9948 
1.0007 
0.7168 
x0* 
1.0381 
1.0621 
1.0972 
1.0699 
1.1005 
1.1011 
1.0724 
E[Vlx0*]/(0.99c0o-x) 
0.0451 
0.1500 
0.3106 
0.1841 
0.3053 
0.3062 
0.1872 
b0 ( multiplied by 
Co) 
1.0278 
1.0515 
1.0862 
1.0592 
1.0895 
1.0901 
1.0617 
E[VI x0*] (multiplied 
byc„) 
0.0045 
0.0150 
0.0311 
0.0184 
0.0305 
0.0306 
0.0187 
Table 9.2 Ao's Optimum Bid-to-Cost Ratio and Optimum Expected Profit Corresponding to 
Different Bidding Methods given m'x = 0.6 and n = 4 
Table 9.2 shows the results for the optimum bid-to-cost ratio XQ, the bid bo and the op-
timum expected profit isfVlxg] that correspond to the new value of m'x, given that the cost 
estimate for the new project AQ is bidding on is now reduced to 0.99crj. 
By looking at the columns corresponding to the bid price bo in both tables 9.1 and 9.2, 
it is clear that adopting a cost-saving technology results in a lower bid price for AQ under 
any of the studied bidding methods. This provides A$ with a competitive edge over its com-
petitors particularly under a low-bid tendering scenario because it is a heavily price-based 
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Figure 9.3 Reduction in Optimal Bid Price per Unit Reduction in Estimated Cost 
competition. In addition, and as expected, the two columns corresponding to the expected 
profit in tables 9.1 and 9.2 indicate that the cost-saving technique adopted by AQ leads to 
higher profits under all bidding methods. 
To show the effect of each bidding method on how much of the savings in CQ get passed 
to the owner, Figure 9.3 shows the value dbo/dco for each, dbo represents the difference 
in bid prices obtained before and after the adoption of the cost saving technique and dcQ 
is the 1% decrease in the estimated cost of Ao- It is clear from Figure 9.3 that the low 
bid method (LBM) allows the highest percentage of cost savings to be passed to own-
ers in the form of lower bid prices. This figure shows that the low bid method indicates 
dbg = 0.15dco = 0.75%co which means that a 1 % reduction in AQ' estimated cost results in 
0.75%co reduction in bid (passed to the owner) and 0.25%co kept by the contractor. How-
ever, the average bid method (ABM), its truncated version (TABM) and the median bid 
method (MBM) reflect the lowest percentage for the bid price decrease and thus indicate 
that a much lower part of the contractor's cost savings is passed to the owner under these 
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methods. For instance, out of the 1% reduction in cost, only 0.31%, 0.29%, and 0.27% 
of this reduction are passed to the owner under the median bid, the average bid, and the 
truncated average bid methods respectively. The second low bid method (SLBM) with a 
dbo = 0.51%co, followed by the below-average method (BABM) and its truncated version 
(TBABM) with a dbo — 0.42%CQ rank in the middle. This confirms that the below-average 
bid method induces more price competition than the average bid method and hence it makes 
a contractor's bid price more sensitive to a change in his cost estimate. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter studied the effect of the different investigated bidding methods in this research 
on the decline level of bid prices resulting from the adoption of managerial or technological 
innovations that result in lower project costs for contractors. 
All bidding methods encourage the adoption of cost-saving technologies since it results 
in higher bid-to-cost ratios and hence higher profits for contractors as shown through the 
numerical example. 
In addition, the analysis conducted here showed that adopting a cost-saving technique 
results in lower bid prices under all bidding methods. The only difference is that the rate 
of bid price reduction varies between the different methods depending on the level of com-
petition they induce in the market. The low bid method allows the highest portion of the 
contractor's cost savings to be passed to the owner. The average and the median bid meth-
ods are not as highly competitive as the low bid method and hence they reflect a much 
lower bid price reduction. The second-low bid and the below-average bid methods induce 
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a slower rate of bid price reduction than the low bid method but higher than the average 
and median methods. 
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Chapter 10 
Determination of Optimum Markup 
Under a Risk-Sensitive Bidding Model 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the development and formulation of a risk-sensitive bidding model 
that aims at determining the optimal markup for a project under the assumptions of a risk-
sensitive contractor and an uncertain final cost for the project. The developed bidding 
models in previous chapters of this research were designed for the same aforementioned 
objective but were based on the following two assumptions: 
1. Contractor AQ is risk-neutral and therefore the optimum markup XQ is determined to 
be the value of XQ that maximizes the expected monetary value of profit. 
2. The mean of the distribution of the final cost of the project is equal to its estimated 
cost co, which is already determined before bidding on the project. Thus, as shown 
earlier the variance of the project's final cost does not affect the optimal bid-to-cost 
ratio XQ that maximizes the contractor's expected profit. 
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This chapter introduces some modifications to the optimal markup decision-making 
process, studied in previous bidding models, to make it more realistic. It aims at provid-
ing additional insight into the effect of the contractor's risk aversion and the project cost 
variance on the optimum markup. The major difference in that chapter is that the optimum 
markup is now determined to be the value that maximizes the expected utility of profit of 
contractor Ao rather than the one that maximizes its expected monetary value of profit. 
We start the chapter by describing the uncertainties included in the optimal markup 
decision such as project cost variance and the risk preference of a contractor. Then we in-
troduce some concepts that are of major use when modeling a contractor's risk sensitivity 
such as the certain equivalent and risk premium of a lottery, the utility theory and concepts, 
the delta property and constant risk aversion, and the exponential utility function. Then we 
move to formulating the risk-sensitive form of the bidding model after stating the relevant 
assumptions and introducing the necessary parameters. The risk-sensitive optimal markup 
decision process, developed in this chapter, will be applied to two of the previously studied 
bidding models: the low bid method and the average bid method. An example application 
will be used to illustrate the effect of risk aversion and cost variance on the optimal markup 
value for the former two bidding methods. In addition, a sensitivity analysis over the risk-
sensitive model parameters is performed by changing these parameters and resolving for 
the optimal markup. 
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10.2 Uncertainties in Optimum Markup Decisions 
10.2.1 Uncertainty in the Actual Cost of a Project 
Cost uncertainty is not only an issue at the conceptual phase of a project but continues even 
into the construction phase. To estimate the cost of a project, a contractor depends mainly 
on its expertise and on available historical data about similar cost items of past projects 
at the time. Then, the bid price is determined by adding to the estimated project cost, 
a markup fraction that covers contingencies, general and administrative expenses and the 
contractor's desired profit. The bidding models discussed in the previous chapters assumed 
that the project's estimated cost at the bidding stage is equal to the expected value of the 
actual cost of the project at its completion. Let C be the actual cost of the project with a 
probability density function fc(c), an expected value of mc and a variance oc. In previous 
analysis we assumed that c$ = mc and because contractor AQ was assumed risk-neutral, the 
expected profit was expressed as follows: 
E[V] = P[Wm\x0,c0} J (b0-c)fc(c)dc (10.1) 
= P[Wm\xo,co\(b0-E[C}) (10.2) 
= P[Wm\xo,c0]{b0-mc) (10.3) 
= P[Wm\x0,co}{bo-c0) (10.4) 
= P[Win|xo,co](xo-l)co (10-5) 
However, the actual cost of a project at its completion might be higher or lower than its 
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estimated cost. Sometimes, the actual cost might even exceed the project bid price which 
results in an unfavorable situation for the contractor who ends up performing the job at cost 
with no profit. This chapter takes into consideration this project's cost uncertainty in deter-
mining the optimum markup. To be more specific, this chapter assumes that the project's 
actual cost follows a distribution function Fc(c) with a mean mc and a standard deviation 
GQ. Additionally, it assumes that the estimated cost of the project CQ is equal to the expected 
actual cost, mc- Hence, the actual profit a contractor earns given that he won the project is 
now expressed in this chapter as the subtraction of the actual cost of the project from the 
submitted bid price bo. 
Effective cost estimation can be influenced by two types of factors: internal factors 
which can be controlled by the estimating team of the firm, and external factors that influ-
ence cost estimation but can not be controlled by the estimators (Liu and Zhu 2007). The 
internal factors are the ones relating to the accuracy of the firm's cost estimation techniques, 
which is in turn a function of many other factors such as quality of the contractor manage-
ment system, expertise of the estimating team, completeness of the project information, the 
time allowed to prepare the estimate, and previous experience on similar projects. On the 
other hand, the external factors that lead to inaccurate estimated cost for the project include 
unforeseen soil conditions, inconvenient weather conditions, design errors or omissions, 
changes in material prices, change orders, labor problems resulting in slower work rates, 
subcontractor's default, and many others. 
All the aforementioned uncertainties can be named as construction risks and depending 
on the contract type, they can be carried exclusively by the owner or the contractor, or they 
can be shared by both (Carr 1977). Therefore, a contractor has to consider the possibility 
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and the magnitude of construction risks involved in a certain project, and has to decide on 
its optimum markup accordingly. 
10.2.2 Contractor's Risk Sensitivity 
In addition to the uncertainty in the actual project cost, the attitude of the contractor toward 
risk taking is of equal or even more importance in choosing the optimum markup and the 
resulting bid price for a project. The bidding models analyzed in previous chapters of this 
research do not capture the risk attitude of the contractor, and base the optimum markup 
decision on maximizing the expected monetary value (EMV) of profit. In such a case, the 
contractor is said to be risk-neutral, i.e., someone who does not care about risk and can 
ignore risk aspects of the decision alternatives he faces. However, for decisions made un-
der uncertainty such as the optimum markup decision and in complex environments such 
as the construction field, expected monetary value of profits do not always represent true 
equivalence of values with respect to the contractor. In other words, the same amount of 
profit might be valued differently by two distinct contractors with different risk attitudes. 
A contractor's financial situation is a main factor in shaping its risk behavior. For example, 
the same amount of money would have more value for a contractor who is in a bad finan-
cial situation and would value less for another who is in good financial terms. Sometimes, 
the same contractor can have varying attitude toward risk depending on the situation he is 
facing. If a contractor is satisfied with the workload he has at a certain time and is in a 
stable financial position, he would tend to avoid taking risks. However, if that contractor 
reaches a stage where he becomes in urgent need for work to keep its business running, or 
if he reaches a bad financial situation and becomes in need for money to cover its incurred 
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costs, he might then switch to a risk-seeking behavior in the hope of avoiding more losses 
and to prevent worsening the situation further. 
Hence, evaluating the alternatives of a decision problem based on monetary values 
might not be the most convenient way to define the optimal alternative especially if there is 
uncertainty in the outcomes of the different alternatives. The utility theory, a widely used 
concept in decision making analysis, represents a more accurate measure of the value of 
money to a contractor. The utility function translates dollars amounts into utility numbers 
that reflect the worth of those amounts to the contractor. The shape of a contractor's utility 
curve is determined by its attitude toward risk. Using the utility theory concept, the decision 
maker, which is the contractor in this case, would now choose the optimum alternative to be 
the one that maximizes the expected utility rather than maximizing the expected monetary 
value. 
10.3 Modeling Contractor's Risk Sensitivity 
As stated above, the bidding models discussed so far in this research were studied from 
the perspective of a risk-neutral contractor and thus the optimum markup was determined 
based on maximum expected monetary value of profit. This chapter introduces the risk at-
titude of a contractor into the bidding process and studies its effect on the optimum markup 
decision. This section will discuss in more details the concept of utility theory, and other 
relevant notions such as the certain equivalent of a lottery, the risk premium, the delta prop-
erty, the exponential utility curve, the risk tolerance, and the risk aversion coefficient of a 
contractor. 
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Figure 10.1 Example of a Lottery with Two Prizes 
10.3.1 Risk Sensitivity 
Risk sensitivity, also called risk preference, refers to the attitude of a contractor towards 
risk when making decisions about uncertain outcomes. A lottery can be described as a 
proposition with uncertain outcomes (Howard, 1977). A project with different uncertain 
outcomes is an example of a lottery where those outcomes could be different profit levels of 
the project or different possible costs of the project. Each alternative in a lottery is associ-
ated with its probability of occurrence. Lotteries can be compared based on their expected 
values which are computed by multiplying the value of each alternative by its probability 
and summing the result over all branches of the lottery. Figure 10.1 presents an example of 
a lottery with two alternatives: winning $100 with a probability of 0.8, and winning $1,000 
with a probability of 0.2. One way to present this lottery is through its expected monetary 
value equal to 0.8* 100+0.2* 1,000 = $280. 
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Certain Equivalent 
Using expected monetary value of a lottery to compare between different decision alterna-
tives (lotteries) is not completely realistic because it does not capture the risk attitude of 
the decision maker. A more accurate measure of a lottery is its certain equivalent, which is 
the least amount of money that a decision maker would accept to give away (sell) the set 
of uncertain alternatives expressed by the lottery given that he already owns it (Howard, 
1977). Thus, the decision maker is indifferent between receiving the certain equivalent and 
facing the risk of the lottery. Different lotteries have different certain equivalents. Addi-
tionally, different contractors can have different estimates for the certain equivalent of the 
same lottery. That is because the risk attitude and the financial status of a contractor are 
the main determinants of the certain equivalent of a lottery. For example, if a contractor 
owns the lottery shown in Figure 10.1 and estimates its certain equivalent at $300, then 
this means that this contractor is indifferent between playing this lottery with its inherent 
uncertainty and receiving the amount of $300 with certainty. This is expressed graphically 
in Figure 10.2 where the symbol ~ indicates the indifference of the contractor between the 
lottery shown in Figure 10.1 and another lottery that pays $300 with a probability of 1. 
Note that the certain equivalent could be a negative amount of money. This applies if a 
contractor is facing a lottery of negative outcomes such as construction costs. In this case, 
the certain equivalent is defined as the amount of money this contractor is willing to pay 
(to a subcontractor in this case) in order to avoid the risk embedded in the outcomes of that 
lottery (Ioannou 1989). 
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Figure 10.2 Certain Equivalent of Lottery 
Risk Premium 
If a lottery is described by a random variable Y, then C£[F] represents the certain equiva-
lent of the lottery and E[Y] is its expected monetary value. The risk premium RP[Y] of the 
lottery is defined to be the amount of money the contractor is willing to forego in order to 
avoid the risk of playing the lottery. This can be expressed as follows: 
RP[Y]=E[Y]-CE[Y] (10.6) 
If the risk premium of the lottery Y is equal to zero, then it can be concluded that the 
contractor who owns that lottery is risk-neutral since he is indifferent between playing the 
lottery and receiving one of its uncertain outcomes or selling the lottery at a price equal to 
its expected value. On the other hand, if the risk premium is positive, the contractor is de-
scribed as risk-averse. In this case, the contractor would rather sell the lottery for a certain 
equivalent that is less than the expected value of the lottery than play the lottery and face 
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the risk of uncertain outcomes. However, if the risk premium is negative, the contractor 
is classified as risk-seeking. This means that the contractor prefers to play the lottery and 
face the risk embedded in its uncertain outcomes over selling it for its expected value and 
this explains why the certain equivalent of the lottery is higher than its expected monetary 
value. For instance, the lottery example shown in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 indicates a risk-
preferring contractor since the risk premium is negative and equal to $280 — $300 = $ — 20. 
It is more common for a contractor to be risk-neutral when dealing with decisions involv-
ing small risks and to be risk-averse in situations with larger risks. In this chapter, we will 
be concerned primarily with the risk aversion case and we will investigate the effect of 
different degrees of risk aversion on the optimum markup. 
10.3.2 Utility Function 
The utility function represents a more accurate measure of true worth of money values to 
contractors. A utility function u(x) is a curve that takes as an argument* which is a possible 
lottery outcome in dollar values, and returns a real number that represents the value (utility) 
of that outcome to the contractor according to its preference among choices. Therefore, the 
risk attitude of a contractor determines the shape of its utility function. For instance, a 
risk-averse contractor will have a concave utility curve, where as a risk-seeking contractor 
will have a convex utility curve. On the other hand, if the contractor is risk-neutral then 
its utility curve is simply a straight line because such a contractor does not take risk into 
account and therefore relies on maximizing expected monetary value to make a decision 
under uncertainty. Figure 10.3 depicts the utility curves corresponding to the three possible 
types of a contractor's risk preference. 
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Figure 10.3 Example of Utility Curves for Three Types of Risk Preference 
The utility theory is based on a set of five axioms that form the foundation for setting 
preference beliefs of decision makers: orderability, continuity, substitutability, monotonic-
ity, and decomposability (Howard 1977). 
The utility numbers do not have any meaning but they are just an indicator of how 
valuable is a certain monetary value to the contractor according to its risk preference. For 
example, an outcome that has a utility of 0.7 is more valued by the contractor than an-
other one that has a utility of 0.4. To choose between several alternatives with uncertain 
outcomes, the decision maker has now to choose the option that maximizes the expected 
utility value (EUV) instead of the expected monetary value (EMV). 
The utility function has two important properties: 
1. The utility of any lottery is the expected utility value (EUV) of its outcomes. 
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2. If the decision maker prefers one lottery to another, then it must have a higher utility. 
The expected utility value (EUV) of a lottery with uncertain outcomes is equal to the 
sum of the utility of each of the possible outcomes times their probability of occurrence, as 
expressed in the equation below: 
EUV(Lottery) = £/}£/(*,•) (10.7) 
in which 
U(Xi) = utility of monetary value X; as taken from a utility curve; 
and Pi = the probability of occurrence of outcome Xt. 
Since a contractor is indifferent between playing a lottery Y with uncertain outcomes 
and selling this lottery for its certain equivalent Cis[y], the certain equivalent must have the 
same utility as the lottery. In other words, after determining the expected utility of a lottery, 
this utility value can be located on the vertical axis. Then it can be matched through the 
utility curve with its corresponding monetary value on the horizontal axis. This monetary 
value is the certain equivalent of that lottery. 
10.3.3 Constant Risk Aversion 
Delta Property 
A contractor is called a constant risk averter if the delta property applies to its risk prefer-
ence behavior. The delta property states that if all the outcomes of a lottery are increased 
(or decreased) by an amount A, then the certain equivalent of that lottery is also increased 
(or decreased) by that same amount (Howard 1977). For example, consider a decision 
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Figure 10.4 Delta Property 
maker who is offered a lottery with two uncertain outcomes of $50 and $200 with equal 
probability. Suppose that the certain equivalent for that lottery is $100. According to the 
delta property, if the outcomes of that lottery are increased by $100 to become equal to 
$150 and $300, then the certain equivalent increases also by the same amount and becomes 
equal to $200. In other words, the delta property implies that for a constant risk-averter 
the certain equivalent of any proposed lottery is the same regardless of its initial amount 
of wealth. Figure 10.4 shows a graphical presentation of the delta property on a lottery X 
with three possible outcomes. 
Exponential Utility 
If the delta property applies to the risk preference of a contractor, then its utility function 
must be linear or exponential. Additionally, the buying and selling prices of a lottery will 
be the same. The analysis conducted in this chapter will consider a constantly risk-averse 
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contractor with an exponential utility function that can be expressed as follows: 
U(x) = l-e~* (10.8) 
U{x) = l-e~yx (10.9) 
This utility function is concave and thus it represents a risk-averse contractor. The util-
ity of zero is equal to zero and as x takes larger values, the utility function approaches 
one. The parameter R in Equation (10.8) is called the risk tolerance of the contractor and 
it indicates how risk averse he is. If R takes large values, then the exponential utility curve 
will take a flatter shape which indicates a less risk-averse decision maker who can tolerate 
more risk. On the other hand, if R takes smaller values, the utility curve will then be more 
concave which means a more risk averse contractor. 
The parameter y in Equation (10.9) is called the "risk aversion coefficient" which is 
also an indicator of how risk averse a contractor is. Clearly, the parameter y is equal to 
\/R. A positive risk aversion coefficient implies a risk-averse contractor and a negative y 
indicates a risk-seeking one. When y = 0, the decision maker is considered risk-neutral. 
A closed-form for the Certain Equivalent 
If a contractor's risk preference is expressed through an exponential utility curve, and if he 
has to make a decision about a lottery whose outcomes follow a normal distribution with 
mean m and standard deviation o~, then the certain equivalent of that lottery has a closed-
form solution. Thus the certain equivalent of a normal lottery X to a constant risk averter 
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with a risk aversion coefficient y can be expressed as follows: 
CE[X] = m-0.5yo2 (10.10) 
If the contractor is risk-neutral (y = 0), then the certain equivalent of the lottery will be 
equal to its expected value m. 
10.4 Formulating Risk-Sensitive Markup Decision Model 
This section uses the risk preference notions discussed above and presents the development 
and formulation of the expected utility of profit for a risk-sensitive contractor. We shall con-
sider contractor Ao who is bidding on a new project against n competitors A\,A2, • • • ,An. 
AQ wishes to determine the optimum markup XQ that would maximize its expected utility 
value of profit. The model presented in this section uses some of the decision and random 
variables that were defined in the Average Bid Method chapter, and moreover, it introduces 
new parameters and variables that are necessary for formulating the risk-sensitive bidding 
model. Below, we provide a comprehensive list of all the decision and random variables as 
well as the parameters that will be used to develop the risk-sensitive bidding model: 
Decision Variables: 
co = The project cost estimate of contractor AQ = Expected Value of the final cost C -
mc 
bo = The bid price of contractor AQ. 
mo = The markup of contractor AQ. 
XQ = ^ = 1 + ^ = The bid-to-cost ratio of contractor A0. 
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Random Variables: 
C = The final cost incurred at the end of the project by contractor AQ given that he had 
won the project. 
V = bo - C — The actual profit of contractor AQ determined after the project completion. 
Bi — The bid price of contractor A,-. 
Xi = ^ = Contractor A s^ apparent bid-to-cost ratio (as viewed by AQ). 
Parameters: 
mx = The mean of apparent bid-to-cost ratios Xj. 
Ox — The standard deviation of apparent bid-to-cost ratios Xt. 
mc = The mean of the project final cost incurred by contractor AQ = Project's Estimated 
Cost = co 
<7c = The standard deviation of the project final cost incurred by contractor Ao-
y= risk aversion coefficient of contractor Ao. 
n = number of opponents competing with contractor Ao. 
After defining the parameters and the variables that will be used in this chapter, we state 
below the assumptions that form the basis for this risk-sensitive optimal markup decision 
process: 
1. Contractor Ao follows the delta property and thus is a constant risk averter with a 
positive risk aversion coefficient 7. 
2. Being a constant risk averter, contractor AQ has an exponential utility curve for its 
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profit U(V) which is expressed in the following equation: 
U{y) = \-e{~^ (10.11) 
3. All apparent bid-to-cost ratios Xi are independent and identically distributed (iid) and 
follow a common normal distribution Fx{Xi) with mean mx and standard deviation 
Ox-
4. The final cost (actual cost) incurred by Ao after completion of the project given that 
he had won the project, defined as C, follows a normal distribution Fc(c) with mean 
mc and standard deviation o"c. 
5. The estimated cost of the project determined by Ao prior to the bidding stage, i.e. CQ, 
is set equal to the mean of the final cost distribution, mc: 
c0 = mc (10.12) 
When a contractor bids for a job and gets selected as the winner, he can be considered 
then as a decision maker who owns a lottery with continuous uncertain outcomes. Those 
outcomes represent the different possible alternatives for the profit value that contractor 
AQ might achieve after completing the project. At that point, this profit value V depends 
mainly on the final cost C that AQ incurs for that project given its already set bid price, bo-
The probability of each possible outcome of that profit lottery is equal to the probability 
that the final cost C will take a certain value c, expressed as fc(c). Note that the profit value 
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also depends on the bid-to-cost ratio, XQ, that contractor AQ chooses initially to determine 
its bid price bo: 
bo = x0c0 (10.13) 
Figure 10.5 shows the decision tree that represents the decision-making process that 
contractor AQ has to undergo when bidding on a project and the resulting lotteries that de-
termine its profit outcomes. It is assumed that Ao knows the number of opponents n. A 
decision tree usually displays two types of nodes: 1) a square node represents a decision 
variable which is controlled , i.e., chosen by the decision maker, and 2) a circular node 
represents the random variable which is the outcome of a decision. Each circular node rep-
resents a lottery with several outcomes. The first lottery in Figure 10.5 is a binary lottery 
with two outcomes, win or lose, that depend on the markup decision made by the con-
tractor, the number of competitors, and the bidding method selected by the owner for this 
project. The second lottery follows the winning alternative , i.e., it is based on the assump-
tion that AQ won the project. This lottery represents the set of continuous profit outcomes 
that AQ might achieve depending on the final cost value of the project. 
Now that we have defined the necessary variables and parameters, and we have stated 
the assumptions that underlie the bidding decision process described through the decision 
tree in Figure 10.5, we can formulate the risk-sensitive markup decision model. Note that 
we are looking at the problem from contractor Ao's perspective who wishes to determine 
the optimum markup XQ that maximizes its expected utility of profit. And given XQ, this 
utility of profit can be expressed as follows: 
247 
n, c0 
mc, c?c 
x0 
Win 
P[Winlx0,c0,n] 
V = b 0 -c 
Lose 
l-P[Winlx0)c0,n] 
V = 0 
Figure 10.5 Bidding Decision Tree of Contractor AQ 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P\Wn\xo,c0,n]U(V) 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P{Wm\xQ,co,n}U(b0-C) 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P[Wm\xo,co,n]U(x0co-C) 
(10.14) 
(10.15) 
(10.16) 
By substituting (10.12) in (10.16), the expression for the Ao's expected utility of profit 
becomes the following: 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P[Win\xo,c0,n}U(xomc-C) (10.17) 
However, C was previously defined as a random variable that follows a normal distri-
bution Fc(c) with mc and standard deviation CQ. Therefore, fc(c) is the probability that 
the random variable C will take a particular value c. Hence, the expected utility of profit 
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can be obtained by integrating over all possible values of C, as expressed in the equation 
below: 
E[U(V)\x0,c0,n] = J P[Wn\xo,co,n]U(xomc-c)fc(c)dc (10.18) 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P\Wa\xo,c0,n]f U(xomc-c)fc{c)dc (10.19) 
The expression inside the integral in the equation above represents the expected utility 
of the profit lottery represented by the second circular node in Figure 10.5. As mentioned 
previously, the expected utility of a lottery is equal to the expected utility of its certain 
equivalent and hence, contractor AQ must be indifferent between that profit lottery and its 
certain equivalent. Therefore, Equation 10.19 has a closed-form solution that can be ob-
tained by replacing the profit lottery of contractor Ao (the integral part of the equation) by 
its certain equivalent CE [V]: 
E[U(V)\xo,co,n]=P[Wm\xo,c0,n}U(CE[V\Win}) (10.20) 
On the other hand, the profit expression is as follows: 
V = b0-C (10.21) 
in which bo is a decision variable that is determined by Ao at the time of bidding on the 
project; however, V and C are random variables that are known at the end of the project. 
As Equation (10.21) shows, the value of V depends mainly on C and therefore, V fol-
249 
lows the same type of distribution (i.e., normal) as C but with the following mean E[V] and 
variance Var[V]: 
E[V] = E[bQ -C] = b0 -E[C\ =bo-mc = b0-c0 (10.22) 
War [V] = Var[b0 - C] = Var[C] = ol (10.23) 
Hence, the profit lottery that contractor Ao faces after winning the job follows a normal 
distribution with a mean equal to (bo — mc) and a standard deviation equal to GQ. And 
based on section 10.3.3, if a decision maker has an exponential utility curve (which is the 
assumption in this case) and if he owns a lottery whose outcomes follow a normal distribu-
tion (which applies to Ao's profit lottery), then the certain equivalent of that lottery can be 
expressed as follows: 
CE[V] = E{V]-0.5YVar[V] (10.24) 
CE[V] = (Z70-m c)-0.5yo£ (10.25) 
Let V represent the CE[V]. By substituting (10.12) in (10.25), the certain equivalent 
can be expressed as follows: 
V = (xQ-l)mc-0.5ya£ (10.26) 
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Then, by substituting( 10.26) and (10.11) in (10.20), we obtain the following closed-
form expression for AQ'S expected utility of profit: 
E[U{V)\xo,c0,n] = P\Wm\xo,co,n]U[(xo-l)mc-0.5yoZ] (10.27) 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = P[Win|x 0 )co,n]{l-exp[-7((x 0 - l )mc-0.57^)]}(10.28) 
The above expression for the expected utility of profit applies to any of the bid-awarding 
methods studied in the previous chapters of this research. The only expression that varies 
depending on the bid method is the winning probability P[Win|xo,co,n]. 
10.4.1 Low Bid Method 
For the low bid method, the probability of winning of contractor AQ against n opponents 
will take the following closed-form expression: 
P[Win|x0lc0,n] = [l-Fx(xo)]n (10.29) 
And therefore, by substituting (10.29) into (10.28), Ao's expected utility of profit can 
be expressed as follows: 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,n] = [1 - F x ( x 0 ) f {1 - e x p [ - y ( ( x o - l)mc-0.570-^)]} (10.30) 
Now in order to determine the value of XQ that maximizes the expected utility of profit 
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of contractor Ao under a low bid tendering scenario, the first derivative of the expression in 
(10.30) with respect to XQ should be determined and set equal to zero: 
• ^ W K C . « ] = "(i'-fwr)(1_exp|_y((;to„i)mc_o.5yCTai} 
dxQ UXQ 
+ [l-Fx(x0)}n{ymcexp[-y((xQ-l)mc-0.5yo£)]} 
= 0 (10.31) 
-nfx(xo)[l-Fx(xo)]n-l{\-cxp[-y{(xo-l)mc-0.5y4)]} 
+[\-Fx(xo)}n{ymctxp[-y({xo~\)mc-0.5yal)}} = 0 (10.32) 
To simplify the representation of the terms in the equation above we will use the fol-
lowing substitutions in the set of equations that follow: 
Fx(xQ) = F (10.33) 
fx(xo) = f (10.34) 
(x0-\)mc-0.5yOc = V (10.35) 
Using the above substitutions and based on (10.32) divided by [1 — Fx{xo)]n~l, we 
obtain the following series of equations: 
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nf + nfexp[-YV} + (\-F)Ymcexp[-yV} = 0 (10.36) 
-nf + exp[-yV]{ymc(l-F)+nf} = 0 (10.37) 
exp[-rV}= , " ' M , (10.38) jmc[\ -F)+nf 
-yV = ln[ — % - -1 (10.39) 
V = - - l n [ — % - -] (10.40) 
7 lymc{\~F) + nf 
Then, to determine the form of Equation (10.40) in terms of XQ, we need to replace the 
terms F, f, and V by their equivalent expressions in function of XQ: 
( jco-l) inc-0.5yog = - - l n [ „ ffi^ — ^ 1 (10.41) 
x0=l + — {0.5yog-±ln[ Z^h fl J l (10-42> 
mc 7 7^c ( l -^x (x 0 ) )+n /x (^o) 
Hence, the optimum markup XQ that will maximize the expected profit utility of con-
tractor AQ under a low bid tendering scenario is the value of XQ that satisfies the equation 
below: 
Jt0_l__L{O.5y<y2 Iln[ 7 ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ ] } = 0 (10.43) 
mc
X
 '
 C
 7 [rmc{l-Fx(xo)) + nfx(x0yS 
It is important to note that a closed-form expression of the expected profit utility could 
be reached in the case of a low bid method because the probability of winning of AQ against 
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n opponents under a low bid method has a closed-form expression shown in (10.29). As a 
result, we could determine the expression in (10.43) which states the condition or equality 
that should be satisfied by Ao to maximize Ao's expected profit utility. 
10.4.2 Average Bid Method—Two Opponents 
The other bidding method that we consider in this chapter is the average bid method. 
As stated previously, the risk-sensitive formula for expected profit utility E[V], shown in 
(10.28), does apply to the average bid method. The part of that equation that should be 
specified further to match the considered bidding method is the probability of winning. 
However, this probability of winning does not have a closed-form expression for n > 2, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Hence, the only case where the expected utility of profit of con-
tractor AQ can have a closed-form expression under an average-bid tendering scenario is the 
situation where AQ is facing two opponents: 
P[Win|x0,c0,«] = 2Fx(xo)(l -Fx(x0)) (10.44) 
Consequently, the expected utility of profit for two opponents has a closed-form ex-
pression, too: 
E[U(V)\xo,co,n] = 2Fx{x0)(l-Fx{xo)){l-exp[-y{(xo-l)mc-0.5yol)]} (10.45) 
In order to determine the value of XQ that maximizes the expected profit utility of con-
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tractor AQ, we will follow the same analysis conducted in the previous section for the low 
bid method but now under the average bid method and given that Ao faces two opponents. 
We start by computing the first derivative of the expression shown in equation (10.45) and 
setting it equal to zero: 
2fx(xo)(l-Fx{xo)){l-exp[-y((xo-l)mc-0.5yoZ)]} 
+2Fx(x0)(-fx(xo)){l -exp[-7[(x0 - \)mc -0.5yog)]} 
+2Fx(x0)(\ -Fx(xo)){ymcZxp[-y({xo- l )m c -0 .5yo£)]} 
0 (10.46) 
Again let us replace some of the terms by their substitutions shown in equations 
(10.33),(10.34), and (10.35) to make the expression in (10.46) look less complicated: 
2/(1 -F){1 - e x p [ - y V ] } + 2 F ( - / ) { l -exp[-yV]} 
+2F(1 -F){ym cexp[-yV]} 
0 (10.47) 
exp[-YV][-2f + 4fF + 2ymcF(l-F)] + 2f-4fF = 0 (10.48) 
dE[U(V)\x0,CQ,n} 
dxo 
dE[U(V)\x0,c0,n} 
dxo 
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~ AfF — If 
e X P
' - ^ l = 4 / f - V + 2 ^ F ( l - F ) < 1 0 ' 4 9 ) 
" ^ = '
J
' / ( 2 f - f ) ^ ( l - F ) i < l a 5 0 ) 
* - - - ; - [ / ( 2 F _ f , ( 2 ; ^ ( 1 , f ) ] 00.5D 
Then, to determine the form of (10.51) in terms of xo, we need to replace back the terms 
F, f, and V by their equivalent expressions in function of XQ\ 
fo-l)Mc-0.5yog = - l l n L ,
 u o p , ^
W
^ ~ A ,
 p , J (10.52) 
Hence, the optimum markup value XQ that maximizes the expected utility of profit for 
contractor AQ under an average bid method and given that n — 2, is determined to be the 
value of XQ that satisfies the equation below: 
r _1_±/nSvrr2-iln[— fx(xo)(2FX(x0) - \) , 
xo
 mc\^y°c Y^fx(X0)(2Fx{xQ)-\) + YmcFx{x0){\-Fx{xQ)f 
(10.53) 
10.4.3 Average Bid Method—More than Two Opponents 
For the case where the number of opponents n is higher than 2 under an average bid method, 
the probability of winning does not have a closed-form solution and therefore the expected 
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utility of profit for contractor AQ, as expressed in (10.28), cannot have a closed-form solu-
tion either. 
The simulation results obtained in Chapter 4 which show the probability of winning 
as a function of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio x*0 that correspond to the average bid 
method will be used in this case. Given the values for the apparent bid-to-cost ratios' mean 
mx and standard deviation ax, we can determine the probability of winning corresponding 
to a specific value of XQ based on the simulation results. It is important to realize here that 
the probability of winning expression in (10.28) is independent of the risk aversion nature 
of the contractor and is mainly based on the values of XQ, mx, ax, n, and the bid-awarding 
method used. That is why the previously obtained simulation results for the probability of 
winning of a risk-neutral contractor with zero project cost variance can also be used for a 
risk-averse contractor and in cases where the project cost variance is not equal to zero. In 
order to determine the optimum markup under an average bid method where the number 
of opponents is higher than 2, we considered values of xo in the range [0.75,1.35] with an 
increment of 0.001 and for each xo, we determined the probability of winning from the 
average bid method simulation graphs. Then again for each of the xo values, we compute 
the corresponding expected utility of profit E[U{V)\. After that, we compare all values ob-
tained for E[U(y)\ which correspond to xo ranging from 0.75 to 1.35. The highest obtained 
expected utility of profit determines the optimum markup to use for contractor AQ. 
All the previous bidding models developed in this research were studied from the per-
spective of a risk-neutral contractor who aims at maximizing its expected monetary value 
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of profit. A standardized form of the expected profit was formulated: 
CQOX 
where 
E\V\ L J
 =P[Wm\x'0,n}{x'0 + m'x) (10.54) 
x0 = (10.55) 
ox 
mx = (10.56) 
ox 
Hence, the optimum standardized markup x'Q was determined in function of the stan-
dardized mean for apparent bid-to-cost ratios, m'x, without the need to specify values of mx 
and Gx-
Unfortunately, the same can not be achieved for a risk-sensitive bidding model where 
Ao's expected utility of profit has to be maximized, as expressed in equation (10.28). In 
this case, it is necessary to set some parameters to specific values such as the risk aversion 
coefficient (y) and the number of opponents (n), as well as some random variables such as 
the apparent bid-to-cost ratio's mean mx and variance ax, and the project cost mean mc 
and variance OQ. 
Since a generalized solution for the optimum markup can not be reached for a risk-
sensitive bidding model, the next section uses a numerical example to study the effect of 
risk aversion and project cost variance on Ao's optimum markup. 
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10.5 Effect of Risk Aversion and Project Cost Variance on 
Optimum Markup 
This section presents a numerical example through which we will study the difference in 
optimum markup decision between risk-neutral (7 = 0) and risk-sensitive (7 / 0) bidding 
models. As stated previously, the results will be shown for two of the bidding methods dis-
cussed in this research: the low bid method, and the average bid method. We do not only 
study the effect of including risk aversion in the analysis but also how does the optimum 
markup change with respect to different degrees of risk aversion. Additionally, this section 
studies the effect of different project cost variances on the optimum markup decision. A 
project cost variance represents the uncertainties or the risks embedded in that project. 
10.5.1 Example Parameters 
We shall consider a contractor AQ with risk aversion coefficient 7 and with an exponential 
utility curve equal to: 
U(V)= l - e x p ( - y V ) for 7 / O (10.57) 
U(V)= V for 7 = 0 (10.58) 
The values that will be considered for 7are 0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4, and 0.5. 
We consider that AQ is competing against n opponents where the apparent bid-to-cost ra-
tio follows a normal distribution with mean m\ equal to 1.05 and with a standard deviation 
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Ox equal to 0.105 , i.e., equal to 10% of the mean value: 
m x = 105 
o-x = 0.105 
Similarly to the risk-neutral bidding methods, the values used for n for the risk-sensitive 
bidding models are 2,4, and 8. Additionally, this example assumes that the historical data 
about previous projects completed by contractor AQ and which are similar to the project 
he is currently bidding on, indicate that this project's final cost is expected to be normally 
distributed with a mean mc equal to $10M. As for the standard deviation OQ, we will con-
sider a range of values for it in order to determine the effect of a change in the project cost 
variance on the optimum markup. For that matter, we shall set the project cost standard 
deviation equal to 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, and 30% of the mean equal to $10M. 
Note that, based on the model assumptions stated in the previous section, Ao's estimated 
cost for the project, CQ, is defined to be equal to the expected value of the project's final 
cost, i.e., equal to $10M. 
Figure 10.6 shows the utility curves corresponding to the different degrees of risk aver-
sion for contractor Ao that will be studied in this example. 
A more convenient form of a utility function is to be scaled such that the smallest out-
come of the lottery that is considered (profit in this case) has a utility of zero and the largest 
outcome has a utility of one. To be able to normalize a utility curve as such, we need to 
know the least and the most preferred outcome values, defined by the parameters L and H 
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Figure 10.6 Utility Curves for Ao's Profit 
respectively. Given L and H, the normalized expression of the utility function is defined 
below: 
U(V) = 
U(V) = 
l-exp[-y(V-L)] 
l-exp[-7(//-L)] 
V-L 
H-L 
for 7 ^ 0 
for 7 = 0 
(10.59) 
(10.60) 
In this example, the profit range is chosen to be equal to $[0,10]M , i.e., L = 0 and 
H = 10 in (10.59). Figure 10.7 shows the normalized utility curves that will be assigned to 
A0. 
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10.5.2 Low Bid Method 
Figure 10.8 shows the optimum markup XQ versus the coefficient of variation Oc/mc of the 
project's final cost given that the number of opponents n is equal to 2. The different curves 
shown in the figure correspond to Ao's different risk aversion coefficients considered in this 
example. 
The first observation to make about Figure 10.8 is that the optimum markup for a 
risk-neutral contractor (y = 0) is the same regardless of the project cost variance. This 
is expected since a risk-neutral contractor by definition does not care about uncertainties in 
the project cost. The optimum markup for such a contractor is the value that maximizes its 
expected profit value, which is equal to 1.06 or a 6% markup as shown in Figure 10.8. We 
can obtain the same value from Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4 which includes the curves for the 
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Figure 10.8 Low Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of Project 
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risk-neutral low bid model that depict the optimum standardized markup versus the stan-
dardized apparent bid-to-cost ratio mean m'x. As an illustration, the example discussed in 
this section implies an m'x value equal to 0.476 (mx — l/o~;c) which, according to Figure 
4.2, corresponds to a standardized optimum markup (XQ — \)/<Jx = 0.58 that is equivalent 
toxj = 1.06. 
As the risk aversion coefficient increases, the corresponding curves in Figure 10.8 do 
not show a straight line shape anymore but they rather take a curved shape, which indicates 
that a risk-averse contractor's optimum markup gets affected by the project cost variance. 
This is expected since a risk-averse contractor is concerned with determining the optimum 
markup that maximizes its expected profit utility which is in itself a function of the range 
of profit outcome and of the risk attitude of the contractor. Figure 10.8 shows that for small 
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Figure 10.9 Low Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of Project 
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coefficient of variation of the project cost {oc/mc < 6%), the more risk-averse a contractor 
is, the lower is its optimal markup XQ. AS the project cost variance increases (oc/mc > 6%) 
the more risk-averse a contractor is the higher its optimum markup. This difference in op-
timum markups with respect to different degrees of risk aversion is due to the difference 
in the corresponding utilities of the certain equivalents since the probability of winning is 
independent of the risk aversion and of the project cost variance. 
A risk-averse contractor is faced with two uncertainties: 1) winning the project and 2) 
making a profit. For a low-risk project, i.e., a project with relatively small cost variance, 
a contractor is more concerned with choosing a markup that would enhance its winning 
probability. In other words, the risk of winning or losing the job outweighs the risk of the 
unknown final cost. As a result, a more risk-averse contractor will be more sensitive to 
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the risk of losing the job and therefore he will adopt a lower optimum markup than a less 
risk-averse contractor. 
As the coefficient of variation of the project cost increases beyond 6% as shown in Fig-
ure 10.8, a higher risk aversion indicates a higher optimum markup. That is because as the 
variance of the project's final cost increases, the contractor is now facing a higher risk of 
less profit and sometimes even loss if he wins the project. In this case, the contractor will be 
facing a profit lottery whose outcomes are highly uncertain. In other words, as the project's 
final cost variance increases, the risk of incurring losses after winning the project due to 
the high variance in the project's final cost takes priority over the risk of losing the job in 
the first place. Therefore, a more risk-averse contractor adopts a higher optimum markup 
in order to avoid the risk of losing money in case the job is won despite that it might be at 
the expense of its winning probability. 
Another important observation about Figure 10.8 is that the first region of the figure 
where the coefficient of variation of the project cost is relatively small and where a higher 
risk aversion indicates a lower markup, is almost a flat region where the different risk aver-
sion curves are close to each other. However, as the cost variance increases beyond that 
region {(Jc/mc > 6%), these curves start diverging and become more and more wide apart 
as the coefficient of variation increases. This is due to the fact that in the first region, a 
contractor is mainly concerned about one risk which is winning the job where as in the 
second region he is concerned about two risks: winning the job and avoiding cost over-
runs after that. To explain this further, consider the expression for Ao's certain equivalent, 
which represents the buying price of the lottery, i.e., the maximum amount of money the 
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contractor is willing to pay to buy this lottery from the owner: 
CEiV) = (x0 - \)mc - 0.5yo£ (10.61) 
Note that the second term in the expression above approaches zero as the variance of 
the project cost approaches zero, which almost eliminates the risk of incurring losses in 
case of winning the job and leaves the contractor with one risk, that of winning the project. 
Additionally, and according to (10.61) a zero or a very low variance in the project cost 
eliminates the effect of the risk aversion coefficient on the certain equivalent value. How-
ever, the utility expression of that certain equivalent involves the risk aversion coefficient 
of the contractor and that is the reason for the slight difference in optimum markup values 
between different degrees of risk aversion. Hence, the region before the crosspoint of all 
curves is almost flat because the contractor is concerned only with the risk of winning. 
On the other hand, as the project cost variance increases, the second term of the certain 
equivalent expression is higher for a higher risk aversion degree. In other words, since y 
is multiplied by 0"c, the C£[V] gets more influenced by Ao's risk aversion as CQ increases. 
It results that a more risk averse contractor will assign a lower certain equivalent for the 
project's profit lottery. Additionally, the utility of that certain equivalent varies according 
to the contractor's risk aversion degree. Hence, for high-risk projects, the risk aversion 
factor gains more weight in determining the optimum markup. This explains why Figure 
10.8 shows the curves corresponding to different risk-attitudes to be more widely spread as 
the project cost variance increases. 
Based on the aforementioned, we can conclude that the project's final cost variance con-
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Figure 10.10 Low Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of Project 
Cost-n=8 
trols the relative behavior of the different risk-aversion curves with respect to the optimum 
markup. And, on the other hand, given a specific project cost variance, the risk aversion 
degree determines the magnitude of the optimum markup. 
Figures 10.9 and 10.10 show the optimum markup versus the coefficient of variation 
of the project's final cost (oc/mc) for n equal to 4 and 8 respectively. The same obser-
vations we made previously about Figure 10.8 apply to these two figures. However, the 
main difference between these two graphs and the graph for n = 2, is that the value for 
o"c where the behavior of the contractor changes with respect to its risk aversion degree, 
gets closer to the origin as the number of opponents increases. For example, Figure 10.9 
indicates that if the project cost coefficient of variation is less than 3.5%, then the most 
risk averse contractor will adopt the lowest markup and as this ratio goes above 3.5%, the 
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Figure 10.11 Low Bid Method-Comparison of Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Vari-
ation of Project Cost for n=2,4 and 8 
opposite is true. Figure 10.10 which corresponds to n = 8 shows this behavioral turning 
point occurring at a 2% coefficient of variation of the project's cost. As the competition 
level increases, the probability of winning decreases and AQ has to use a lower optimum 
markup independently of its risk attitude. Now that AQ is using a lower markup, the risk 
of incurring losses in case of winning the job is more probable and thus AQ becomes more 
sensitive to the project's final cost variance. This explains why the crosspoint among the 
curves corresponding to different degrees of risk aversion in Figures 10.8, 10.9 and 10.10 
occurs at a smaller coefficient of variation for the project cost as the number of opponents 
increases. 
A very important observation about Figures 10.8, 10.9, and 10.10 is that for small val-
ues of GQ the curves for the optimum bid-to-cost ratio are almost flat for any value of the 
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risk aversion coefficient y. This means that the optimum markups indicated by the different 
risk aversion curves are almost equal. 
Thus, for low-risk projects where o~c is small, a contractor should adopt the 
same optimum markup regardless of its risk aversion attitude. The optimum 
bid-to-cost ratio in this case depends on the number of competitors only. 
Figure 10.11 shows the three groups of XQ curves for the different values of n considered 
in this example (2, 4 and 8). An obvious and expected observation is that as the number of 
opponents increases, the optimum markup decreases given particular risk aversion degree 
y and coefficient of variation for the project cost Oc/mc. This has been already shown 
and explained through the low bid method simulation results for the risk-neutral case and 
applies as well to risk aversion cases according to Figure 10.11. 
Note that for the same risk aversion coefficient y, the curves corresponding to the dif-
ferent values of n never cross each other. However, the y = 0.5 curve for n = 4 crosses 
the curves where y < 0.4 that correspond to n = 2. Similarly, the y = 0.5 curve for n — 8 
crosses the curves where y < 0.4 that correspond to both n = 2 and n = 4. In other words, 
the three groups of XQ curves for different n values cross each other as the project cost vari-
ance increases. The curves for n = 2 and n = 4 cross starting at Gc/mc = 0.125 where 
(« — 2, y = 0) crosses (n = 4, y = 0.5). As for the curves corresponding to n — 4 and n = 8, 
they do cross starting at Gc/mc = 0.088 where (n — 4, y = 0) crosses (n = 8, y = 0.5). Along 
the same lines, the curves (n = 2, y = 0) and (n = 8, y = 0.5) cross at Gc/mc = 0.135. This 
means that given two contractors with different risk attitudes where the more risk averse 
contractor is bidding against a higher number of opponents, the less risk averse contractor 
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will adopt a higher markup for small values of Oc/mc- However, as Gc/mc increases, the 
relative behavior of the two contractors will shift where the more risk averse contractor, 
who is facing a greater number of opponents, will use a higher markup. 
This indicates that as the project cost variance increases, a more risk averse 
contractor will adopt a higher markup then a less risk-averse contractor 
eventhough the latter competes with a lower number of opponents. 
10.5.3 Average Bid Method 
The same analysis conducted in the previous section to study the effect of risk aversion 
and project cost variance on the optimum markup under a low bid tendering scenario, is 
replicated here for the average bid method. Figure 10.12 shows the optimum markup in 
function of the project's final cost variance for different degrees of risk aversion under an 
average bid method for n = 2. The curves follow the same trend as the ones for the low 
bid method, i.e., the most risk averse contractor has the lowest markup for small variance 
of the project cost where as the opposite holds when this variance takes higher values. As 
expected, the risk-neutral contractor (y = 0) has the same optimum markup equal to 1.12 
regardless of the estimated variance in the project final cost. Again, consider Figure 4.2 of 
Chapter 4 which shows the optimum standardized markup (XQ — l/<7x) m function of the 
standardized mean m'x for the average bid model. The value of m'x that corresponds to the 
example studied in this section is equal to 0.476, which indicates that (XQ — l)/<Jx = 1.15 
which is equivalent to XQ = 1.12. This latter optimum markup value obtained by simulation 
for a risk-neutral contractor under an average bid method verifies the value indicated by the 
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Figure 10.12 Average Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of 
Project Cost-n=2 
curve y — 0 in Figure 10.12. 
Moreover, Figure 10.12 shows that under an average bid tendering scenario, the cross 
point of the different risk aversion curves occurs around a coefficient of variation of the 
project's final cost equal to 0.11 or 11%. This value is higher than the one obtained for the 
low bid method, equal to 6%. For the sake of comparison, Figure 10.13 combines the risk 
aversion curves for both the low bid and the average bid methods in order to illustrate the 
difference. 
The shift of the Oc/mc cross point from 6% to 11% means that under an average bid 
method, the relative risk of not winning the bid and losing money on the project changes. 
That is due to the nature of the average bid method that defines the winner to be the con-
tractor whose bid is closest to the average of all submitted bids. Hence, when a project is 
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Figure 10.13 Comparison of Low and Average Bid Methods-Optimum Markup versus Co-
efficient of Variation of Project Cost-n=2 
awarded through an average bid method, a contractor is expected to have a higher optimum 
markup, a higher bid price and a higher expected profit than for a low bid method. There-
fore, since contractor AQ now has a higher margin of profit, he will then give higher priority 
to the risk of winning/losing the project for a wider range of Oc/mc-
According to Figure 10.12, the more risk averse AQ is, the lower the optimum markup 
he will adopt as long as the estimated standard deviation of the project's final cost does not 
exceed 11% of its estimated mean. However, as the project cost variance takes larger val-
ues, specifically as Gc/mc exceeds 11% in this example, the relative effect of risk aversion 
on optimum markup changes such that the most risk-averse contractor has now the highest 
markup. 
The risk aversion curves for the average bid method are close to each other for values 
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Figure 10.14 Average Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of 
Project Cost-n=4 
of the project cost coefficient of variation less than the cross point at 11%. This is similar 
to the low bid method for Oc/mc < 6%. Because the crosspoint for the average bid method 
occurs at 11% > 6% the range of XQ values for Oc/mc = 0 is wider while the range for XQ 
for Oc/mc = 0.3 is narrower than for the low bid method. 
According to Figure 10.13, we observe that the curves for the two bidding methods 
appear similar but shifted. The curves for the average bid method seem shifted from the 
low bid method by 0.05 to the right direction and then by 0.06 in the upward direction. The 
first shift was explained previously and is due to the fact that a contractor gives a higher 
importance to the risk of winning a job for a wider range of Oc/mc under an average bid 
method. On the other hand, the upward shift suggests that for any risk aversion coefficient 
and for any number of opponents, the average bid method indicates a higher optimum bid-
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Figure 10.15 Average Bid Method-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of 
Project Cost-n=8 
to-cost ratio than the low bid method given the same coefficient of variation for the project 
cost. That is due to the nature of the average bid method which requires the winner to 
bid closer to the expected average of the opposing bids and thus encourages bidders to use 
higher markups. 
This means that for a high-risk project, the behavior of a risk-averse con-
tractor is dominated by the high uncertainty of its profit lottery due to the 
high variability of the project cost, regardless of the bid-awarding method 
used for that project. 
Furthermore, Figures 10.14 and 10.15 show the optimum markup in function of the 
project's cost coefficient of variation under an average bid method with 4 and 8 oppo-
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Figure 10.16 Average Bid Method-Comparison of Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of 
Variation of Project Cost for n=2, 4 and 8 
nents respectively. The same trend of contractor's behavior towards optimum markup 
appears again in these two graphs. In the case of four opponents, the risk aversion curves 
cross at Oc/mc = 7.5%. As for the case of eight opponents, the crosspoint occurs at 
Oc/mc = 6.5%. 
Similarly to the low bid method, the average bid method graphs show that as the num-
ber of opponents increases the crossing point of the different risk aversion curves occurs at 
a lower project cost variance. This happens because as the competition level increases, it 
becomes harder to win the project under any bidding method and the contractor is forced 
to bid lower(this means closer to the mean mx = 1.05 under the average bid method). 
Thus, AQ should expect lower expected profits with an increase in the num-
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ber of its opponents n. As a result, the uncertainty in the profit lottery that 
AQ faces after winning the project is now higher and therefore, he can not 
tolerate the same levels of cost variance as when the number of opponents 
is lower. Consequently, the behavioral turning point occurs at a lower cost 
variance as the number of opponents increases. 
Figure 10.16 shows the three groups of curves that correspond to different values of n 
(2, 4 and 8) under an average bid method. As expected, given specific project cost variance 
and risk aversion coefficient the optimum markup is always lower for a higher number of 
opponents. However, the three groups of curves do intersect at some values for the coef-
ficient of variation of the project cost. For instance, the curves for n = 2 and n = 4 start 
crossing at Gc/mc — 0.175 where (n = 2, y = 0) crosses (n = 4, y = 0.5). Similarly, the first 
cross point between n = 4 and n = 8 occurs at Oc/mc = 0.14 and the cross point for n = 2 
and n = 8 happens first at Oc/mc — 0.195. This figure shows the same trend as Figure 
10.11 for the low bid method except that the crosspoints between the different groups of 
curves occur at greater Oc/mc given the nature of the average bid method. Hence, Figure 
10.16 suggests the same conclusion that as the project cost variance increases, a more risk 
averse contractor will adopt a higher markup then a less risk-averse contractor even if he is 
facing a higher number of opponents than the latter. 
10.6 Effect of Opponents' Apparent Bid-to-Cost Ratio 
Mean and Variance on Optimum Markup 
The previous section presented an analysis of the effect of two risk factors, namely the risk 
preference of a contractor and the project's final cost variance, on the optimum markup 
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mx 
1 
1.05 
1.1 
1.15 
ox 
0.0525 
0.07875 
0.105 
0.13125 
0.1575 
0.0525 
0.07875 
0.105 
0.13125 
0.1575 
0.0525 
0.07875 
0.105 
0.13125 
0.1575 
0.0525 
0.07875 
0.105 
0.13125 
0.1575 
m'x=(mx-l)/ox 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.95 
0.63 
0.48 
0.38 
0.32 
1.90 
1.27 
0.95 
0.76 
0.63 
2.86 
1.90 
1.43 
1.14 
0.95 
o x/m x(%) 
5.25 
7.88 
10.50 
13.13 
15.75 
5.00 
7.50 
10.00 
12.50 
15.00 
4.77 
7.16 
9.55 
11.93 
14.32 
4.57 
6.85 
9.13 
11.41 
13.70 
Table 10.1 Values of mx, Ox used in the analysis 
decision. The analysis was conducted through a numerical example in which mx was set 
equal to 1.05 and Ox equal to 0.105, i.e., 10% of the mean. Thus, the conclusions were 
made based on these particular values for mx and Ox- Therefore, this section aims at vary-
ing the values for mx and ax in order to study the effect of the apparent bid-to-cost ratio's 
mean and variance on the optimum markup for a risk-sensitive bidding model. Table 10.1 
shows the values that will be used for mx and o~x in this section. 
As mentioned earlier, a risk-averse contractor is faced with two risks when deciding 
on its optimum markup. The first risk is the risk of winning or losing the project and the 
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second risk is making or losing money after winning the project. The estimated variance 
in the apparent bid-to-cost ratios represents the first risk and the estimated variance in the 
final cost of the project represents the second risk. In this section we set the project cost 
variance at a fixed level and we vary the bid-to-cost variance to study its sole effect on the 
optimum markup. 
10.6.1 Low Bid Method 
We shall consider the same example used in the previous section with its defined variables 
and parameters. First, we keep mx equal to 1.05 as defined previously, and we vary Gx 
to only study the effect of the bid-to-cost variance on the optimum markup. Figure 10.17 
shows the optimum markup in function of the bid-to-cost coefficient of variation given that 
mx — 1.05 and n — 2. The four graphs of the figure correspond to different values for the 
project cost coefficient of variation Gc/mc'. 0,0.1,0.2 and 0.3. Figure 10.18 displays the 
same graphs but given that the number of opponents is equal to 8. 
Considering the expected utility of profit expression for a risk-averse contractor or the 
expected monetary profit for a risk-neutral contractor, the probability of winning is the 
only part of these expressions that gets affected by any variation of mx or Gx- Given that 
mx = 1.05 and given that n = 2, if AQ uses a markup xo < 1.05 then its winning probability 
will increase as the variance for the apparent bid-to-cost ratio decreases. That is because as 
the bid-to-cost variance decreases, the two opposing bids will be closely clustered around 
their mean which makes it easier for AQ to underbid them and win the project. 
However, if AQ bids above the estimated mean of its opponents, his probability of win-
ning decreases as Gx decreases. In the case of n — 8, if XQ > mx then AQ has almost no 
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Figure 10.17 Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of Bid-to-Cost Ratio given 
mx=1.05 and n=2 
chance of winning the project even with a high variance in the opponents' bids. And that is 
because with more competitors, it becomes harder to bid above the estimated mean of the 
opposing bids and still rank the lowest and win the project. 
Thus, both Figures 10.17 and 10.18 show that for any degree of risk aversion and any 
coefficient of variation for the project final cost, the optimum markup increases as the 
bid-to-cost variance increases and in six out of the eight graphs crosses over the mean 
mx = 1.05. There are two reasons for this behavior. The first reason concerns the effect 
of Ox on the probability of winning of AQ. By bidding above mx, A$ has a higher winning 
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probability as the bid-to-cost variance ax increases. The smallest ax considered in this 
example is equal to 0.0525, which means that the apparent bid-to-cost ratio Xt, which is 
assumed to follow a normal distribution, will fall between mx — 3Ox and mx + 3o"x, i.e., 
between 0.8925 and 1.2075. And as ax increases, the range of X,- will be wider. On the 
other hand, AQ can not choose a markup value less than 1 because this will certainly lead to 
a negative profit. Therefore, as the bid-to-cost variance increases, there is a higher chance 
that some of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios will be below 1, i.e., their bids will be lower 
than AQ'S estimated cost for the project. Thus AQ'S probability of winning decreases since 
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AQ can not bid below its cost. In this case, AQ, and regardless of its risk attitude, will use a 
higher markup to minimize the risk of losing money if he ends up being the winner. 
The second reason is that as the project cost variance increases, and given a high vari-
ance in the opponents' bids, the contractor is now facing the risk of making/losing money 
after winning the project in addition to the risk of winning/losing the project in the first 
place. In this case, the high uncertainty in the profit outcome outweighs the uncertainty in 
winning the job and therefore the optimum markup increases as Cx increases in order to 
avoid losing money afterwards in the case where the project is won. On the other hand, 
the two graphs where the optimum markup XQ remains below mx = 1.05 are the ones that 
correspond to n = 8 and to Oc/mc = 0 and Oc/mc — 10%. That is explained by the fact 
that given a relatively low variance in the project cost, AQ is more concerned about the risk 
of winning/losing the project. And given a high number of competitors, n = 8, it becomes 
almost impossible to win the project if AQ bids above mx, which explains why the curves 
remain below mx = 1.05 as ax increases. 
Each of Figures 10.17 and 10.18 shows four graphs, each corresponding to a specific 
value for the project cost variance. The first graph corresponds to a project with no cost 
risk (o"c = 0). The other three graphs correspond to a coefficient of variation in the project 
cost equal to 10%, 20% and 30%. Note that all four graphs in each of the figures show that 
the optimum markup increases with an increase in the bid-to-cost ratio variance regardless 
of the risk attitude of the contractor. Within the group of four graphs in each figure, as 
we move from the least to the highest project cost variance, the curves corresponding to 
the different degrees of risk aversion get more dispersed. As explained previously, this 
shows that the risk attitude of the contractor has a higher influence on the optimum markup 
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value as the project cost variance increases. Additionally, the first graph of each figure 
corresponds to a zero project cost variance and shows that the more risk-averse a contrac-
tor is, the lower is its markup. However, the remaining three graphs of each figure which 
correspond to o~c > 0 show that the most risk-averse contractor has the highest markup. 
Effect of mx on XQ? 
We just studied the effect of the apparent bid-to-cost variance on the optimum markup given 
an mx value equal to 1.05. We will now assign different values for mx (1,1.05,1.1, and 
1.15) and study the effect of ax on the optimum markup under each of these mx values. 
We start with the case of a risk-neutral contractor where the project cost variance does 
not play any role in determining XQ. Figure 10.19 includes two graphs for n = 2 and n — 8 
respectively. Each of these graphs depicts the optimum markup XQ as a function of the bid-
to-cost standard deviation o~x • The four curves shown in each of the graphs correspond to 
the different values of mx-
Figure 10.19 shows that as the mean of the apparent bid-to-cost ratios increases, the 
optimum markup does not constantly increase with the bid-to-cost variance anymore, but 
rather decreases and then increases. And this behavior is more obvious in the case of 8 
opponents, i.e., as the competition level is more intense. 
This can be explained as follows. As mx takes higher values and as ax takes relatively 
small values, this means that the opposing bids are closely clustered around their mean and 
are significantly greater than Ao's estimated cost for the project. Therefore Ao can expect 
a relatively high winning probability by decreasing its optimum markup without the need 
for XQ to be below 1. As the bid-to-cost variance slightly increases, X,- will now have a 
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Figure 10.19 LowBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-Cost 
Ratio with variable mx for a risk-neutral contractor 
wider range. However, because of the high value of mx, the chance to have X; < 1 remains 
low. Hence, AQ would still be able to choose an optimum markup that is higher than 1 to 
make a profit and low enough to secure a high chance of winning the project. But since the 
apparent bid-to-cost variance is now bigger, AQ has to lower its optimum markup further to 
have a high winning probability. That explains why for high values of mx, the optimum 
markup decreases with an increase in the bid-to-cost variance given relatively small values 
for the bid-to-cost variance. On the other hand, as ax increases further, the range for Xj, 
[mx - 3ox,mx + 3ox], becomes wider and therefore there is higher probability that some 
of the X,s will be lower than 1. In this case, and especially with a high number of oppo-
nents, Ao will have a low probability to win the project. Hence, AQ will choose a higher 
markup as ax takes higher values in order to avoid profit loss if the project is won. Chapter 
4 shows the corresponding graphs and provides detailed explanation about this process. 
Another observation about Figure 10.19 is that the optimum markup is always higher 
for a higher mx for the same bid-to-cost standard deviation ax. This is expected because 
a higher mx means that the opposing bids are higher relative to its own cost, and therefore 
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Figure 10.20 LowBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-Cost 
Ratio for 7 = 0.1,0.5 and given ac/mc = 0 
Ao can use a higher bid-to-cost ratio and still have a significant probability to win. This 
observation holds for both values of n, as shown in Figure 10.19. 
Figures 10.20 and 10.21 show the optimum markup XQ as a function of the apparent 
bid-to-cost ratio standard deviation for a risk-sensitive contractor. Figure 10.20 assumes a 
zero project cost variance and shows four graphs where the upper two correspond to 7 = 0.1 
and the lower two to 7 = 0.5. The two graphs in each row of the figure are based on the 
lowest and highest number of opponents considered in this example, 2 and 8 respectively. 
Figure 10.21 shows the same types of graphs shown in Figure 10.20 but for a project cost 
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Figure 10.21 LowBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-Cost 
Ratio for y = 0.1,0.5 and given Cc/mc = 30% 
variance equal to 30%, the highest project cost variance considered in this example. 
Figures 10.20 and 10.21 which include risk aversion in the analysis of the effect of bid-
to-cost parameters on the optimum markup show the same behavior shown in Figure 10.19 
for a risk-neutral contractor. In other words, as the bid-to-cost variance increases and for 
higher values of mx, the optimum markup decreases and then increases regardless of the 
risk aversion coefficient of the contractor. This is shown clearly in Figure 10.20 which cor-
responds to a zero variance in the project final cost. This means that the actual cost of the 
project at its completion will match exactly its estimated cost determined before bidding on 
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the project. In this case, the contractor is facing only one of the two aforementioned risks 
and that is the risk of losing the project. 
Figure 10.20 shows the curve corresponding to mx = 1.15 to decrease and then increase 
with higher values of ax, for both risk aversion degrees (0.1 and 0.5), and for both values 
of n (2 and 8). This means that regardless of its risk-aversion coefficient and regardless of 
the competition level he is facing, a risk-averse contractor has the same attitude in choos-
ing its optimum markup when the mean for apparent bid-to-cost ratios is relatively high. 
Furthermore, the lower two graphs of Figure 10.20, which correspond to n = 8, show that 
this trend is even more emphasized with higher competition. For instance, in the case of 8 
opponents, the curves corresponding to mx = 1.1 also decline and then rise again with an 
increase in Ox • 
On the other hand, Figure 10.21 corresponds to a high coefficient of variation for the 
project cost, equal to 30%. In this case, the contractor is again faced with two risks: the risk 
of losing the project and the risk of negative profit after winning the project. The curves 
showing the behavior for a low risk-averse contractor ( 7 = 0.1) still depict that for high 
values of mx, the optimum markup decreases and then increases as Ox increases. Again, 
this shows more clearly for the case of 8 opponents. However, the interesting observation 
about Figure 10.21 is that the graphs corresponding to a risk aversion coefficient equal to 
0.5 do not show anymore a change in the behavior of the contractor towards its optimum 
markup as mx increases. In other words, the optimum markup strictly increases as the 
bid-to-cost variance increases even for high values ofmx such as 1.15. This means that for 
highly risk-averse contractors bidding on high-risk projects, the optimum markup always 
increases with an increase in the variance for the apparent bid-to-cost ratios of opponents. 
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As discussed earlier, a high ax implies a wide range for the opponents' apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios, Xj. However, if mx takes relatively high values such as mx = 1.15 and if ax takes 
small values, the percentage of bids that will be lower than Ao's estimated cost CQ , i.e., 
Xj < 1 decreases. Hence, for a high mx and a small ax, AQ has a higher chance of winning 
the project through choosing an optimum markup that is low enough to underbid all bids 
and at the same time higher than 1 such that it covers the cost of the project. This explains 
why for relatively small values of Ox, the optimum markup decreases as the bid-to-cost 
variance increases but stays within a small range. This interpretation applies for the cases 
of a risk-neutral contractor, a low risk-averse contractor, and a high risk-averse contractor 
but under the condition of a small project cost variance for the latter. 
However, the same does not apply for a highly risk-averse contractor bidding on a high-
risk project, as shown in the two graphs corresponding to (y = 0.5) of Figure 10.21. Even 
for high values of mx and small values for ax, the optimum markup is always increasing 
with the bid-to-cost variance. This is explained by the fact that a highly risk-averse con-
tractor gives more attention to risk and a higher priority to minimizing losses if the project 
is won. Even for high mx and for small values of ax where the contractor can use a low 
markup and increase its winning chance, a highly risk-averse contractor would not go for 
this option because it means cutting on its profit on a highly risky project. This means 
that the more risk-averse a contractor is, the more he cares about avoiding losses in case of 
winning a high-risk project even if it comes at the expense of a lower chance of winning. 
In other words, as a contractor gets more risk-averse, the project risk represented by its 
cost variance dominates the risk of winning/losing a job embedded in the opponents' ap-
parent bid-to-cost ratio variance. This conclusion confirms the results obtained in previous 
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graphs of this chapter, which showed that as the project cost variance increases, the more 
risk averse a contractor is, the higher is its markup. 
10.6.2 Average Bid Method 
This section studies the effect of varying the parameters of the apparent bid-to-cost ratio 
distribution, mx and Ox, on the optimum markup under an average bid method. The val-
ues listed in Table 10.1 for mx and <7x will be used in this section to allow comparison 
with the low bid method results. Figure 10.22 shows the optimum markup XQ for a risk-
neutral contractor as a function of the apparent bid-to-cost ratio standard deviation. The 
two graphs correspond to two different values of n (2 and 8). On the other hand, similar 
to Figures 10.20 and 10.21 for the low bid method, Figures 10.23 and 10.24 show the op-
timum markup XQ for a risk-sensitive contractor as a function of the apparent bid-to-cost 
ratio standard deviation under the average bid method. The difference between Figures 
10.23 and 10.24 is that they assume a coefficient of variation for the project final cost equal 
to 0% and 30% respectively. Each of these figures shows four graphs where the upper two 
correspond to 7 = 0.1 and the lower two graphs correspond to 7 = 0.5. The two graphs in 
each row of each figure correspond to two distinct values for n equal to 2 and 8 respectively. 
All of the three figures show that for any value of mx, the optimum markup always in-
creases as the bid-to-cost variance increases. This means that for any degree of risk aversion 
7 (0 < 7 < 0.5) and given any project cost variance (0% < <JC/mc < 30%), the optimum 
markup increases with an increase in the apparent bid-to-cost ratio variance. This is ex-
pected because any change in the mean or the variance of the apparent bid-to-cost ratio only 
affects the winning probability in the expected utility of profit expression. Regardless of its 
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Figure 10.22 AverageBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-
Cost Ratio with variable mx for a risk-neutral contractor 
risk aversion degree, a contractor will always bid above mx under an average bid method to 
maximize its expected profit utility. This was shown clearly in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4 that 
depicts the standardized optimum markup versus the standardized bid-to-cost mean for a 
risk-neutral contractor. 
By definition, the average bid method awards the project to the contractor whose bid 
is closest to the average. This means that a contractor is expected to bid close to mx and 
preferably above mx to maximize expected profit for a risk-neutral contractor and expected 
utility of profit for a risk-averse contractor. Thus, the average bid method leads to much 
higher profits for the contractor than the low bid method. As the bid-to-cost mean mx in-
creases, it is expected that the optimum markup will increase because a contractor has to 
bid closer to the average to enhance its probability of winning. This is shown clearly in 
Figures 10.22, 10.23 and 10.24. On the other hand, given a specific mx, a high bid-to-cost 
variance Ox means that the opposing bids are widely spread around the mean. Hence, the 
probability that AQ wins at a certain markup is higher. This means that if there is a high 
variance in the opposing bids, AQ can afford increasing its markup further above the mean 
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Figure 10.23 AverageBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-
Cost Ratio for 7 = 0.1,0.5 and given Oc/mc = 0 
mx and still have a significant chance of winning the project. This explains why Figures 
10.22, 10.23 and 10.24 show a higher optimum markup for a higher bid-to-cost variance 
for any value of mx-
Thus, as variance in the apparent bid-to-cost ratios ax increases, so does the 
optimum markup XQ, and so does the expected value of profit E[V], 
Furthermore, an additional observation about the three figures is that among all graphs, 
the two graphs for two and eight opponents corresponding to a risk aversion degree of 0.5 
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Figure 10.24 AverageBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Standard Deviation of Bid-to-
Cost Ratio for y = 0.1,0.5 and given Oc/mc = 30% 
and a project final cost variance of 30% show the different mx curves much closer to each 
other. This shows that for high-risk projects and given a highly risk-averse contractor, the 
project cost variance outweighs the variance in the bid-to-cost ratio parameters and this 
means that the project cost risk dominates the risk of winning/losing the project. 
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10.7 Formulation of the Risk-Sensitive Model given a Nor-
mal Distribution for mc 
In the previous section, we assumed that Ao's estimated cost, CQ, is equal to the expected 
value of the final cost for the project, defined as a deterministic value mc- Beside the un-
certainty of the final cost or the final profit expressed through the variance Of, this section 
adds another uncertainty to the optimum markup decision process where it assumes that mc 
is not a deterministic value anymore but rather follows a normal distribution with a mean 
m and a standard deviation a. This assumption reflects the situation where Ao is uncertain 
about his estimate of the expected cost for the project {mc) due to insufficient information 
about previous projects, complexity of the project, or possible mistakes by the estimating 
team. Hence, for a more sophisticated analysis, mc, now follows a normal distribution with 
mean m and a standard deviation a. In this case, AQ'S estimated cost for the project prior to 
bidding is set equal to m. 
10.7.1 Formulation of EU[V] given a variable mc 
This section develops the risk-sensitive expression for the expected utility of profit for con-
tractor AQ given that the project cost C follows a normal distribution with a mean mc and 
a standard deviation Oc and given that the expected value for the project cost mc also fol-
lows a normal distribution with mean m and standard deviation a. Figure 10.25 shows the 
decision tree that pictures the decision making process that AQ has to go through given a 
probabilistic mc- Note that afc is kept deterministic in the analysis followed in this section 
in order to avoid adding more complexity to the problem. 
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P[Win lx0,c0>n] 
V = x0c0-c 
= x0m-c 
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Lose 
l-P[Winlx0,co,n] V = 0 
Figure 10.25 LowBidMethod-Bidding Decision Tree of Contractor Ao given a distribution 
for mc with a mean m and a standard deviation a 
According to the decision tree shown above, and given a risk aversion coefficient 7, the 
expected utility value for AQ'S profit can now be expressed as follows: 
E[U(V)\xo,n,co,a,Gc,mc] = P[Wm\x0,c0,n] / U (x0m - c)fc(c\mc)dc (10.62) 
E[U(V)\x0,n,CQ,G,GC]=P[Win\xo,co,n] < / U(xom-c)fc(c\mc)dc>fmc(mc)dmc 
(10.63) 
We follow the same assumption stated at the beginning of this chapter , i.e., a constant 
risk-averter with an exponential utility curve and a risk aversion coefficient 7. We start by 
computing the inside integral with respect to c assuming mc is known: 
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E[U(V)\xo,n,co,G,oc,mc] = / (l-Exp[-y(x0m-c)]) 
J C= — oo 27TCTc 
£*p - ~ ( — — ) \dc (10.64) 
The parameters m, OQ, the random variable mc, and the decision variable XQ are all con-
sidered as constants in (10.64) and c is the only variable of interest with respect to which 
the expression is integrated. 
The above integral has a closed-form solution as follows: 
E[U(V)\x0,n,co,a,ac,mc] = -Exp - y(xom -mc- 0.5yo"c) 
Erf 0.707yol + 0.707mc - 0.707c 
Oc 
-2Erf 0.707(m c-c) oc (10.65) 
After computing the integrated expression in (10.65) from c = — °° to c — +<», we obtain 
the following expression for the expected utility of profit in function of mc'. 
E[U{V)\x0,n,co,G,ac,mc} = 1 -Exp[- y (xom-m c -0 .5yo£)] (10.66) 
As (10.66) shows, the expected utility of profit does not include the variable c anymore 
and is only a function of mc. Hence, it now has to be integrated over all possible values of 
mc: 
294 
f+°° 
E[U(V)\xo,n,co,o,oc} = / (\-Exp[-y(x0m-mc-0.5yal)} 
1
 IT r Ximc~m\i-\A (10.67) 
Again, the expression in (10.67) is only a function of mc and all other parameters 
and variables are considered deterministic values with respect to integrating over mc- The 
closed-form solution obtained from integrating the above expression is as follows: 
E[U(V)\xQ,n,c0,a,(Jc] = -Exp - 7 ( ( x 0 - l ) m - 0 . 5 7 ( o - £ + o-2)) 
Erf 0.707yd
1
 + 0.707m - 0.707mc 
--2Erf 
0.707(m-m c) (10.68) 
After computing the integrated expression in (10.68) from mc = —°° to mc = +°°, we 
obtain the following: 
E[U(V)\xo,n,co,a,oc} = 1 -Exp y( (x0-l)m--y(al + G2) (10.69) 
Then, the expression in (10.69) needs to be multiplied by the probability of winning 
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P[Win\xo, co, n] to obtain the final form for the expected utility of profit for AQ : 
- 7 U x o - l ) m - - 7 ( c r £ + c72)j \ E[U(V)\xo,n,c0,G,Gc} =P[Win\xo,co,n}< l-Exp 
(10.70) 
Thus, given that the project final cost C follows a normal distribution with mean mc 
amd variance a^, the estimated expected project cost mc follows a normal distribution 
with mean m and variance a2, and that the low bid method is used, the closed-form for 
/4Q'S expected utility of profit is as follows: 
E[U(V)\xo,n,co,o,(Jc}=n-Fx{xo}) ll-Exp -y({xo - \)m- ^y{ol + G2) j I 
(10.71) 
The aforementioned analysis was performed to determine the expected utility of profit 
for a risk-averse contractor with a positive 7. However, if Ao is a risk-neutral contractor 
with 7 = 0, he will aim at maximizing its expected monetary value for profit E[V] which 
can now be defined as follows: 
E[V\x0,n,CQ,G,ac,mc} =P[Wm\xQ,c0,n] / (x0m-c)fc(c\mc)dc (10.72) 
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E[V\xo,n,co,o,oc] =P[Wm\xo,c0,n] / I / (xom-c)fc(c\mc)dc>fmc(mc)dmc 
(10.73) 
By integrating (10.73) with respect to c first and then with respect to YUQ, we obtain the 
expression for the expected profit value of a risk-neutral contractor that should be maxi-
mized to determine its optimum markupx^: 
E[V\xo,n,c0,o,Oc} = P[Win|x0,c0,n] / {x0m-E[c}}fmc(mc)dmc (10.74) 
= P[Win|x0,co,«] / {xom-mc}fmc(mc)dmc (10.75) 
Jmc 
— P[Wm\xo,co,n}{xom — E[mc]} (10.76) 
= P[Win|x0 ,co,«](x0-l)m (10.77) 
10.7.2 Effect of Varying rac's variance o on Ao's Optimum Markup 
This section studies the effect of varying o, i.e., the variance or level of uncertainty in mc, 
on the optimum markup XQ for the low bid method. We set the value of m at $10M and we 
vary a from 0 to $3M through increments of 0.5. In order to study the sole effect of cr on 
XQ, we need to keep all other variables constant. Below we define the values used for these 
variables in this analysis: 
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Figure 10.26 LowBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of the Ex-
pected Project Cost mc given m\ = 1 05, ax = 0.105, ac = 0, and n — 2 
m = 10 
m x = 105 
ox = 0.105 
Figure 10.26 shows the optimum markup XQ versus the coefficient of variation c/m for 
the expected project cost mc for n = 2 and given Oc = 0. The six curves in the figure cor-
respond to different values for the risk aversion coefficient ranging from y = 0 to y— 0.5 
with an increment of 0.1. This graph assumes a zero variance in the final cost of the project 
and therefore the two uncertainties facing the contractor are 1) winning/losing the job, and 
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pected Project Cost mc given m* = 1 05, ax = 0.105, ot = 0, and n = 8 
2) making or losing profit after winning the job due to the uncertainty in the estimated cost 
for the project. This figure is the same as Figure 10.8 which showed the optimum markup 
versus the coefficient of variation of the project final cost C. The two figures are the same 
because the two variances Oc and a have the same weight in the expression for the ex-
pected utility of profit in (10.71) and thus setting the first at zero and varying the second 
has the same effect on the optimum markup as setting the second equal to zero and varying 
the first. Figure 10.26 indicates that for low values of a/m, the most risk-averse contractor 
adopts the lowest markup, and as a/m takes higher values the order is reversed. In fact, 
the same interpretation and analysis that was done for Figure 10.8 applies to this figure as 
well. 
Figure 10.27 shows the optimum markup^ versus the coefficient of variation a/m for 
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Figure 10.28 LowBidMethod-Optimum Markup versus Coefficient of Variation of the Ex-
pected Project Cost me given m* = 1 05, ax = 0.105, Oc/m = 30%, and n = 2 
n = 8 and given OQ = 0. Again, the difference with n = 2 is that the behavioral crosspoint 
occurs at a lower value of a/m and that is because a higher competition implies a lower 
profit margin and therefore the uncertainty about making/losing profit after winning the job 
is higher. Thus, AQ can not tolerate the same variance in the project estimated cost as when 
he was facing 2 opponents and that is why the shift in behavior occurs at a lower a/m. 
Again, this figure is identical to Figure 10.10. 
A more interesting case to observe is when both uncertainties in estimated cost, a, and 
in final cost, a t , have non-zero values, which is depicted in Figures 10.28 and 10.29. These 
two figures correspond to two different values of n, 2 and 8, and show the optimum markup 
XQ versus the coefficient of variation a/m given a relatively high ac/m = 30%. This means 
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pected Project Cost mc given m* = 1 05, ax = 0.105, ac/m = 30%, and n = 8 
that the contractor is now facing three uncertainties which are 1) winning/losing the job, 
2) making/losing profit due to high variance in the final cost of the project, and 3) mak-
ing/losing profit due to uncertainty in estimated cost. The variances reflecting the latter 
two uncertainties are added in the formula for the expected utility of profit and therefore 
their effect on the optimum markup is combined as if they constitute one high uncertainty. 
The first observation to make about both figures is that they are very similar to each 
other which means that the number of opponents has a very minimal effect on the optimum 
markup and that is expected since now with both non-zero uncertainties about the cost of 
the project, the contractor is more concerned with not losing profit in case the project is 
won. Additionally, given a Cc/m = 30%, the more risk-averse contractor adopts a higher 
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markup for any value of o/m. The curves corresponding to different degrees of risk aver-
sion in Figures 10.28 and 10.29 are much more dispersed than the ones in Figures 10.26 
and 10.27, and that is because the risk attitude of a contractor plays an important role in de-
termining the optimum markup for a project if there is high uncertainty about its cost. Note 
that for high values in both variances, namely Gc/m = 30% and a/m = 30%, the optimum 
markup can reach significantly high values for a highly risk-averse contractor with y = 0.5 
such as 1.45. 
Finally, we can conclude that when there is uncertainty in both the estimated and the 
final costs of a project, a risk-averse contractor is more concerned about the risk of mak-
ing/losing profit in case he wins the project than about its chance of winning in the first 
place. 
10.8 Conclusion 
Past chapters focused on a risk-neutral contractor. This chapter introduced the notion of 
a contractor's risk preference and developed risk-sensitive bidding models for two of the 
previously studied tendering methods: the low bid method and the average bid method, 
under the assumption that a contractor's utility function is exponential. 
A contractor is faced with two uncertainties when making his decision about the opti-
mum markup to use on a project. The first uncertainty lies in the probability of winning 
the project. The second uncertainty concerns the project's estimated and final costs. The 
estimated cost of a project does not end up to be its actual cost at completion due to many 
factors such as inconvenient weather conditions, unforeseen conditions, schedule delays, 
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change in material prices, etc. The risk-sensitive bidding models developed in this chapter 
capture both uncertainties and determine accordingly the optimum markup that maximizes 
the expected utility of profit for the contractor. 
We started the chapter by introducing the concepts about the risk attitude of a contrac-
tor, the certain equivalent of a lottery, the utility theory, the delta property and exponential 
utility function. Then, we formulated the expected utility for profit for a risk-averse con-
tractor under the low and average bidding methods. Numerical examples were used in this 
chapter to study the effect of a contractor's risk attitude and the effect of uncertainty in the 
estimated and final cost of a project upon the optimum markup charged by a contractor for 
that project. 
Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter for both the low and average bid 
methods, we can conclude that for low-risk projects, i.e., where the final cost variance 
is relatively small, the contractor gives more importance to the risk of winning/losing the 
job and thus the more risk averse he is, the lower is its optimum markup. Additionally, 
the difference in the optimum markup for different degrees of risk aversion is small com-
pared to their difference under a greater final cost variance. This means that for low-risk 
projects, the optimum markup of a contractor depends only on the number of competitors. 
The risk attitude of a contractor has a greater impact on his optimum bid-to-cost ratio as 
the uncertainty about the final cost of the project increases. 
On the other hand, for high-risk projects with a high variance in the final project cost, 
the relative effect of risk aversion on the optimum bid-to-cost ratio is reversed in the sense 
that a higher risk aversion leads to a higher markup. That is because the contractor is now 
faced with a high uncertainty about its profit in case he ends up winning the project and 
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this explains the increase in markup as the contractor is more conservative towards taking 
risks. These conclusions apply to low and average bidding methods. The only difference 
between both bidding methods is that for an average bid method, the shift in the relative 
behavior of a risk-averse contractor towards its optimum markup as the variance for the 
final cost increases, happens at a higher value of the project cost variance. This means that 
the risk of the project's unknown final cost starts dominating the risk of winning or losing 
the job at a higher value of the project cost variance for the average bid method. This is due 
to the fact that the latter method provides the contractor with higher profits than the low bid 
method and hence, he can afford giving priority to the risk of winning/losing the job for a 
wider range of the project cost variance. 
As the number of opponents increases, the uncertainty in the expected profit after win-
ning the project increases and thus it dominates the risk of winning/losing the job starting at 
smaller values of the project final cost variance under both the low and the average bidding 
methods. 
On the other hand, this chapter studied the effect of the mean and variance of apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios of opponents, representing the uncertainty in the probability of winning, 
on the optimum markup decision. A sensitivity analysis was conducted over the afore-
mentioned parameters by fixing one of them and varying the other to determine its sole 
impact on the optimum markup value. As expected, for any risk aversion degree and for 
any project cost variance, the optimum markup increases as the mean for the opponents' 
bids increases for both bidding methods. Additionally, and for a given mean of the oppos-
ing bids, an increase in the bids' variance causes a small increase in the markup for both 
bidding methods. The only exception to this conclusion is the case of a relatively high mean 
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for the opponents' bids under a low bid method, where the optimum markup decreases for 
small values of the opposing bids' variance and then increases as this variance takes larger 
values. 
Moreover, the last part of this chapter introduced an additional uncertainty to the op-
timum markup decision process under a low bid method, which is that of the project's 
estimated cost. It assumed that the expected mean for the final project cost has itself a 
probability density function and therefore the contractor's estimated cost for the project is 
not a deterministic value anymore. The conducted analysis showed that both uncertainties 
in the estimated cost and the final cost of the project have the same individual effect on the 
optimum markup and thus their combined effect is even higher than their sole impact. 
In brief, the risk attitude of a contractor has a major impact on its optimum markup 
value as the uncertainty about the final cost of the project takes higher values. However, 
given a particular project's final cost variance, the risk aversion coefficient has a lower ef-
fect on the optimum bid-to-cost ratio as the number of opponents increases, and a lower 
impact as the uncertainty about the opponents' bids increases. 
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Chapter 11 
Stability of Bidding Methods 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays the ground for studying the stability of the bidding methods discussed 
in previous chapters of this research. These bidding models were developed from the per-
spective of a particular contractor. However, this chapter aims at modeling the bidding 
market from an outsider's perspective in order to imitate the indirect interaction among 
contractors that happens through storing information about each others' bids and using this 
data to determine their optimum markup for upcoming projects. A simulation model for an 
interactive bidding environment is developed in this chapter to observe the evolution of the 
optimum markup over time for the different bidding methods and consequently compare 
their stability. The first section of this chapter describes the simulation algorithm that was 
developed and states the assumptions that form its basis. And, the second section presents 
the simulation results that show the progress of the optimum markup over time, explains 
the challenges and the limitations of this model, and provides suggestions to improve it. 
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11.2 Description of Interactive Bidding Model 
A contractor relies on its information about the bids submitted by opponents on previous 
projects to estimate its optimum markup for a given project. After each bid opening for a 
project, a contractor gathers data about the bids that were submitted by his opponents and 
updates his database. Thus the estimated mean and variance of the apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios, mx and ax, are updated after each project the contractor bids on whether he ends 
up winning the project or not. Of course, this model assumes that all bids are announced 
publicly during bid opening. 
This model simulates a bidding environment with a defined number of contractors who 
are continuously bidding against each other. Projects are generated one at a time and are 
assumed to be of the same scope and budget. All contractors are assumed "equivalent" 
in that their cost estimates for each new project comes from the same cost distribution and 
they all start with the same estimates for mx and ax- This allows to study the isolated effect 
of the bidding method on the stability of the optimum markup without adding variability to 
other aspects of the model. The cost distribution from which the contractors sample their 
estimated costs for the projects does not change over time. But because of randomness, 
each contractor will have a different cost estimate for a particular project and this estimate 
will change from one project to the next. Given a specific bidding method, this model is 
based on the associated nomogram that shows the optimum standardized bid-to-cost ratio, 
(XQ — I)/Ox, as a function of the standardized mean m'x. The corresponding nomograms for 
all bidding methods were developed in previous chapters of this research. All contractors 
are assumed to use the same bidding model, i.e., the same nomogram to determine their 
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optimum bid-to-cost ratio for each job. Each contractor has a database where he stores his 
estimated cost for each of the projects and the opponents' bids submitted for that project. 
Prior to bidding on each project, each contractor will compute his updated mean for the ap-
parent bid-to-cost ratios of his opponents such that it includes the data from the last project 
he bid on. Then, after determining m'x, the contractor will refer to the nomogram for the 
bidding method used to identify the corresponding optimum standardized bid-to-cost ratio, 
(XQ — 1)/GX, and consequently its optimum markup XQ. Then the contractor's bid will just 
be the product of the determined markup and of his estimated cost, already sampled from 
the cost distribution defined at the beginning of the model. 
Note that on the first new simulated project, all contractors will use the same optimum 
markup because they start with the same initial values for mx and ax- However, they will 
have different cost estimates and therefore different bids. Then, after the first project, each 
contractor updates his own estimates of mx and ax using the new data obtained from the 
first project B-JCQ. Hence, starting from the second simulated project, each contractor will 
have a different m'x to determine its optimum markup x*Q. Consequently, the submitted bids 
by the different contractors will be different due to the difference in their estimated cost 
and in their optimum markup. 
Given a specific bidding method defined at the start of the simulation, the model or 
in other words, the outsider observer or controller of the market, will determine the win-
ning bid. Then the winning contractor will update his database by adding this project to 
his list of won projects. The model assumes that the final cost of the project is equal to 
its estimated cost and thus after determining the winner, his total profit is automatically 
updated by adding the profit that is to be earned from this project. At the same time, the 
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database corresponding to each project is updated by adding the following attributes: the 
list of submitted bids, the winner identity, the estimated cost, and the winning bid. 
11.3 Assumptions, Variables, and Simulation Procedure 
11.3.1 Definition of Variables and Parameters 
The simulation model described in the previous section is based on a set of variables and 
parameters that are defined below: 
Parameters 
s = number of simulation sets, 
N - number of previous projects the contractors have bid on and based on which the 
initial estimates for mx and Ox are defined, 
p - number of upcoming projects generated during the simulation, 
n - number of potential opponents facing each contractor, 
mXi„i,iai = initial value for the estimate of the mean of apparent bid-to-cost ratios, used 
by all contractors, 
°Xinitiai = initial value for the estimate of the standard deviation of apparent bid-to-cost 
ratios, used by all contractors, 
mec = mean of the estimated cost distribution followed by all contractors, 
Gec = standard deviation of the estimated cost distribution followed by all contractors, 
Variables 
Cij = estimated cost of contractor i for project j , 
X*j = Optimum markup used by contractor i on project j , 
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Bij = bid submitted by contractor / for project j , 
mxij = Contractor t's estimate for the mean of his opponents' apparent bid-to-cost ra-
tios, determined just before bidding on project j , 
Gxij = Contractor j's estimate for the standard deviation of his opponents' apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios, determined just before bidding on project j , 
11.3.2 Assumptions 
After defining the parameters and the variables that will be used in this chapter, we state 
below the assumptions that form the basis for the developed stability model: 
• The contractors are assumed identical in that they all sample from the same distribu-
tion for their projects' estimated costs. 
• All contractors are risk-neutral. 
• Projects' Estimated costs by contractors follow a normal distribution with a mean 
mec and a standard deviation aec 
• The contractors bid on one project at a time. 
• All contractors bid on each generated project, i.e., every contractor faces n opponents 
on each project. 
• Contractors have enough available bonding capacity to bid on each project. 
• The actual cost of a project at its completion is equal to its estimated cost. 
• All projects are of the same scope and within the same budget. 
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• All contractors start with equal estimates for the mean and variance of the apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios of their opponents 
• The number of opponents on a project is known to each contractor. 
11.3.3 Simulation Procedure 
The steps of the simulation procedure for the stability model are the following: 
Step 1: Initialize the number of contractors in the market to (n + 1) which makes 
the number of opponents facing each contractor equal to n. 
Step 2: Read from an input file the data showing the standardized optimum markup 
as a function of m'x for the bidding method used in the simulation, and store 
them in a map called [OptimumMarkup]. 
Step 3: Initialize the simulation set counter k = 1. 
Step 4: Initialize the number of previous projects for which data is available to N. 
Step 5: Initialize the project counter j =1. 
Step 6: For each contractor / (/ = 1,2,..., n + 1): 
1. Sample his estimated cost for project j , Qy, from a normal distribution 
with mean mec and a standard deviation cec. 
For j= 1: mxij=mXinUlal, and 
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For j > 1: Contractor / will use the following equations to update his 
own estimates of the mean and the standard deviation of his opponents' 
bid-to-cost ratios: 
mxU = TTT-^ (11-D (N + n) 
2. Determine the standardized mean m'Xr for his opponents' apparent 
bid-to-cost ratios: 
_, _mxil-\ 
GXlJ 
mXii = —- (11.3) 
"7 
3. Locate m'Xi- in the map [OptimumMarkup] and interpolate between 
the surrounding values to obtain the corresponding standardized opti-
mum markup (X*j — \)/oxij, and hence compute X*j. 
4. Determine his bid for the current project j and which is equal to: 
Bij=X?jCij (11.4) 
5. Update contractor i's database with his estimated cost and bid for 
project j . 
Step 7: Compare all bids By for i = 1,2, . . . ,«+ 1 and determine the winning con-
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tractor w according to the bidding method used. 
Step 8: Compute expected profit for contractor w from project j which is equal to 
BWj — CWj, and add to the total profit of contractor w from previous projects. 
Step 9: Update the list of projects won by contractor w. 
Step 10: Increase N by (n — 1). 
Step 11: If the index j equals the total number of projects p, then go to Step 12. 
Otherwise, increase j by 1 and go back to Step 6. 
Step 12: If the index k equals the total number of simulation sets s, then go to Step 
13. Otherwise, increase A: by 1 and go back to Step 4. 
Step 13: Calculate the average optimum markup for each contractor / on each project 
j over all simulation sets s: 
A
 k=\ 
11.3.4 Simulation Results 
Figures 11.1 and 11.2 show the progress of the optimum markup for all competing con-
tractors over a sequence of projects in the market for all bidding methods discussed in this 
research. Figure 11.1 corresponds to n = 2, i.e., a total of three competitors and Figure 11.2 
corresponds to n = 8, i.e., a group of nine competitors. 
Some variables and parameters need to be initialized before starting the simulation. 
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Hence, it is important to realize that the obtained simulation results that are analyzed in 
this section are based on the following initial conditions: 
s = 1000 
N = 200 
p = 800 
Win,,!* = L 0 5 
ox. .,., = 0.0525 
^•initial 
mec = $10M 
Oec = $0.5M 
Note that Figures 11.1 and 11.2 use the following acronyms to designate the curves for 
the different bidding methods: 
LBM = Low Bid Method 
ABM — Average Bid Method 
BABM = Below — Average Bid Method 
TABM = Truncated Average Bid Method 
TBABM — Truncated Below — Average Bid Method 
SLBM = Second Low Bid Method 
MBM = Median Bid Method 
The first observation about both figures is that for each bidding method, the curves 
corresponding to all contractors match perfectly. This harmony or equilibrium between 
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the different contractors is due to the assumption that all contractors use the same bidding 
model and sample their estimated costs for the project from the same distribution. 
Figure 11.1 shows that, given three competitors in the market, the optimum markup 
curves corresponding to the average bid, the second-low bid, the median bid, and the trun-
cated average-based bid methods are all identical. This is expected and was shown in 
previous nomograms that compared between the bidding methods modeled in preceding 
chapters of this research. On the other hand, an important observation regarding the stabil-
ity of these bidding methods, is that the optimum markup keeps increasing on the long-term 
given that there are only three contractors in the market who are bidding continuously on 
each project against each other. This means that given a low competitive environment, and 
given that a contractor has a good financial status and enough bonding capacity that allow 
him to bid on every project, he will tend to use a higher bid-to-cost ratio over time under 
the aforementioned bidding methods. Note that the second low bid, the median bid, and 
the truncated average and below-average bid methods behave similarly to the average bid 
method in the case where three contractors are competing against each other and that is be-
cause they all require the winner to bid between his two opponents' bids such that his bid 
is the closest to the average. As a result, each contractor will try to bid closest to but higher 
than his estimate for the mean of the opposing bids, which drives the optimum markup 
higher and higher with each project in the market especially given a low competition. 
On the other hand, the below-average bid method curve shows an increasing markup 
over time but at a much slower rate than the aforementioned bidding methods. And that 
is because the below-average bid method requires the winner to bid closest to but lower 
than the average of all submitted bids. This condition inhibits the markup to have a large 
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Figure 11.1 Progress of Optimum Markup versus Project Number—n=2 
increase over time. This explains why the curve seems to almost stabilize as the number 
of projects increases. Similarly, the low bid method curve shows a markup that is slightly 
increasing at the beginning and that stabilizes as more projects are generated and bid on. 
This is expected for the low bid method since each contractor has to bid lower than his 
opponents to win the project. Since the number of competitors is relatively small, each 
contractor will try to underbid his opponents. However, this markup soon reaches a stable 
level because decreasing it further means that the contractor has to sign the contract at cost 
which is not favorable. That is why the low bid method curve stabilizes faster than the 
below-average bid method in this case. 
Figure 11.2 shows the progress of the optimum markup over time for all the previ-
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Figure 11.2 Progress of Optimum Markup versus Project Number—n=8 
ously discussed bidding methods but for nine contractors present in the market (n — 8). As 
the competition in the construction market increases, four out of the seven bidding meth-
ods lead to a stabilized optimum markup on the long-term. As expected, the average bid 
method and its truncated variant indicate a continuously increasing markup over time re-
gardless of the number of competitors. However, as the number of competitors increases, 
the increase in markup happens at slower pace. That is because as the competition level 
increases, contractors would still bid higher than the mean of their opponents' bids but 
each would try to be the closest to that mean due to the highly competitive environment. 
Hence, the increase in optimum markup over time is now milder due to higher competi-
tion. Similarly, the median bid method which shows the highest optimum markup among 
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all methods, also indicates a continuously increasing markup over time. That is because the 
median bid method does not care about the magnitude of bids but about their order. And 
therefore, contractors are more comfortable to increase their optimum markup as it does 
not necessarily mean a lower chance of winning. This explains the continuous increase in 
optimum bid-to-cost ratio. 
Figure 11.2 shows that the below-average bid method and its truncated version start 
with an increasing markup and then they reach an equilibrium level. Thus, as the num-
ber of competitors increases, the below-average bid method shows a stable markup on the 
long-term. That is because as the competition level becomes higher, contractors have to bid 
further close to the mean but lower. That's why the optimum markup reaches a stable level 
over time. It is interesting to observe that by moving from an average to a below-average 
bid method through forcing one additional requirement on the winner and that is to bid 
below the average, the optimum markup changes its longterm behavior from a continuous 
increase to an equilibrium state. 
As expected, the second-low bid and the low bid method curves show a slight decrease 
at the beginning and then stabilize over time. That is because they are both more price-
competitive than the other methods and hence as the competition intensifies, contractors 
have to bid lower to increase their chances of winning. However, contractors have to bid 
higher than their estimated costs in order to at least cover them. Hence, as a contractor 
lowers his bid, he reaches a minimum threshold below which bidding on the project would 
mean a loss for him. Similarly, in the case of a second-low bid method, a high competition 
will lead each contractor to lower his markup but with the constraint not to go below the 
lowest bidder. This explains why the corresponding curve in Figure 11.2 decreases and 
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then reaches an equilibrium level. 
11.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a simulation of the bidding environment where projects are gen-
erated one at a time and contractors are continuously competing on these projects. The 
chapter starts with a description of the concepts presented in the model for the bidding 
market. Then, the assumptions that form the basis for the developed model are stated, and 
the related variables and parameters are defined. At the end of the chapter, the simulation 
results which show the progress of the optimum markup over time are presented for all 
bidding methods of interest to this research. 
This chapter showed that as the number of competitors increases in a construction mar-
ket, and as projects are advertised and bid on over time, the low bid, the second-low bid, 
the below-average and the truncated below-average bid methods lead to a stable optimum 
markup on the long-term. But, the average bid, its truncated version, and the median bid 
methods reflect a continuously increasing markup. 
However, it is important to understand that the model developed in this chapter is a 
simplified imitation of the construction bidding environment that is based on certain as-
sumptions and initial conditions which are stated clearly throughout the chapter. These 
assumptions or simplifications were made to allow comparison of the long-term stability 
of different bidding methods on the basis of everything else being equal. For example, 
this model assumes that all contractors have the financial capacity to bid continuously on 
each project, which is not very realistic. It will rather be more logical to initialize a bond-
319 
ing capacity for each contractor that gets updated with every project he takes charge of, 
and to include a bidding decision strategy for each contractor that evaluates the desirabil-
ity of projects to contractors according to their current situation. Additionally, this model 
assumes that all contractors in the market bid on each project, whereas having the same 
number of competitors on each project is a very rare situation. Also, contractors should 
have different cost distributions for sampling their estimated costs which should be dif-
ferent from the final actual costs for projects. Furthermore, it would be more realistic if 
the death/birth factor is introduced to the model where a death process means a contractor 
going bankrupt and thus leaving the market, and a birth process occurs as a new firm enters 
the market. To make it even more complicated, contractors, assumed risk-neutral in this 
model, can be modified to include risk aversion in their bidding behavior. 
Thus, this chapter achieved the goal of studying the long-term behavior of previously 
discussed bidding methods through a simplified bidding environment given some initial 
conditions. Future work of this research includes improving the bidding market model 
presented in this chapter to acquire a more sophisticated nature. 
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Chapter 12 
Unknown Number of Opponents 
12.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters of this research examined the competitive bidding problem and sim-
ulated the probability of winning under each of the investigated bidding methods assuming 
that a contractor knows the number of opponents facing him for the new project he is 
bidding on. Accordingly, the optimum markup nomograms, that were developed for a 
risk-neutral contractor to use in order to determine his optimum markup for a new project, 
required the contractor to know the number of opponents he expects to compete against. 
However, a contractor usually does not know the exact number of opponents on a newly 
advertised project until after its bid opening takes place. 
This chapter develops the formulas for expected profit of a risk-neutral contractor and 
expected utility of profit for a risk-averse contractor given an unknown number of oppo-
nents. A numerical example is used to show how the previously developed nomograms for 
the winning probability can be used by a contractor to determine his optimum markup if he 
has a certain probability distribution for n. 
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12.2 Expected Profit and Expected Utility of Profit Given 
Unknown n 
A contractor can rely on his bidding history to study the relative frequency of facing a cer-
tain number of opponents. Let TV be the random variable representing the unknown number 
of opponents. By looking at similar past projects and the number of opponents that he 
faced for each, AQ can arrive at estimates for the probability of facing a given n on the new 
project he is bidding on, PN{YI) = p[N = n]. The decision tree, shown in Figure 12.1, de-
picts the optimal markup decision that AQ has to make given unknown an unknown number 
of opponents. 
The expected profit given a particular n can be expressed as follows: 
E[V\x0,c0,n] = P[Wm\xo,c0,n] J (b0-c)fc(c)dc (12.1) 
= P\Wn\xo,c0,n](bo-E[C\) (12.2) 
= P[Wm\xo,co,n}(bo-mc) (12.3) 
= P[Wm\xo,c0,n}(b0-co) (12.4) 
= P[Win|x0,co,n](x0- l)c0 (12.5) 
Then, as shown in the decision tree in Figure 12.1, E [V pro, c0,n] needs to be summed 
over all possible values of N to obtain: 
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Figure 12.1 Bidding Decision Tree of Contractor AQ with Unknown n 
E[V\xo,c0) = Y,{PN{n)p[Wm\x0,c0,n](xo-l)co} 
N 
= Y,{pN(n)P[Wm\xo,c0,n]}(x0-l)co 
(12.6) 
(12.7) 
In the case of a risk-averse contractor, the expected utility of profit given a particular n 
was developed in Chapter 10 and is shown below. An attempt has been made to tie together 
the notation used for the development of bidding models for the risk-neutral case that uses 
Co and the risk-sensitive case that uses mc- It is important to reiterate here that CQ — mc'. 
E[U(V)\xo,c0,mc,oc,n] = P[Wm\xo,c0,n]U[(xo- l)mc -0.5yo%\ (12.8) 
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E[U{V)\xo,co,mc,0c,n}=P[Wm\xo,co,n}{l-exp[-Y((xo-l)mc-O.5Yo£)]} (12.9) 
To obtain the expected utility of profit expression taking into account all possible values 
of n, as estimated from bidding history on past projects, (12.9) should be summed over N 
as follows: 
E[U(V)\xQ,co,mc,Oc]=J^\pN(n)P[Wm\xo,co,n]{\-exp[-y((xo-l)mc-0.5YGc)}}} 
(12.10) 
E[U(V)\xo,co,mc,oc] =Y,{pN(n)P[Wm\xo,c0,n}\{l - e x p [ - y ( ( x 0 - l )m c -0 .5yo£)]} 
N J 
(12.11) 
Hence, after determining the discrete probability distribution for N based on similar 
past projects, AQ can determine his optimum markup for the new project by maximizing 
(12.7) if he is risk-neutral and maximizing (12.11) if risk-averse. 
12.3 Numerical Example 
This section shows an example where contractor AQ determines the relative frequency dis-
tribution for TV based on similar past projects reflected in Table 12.1. According to this 
table, AQ has a 25% chance to face 2 opponents, a 50% chance to face 4 opponents and a 
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Number of 
Project # Opponents, n 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
4 
2 
4 
8 
2 
4 
4 
8 
2 
2 
8 
4 
4 
8 
4 
2 
4 
8 
4 
4 
i„(2) 0.25 
f„(4) 0.5 
f„(8) 0.25 
Table 12.1 Number of Opponents n for Similar Past Projects 
25% chance to compete with 8 opponents. In this case, the probability of winning at any 
particular XQ is equal to: 
/,[Win|jco)co]=0.25P[Win|jio,co,^ = 2]+0.5P[Win|jr<),co,^ = 4]+0.25P[Win|xo,co,^V = 8] 
(12.12) 
Figures 12.2, 12.3, and 12.4 show the nomograms that depict the probability of winning 
as a function of xfQ for the low, average and below-average bidding methods respectively. 
Each nomogram contains four curves corresponding to n=2, n=4, n=8, and the curve re-
flecting the relative frequency distribution of N. This last curve is obtained by adding the 
three probability of winning curves for n=2, n=4 and n=8, presented in Chapter 5, mul-
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Figure 12.2 Low Bid Method - Probability of Winning as a function of x!Q given F^(n) 
tiplied by their relative frequencies as shown in (12.12). So given the relative frequency 
distribution obtained from bidding history, this winning probability curve should be now 
used to determine the optimum markup for a risk-neutral or a risk-averse contractor. 
For instance, if we consider Figure 12.2 and JCQ = — 1, the low bid method indicates a 
probability of winning equal to 0.7079 for n = 2, 0.5011 for n = 4, and 0.2511 for n = 8. 
These values are shown in Appendix A. But, if we use the probability of winning curve 
corresponding to the relative frequency distribution for N, we obtain 0.491 from Figure 
12.2. This value is closer to the value for n = 4 since this value has the highest probability 
of occurring among all possible values of TV. 
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12.3.1 For a Risk-Neutral Contractor 
Figures 12.5, 12.6, and 12.7 represent the optimum markup (XQ - I)/Ox as a function of 
m'x for a risk-neutral contractor for the low bid method, the average bid, and the below-
average bid methods respectively. Again, each figure includes four curves that correspond 
to n — 2, n = 4, n — 8 and to the relative frequency distribution of N shown in Table 12.1. 
The optimum markup given a certain discrete distribution for N, fJv(n), is derived from 
the corresponding probability of winning curve following the same approach as in previ-
ous chapters. In other words, the standardized optimum markup (XQ — \)/ox = x/0+m'x 
for a given m'x is obtained by maximizing the standardized expected profit v' using the 
probability of winning curve that corresponds to the relative frequency distribution for N: 
v' = - ^ = p(x>0,FN(n))X°-mX + mX ~ l = p(x>0,FN(nW0+m'x) (12.13) 
CQOX OX 
For example, if we consider Figure 12.6 which corresponds to the average bid method, 
and given m'x = 0, it indicates an optimum standardized bid-to-cost ratio equal to 0.9 for 
n = 2, 0.596 for n = 4, and to 0.396 for n = 8. These values are shown in Appendix B. If 
we consider the curve corresponding to the considered relative frequency distribution for 
N, it shows an optimum markup equal to 0.639. Again, this value is closer to the value 
for n — 4 since the latter has the highest probability of occurring among all possible values 
of N. Note that this optimum markup value is derived from the corresponding probability 
of winning curve and can not be obtained by summing up the individual optimum markup 
values corresponding to possible values of N multiplied by their probability of occurrence. 
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12.3.2 For a Risk-Averse Contractor 
This section shows how the probability of winning curve corresponding to the relative 
frequency distribution for N shown in Table 12.1 can be used to determine the optimum 
markup for a risk-averse contractor. We shall consider an example where mx = 1.05, 
ax = 0.105, mc = 10, Oc = 2, and y = 0.3. If the low bid method is used, and based 
on Figure 10.8 from Chapter 10 the optimum markup corresponding to n — 2 is equal to 
1.103. If we consider Figures 10.9 and 10.10 from the same chapter which correspond to 
n = 4 and n = 8 respectively, they indicate optimum markup values of 1.084 and 1.073 
respectively. 
Now if AQ faces an unknown number of opponents and estimates the corresponding rel-
ative frequency distribution based on Table 12.1, the optimum markup XQ is the value that 
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maximizes the expected utility of profit expressed in (12.11) based on the probability of 
winning curve for the relative frequency distribution of N, depicted in Figure 12.2. Given 
mx = 105, <Jx = 0.105, mc = 10, o"t = 2, and y = 0.3, the optimum markup value is de-
termined to be equal to 1.0979. Again, this value is closer to the value obtained for n = 4 
since the latter has the highest probability of occurence among all possible values of N. 
VIA Stability Analysis with Unknown Number of Oppo-
nents 
The stability analysis of studied bidding methods conducted in Chapter 11 assumed that 
each contractor faces the same number of opponents on each simulated project. As men-
tioned previously, this is rarely the case. The discussion presented in this chapter about 
how to determine the probability of winning and the optimum markup for a project given 
unknown N, can be implemented in the simple dynamic bidding model presented in Chap-
ter 11 to make it more realistic. First, the number of contractors bidding on each project, 
assumed constant in the previous chapter, can now be generated randomly from a defined 
sample space such that each new project has a different number of competitors. Then, 
before bidding on any project, each contractor needs to determine the relative frequency 
distribution for N depending on his bidding history for previously generated projects, and 
accordingly compute his probability of winning given a particular xo. 
Because all contractors were assumed to face the same number of opponents n on each 
project, the stability bidding model developed in the previous chapter used the same opti-
mum bid-to-cost ratio nomogram (as an input file to the code) to determine the optimum 
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markup for each contractor on each project. However, this can not be done after updating 
the model such that each contractor has a different relative frequency distribution for N 
before bidding on each project. In fact, since the probability of winning formula will be 
different for each bidder on each project, the optimization analysis should be performed 
accordingly inside the simulation program using (12.13). Thus, the model can not rely 
anymore on a single input file representing the optimum markup nomogram but rather has 
to determine X'Q that corresponds to a particular distribution for N and to the value of m'x 
determined by a given contractor before bidding on each project. 
12.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced uncertainty about the number of opponents a contractor has to 
compete with when bidding on a new project and developed the corresponding expressions 
for expected profit and expected utility of profit. 
A contractor can rely on his bidding information about similar past projects to observe 
the number of opponents he faced on each and hence determine the relative frequency 
distribution for N. Then, a contractor can determine his winning probability nomogram 
based on the latter distribution for N and using the probability of winning nomograms that 
correspond to the different values for N. These nomograms were developed in previous 
chapters of this research for specific values of N, however, the corresponding algorithm 
can be applied to any N. 
In brief, considering an unknown number of opponents only affects the winning prob-
ability function and thus it only changes the corresponding nomogram. Once defined, 
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determining the optimum markup that maximizes expected profit for a risk-neutral contrac-
tor or expected utility of profit for a risk-averse one follows the same procedure described 
in previous chapters. 
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Chapter 13 
Conclusion 
This research studies and models different competitive bidding methods that have been 
used in practice to address the problem of unrealistic low bid prices that are the bane of 
the low bid method. These alternative methods include the below-average bidding method, 
the truncated average and below-average bid methods, the second-low bid and the median 
bid methods. These bidding methods are analyzed from the perspective of a particular risk-
neutral contractor and modeled using a Monte Carlo simulation approach. The simulation 
results showing the probability of winning, the optimum markup and the optimum expected 
profit are used to compare the relative merits and shortcomings of these bidding methods. 
This research also develops a risk-sensitive bidding model that determines the optimum 
markup for a project taking into consideration the risk attitude of the contractor and the 
uncertainty about the cost of the project. This model can be applied to any of the studied 
bidding methods. The probability of winning used in the risk-sensitive formula comes from 
the simulation results obtained previously for each of the bidding methods. 
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13.1 Summary and Conclusions 
13.1.1 Alternative Competitive Bidding Methods 
The low bid method has been the most common form of open competitive bid selection 
approach used for public construction projects worldwide. However, awarding the project 
to the lowest bidder allows the selection of contractors who deliberately submit unrealistic 
low bids hoping to increase the bid price through filing claims and change orders after win-
ning the project. These kinds of bids lead to cost overruns, schedule delays, and adversarial 
relationships between the owner and the contractor. This formed the main motivation be-
hind this research which is exploring alternative competitive price-based bidding methods 
with different bid award criterion in order to compare their merits relative to the low bid 
method and to each other in a design-bid-build situation. 
Average-based bidding methods have been practiced in some countries such as Italy, 
Taiwan and Peru. Additionally, Florida state department of transportation experimented 
with this method among other innovative approaches in order to assess its impact on re-
ducing cost and time overruns. Average-based bidding methods have different versions 
where the winner can be defined as the closest to the average, or the closest but less than 
the average, or the closest to the average after excluding a certain percentage of lowest 
and highest bids. The rationale behind these methods is that they should protect the owner 
against unrealistic low bid prices and result in a reasonable bid price with a reduced chance 
of cost overruns and schedule delays. By awarding the project to the bid closest to the av-
erage, an owner might be missing a genuine low bid that can provide him with better return 
on investment but he is also protected against the risk of selecting an unrealistic low bid 
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with hidden costs. Obviously, this is a tradeoff that an owner should consider before ten-
dering any project to determine the most suitable bid-awarding method given the project's 
characteristics. 
Ioannou and Leu (1993) developed the only model for an average bid method where 
the winner was defined as the one who bids closest to the average of all submitted bids. A 
review of this model is presented in this research. 
This research studied and modeled another version of average-based bidding methods 
which awards the project to the bid closest to, but less than the average. The study of the 
below-average bid method shows that as the number of competitors increases, it leads to 
bid prices that are little below the expected average of submitted bids, which is more eco-
nomical to the owner. It also results in lower expected profits for the contractor than the 
average bid method but higher than the low bid method. 
However, for low-risk projects with a relatively small number of competitors, the 
below-average bid method shares the same drawback as the low bid method in that it allows 
a deliberately or accidentally very low bid price to win the project. That is because with a 
small variance in the opponents' bids, a contractor can underbid the opposing bids in a way 
to bring the average underneath them. 
This suggested the study of truncated average and below-average bidding methods 
where the average is determined after eliminating the lowest and highest submitted bids. 
Excluding the extreme bids prior to determining the average is especially helpful in the 
case of the below-average bid method because it prevents a contractor from winning a job 
through submitting a very low bid that can pull the average below all his opponents' bids. 
Truncated average-based bidding methods have the same advantages of the original 
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average-based bidding methods and moreover, can help limit collusion practice where some 
contractors attempt to share the market by submitting affiliated bids for the same project 
that are high or low enough to shift the bid average to their advantage. 
Excluding the lowest and highest submitted bids has a greater impact on the bidding 
outcome when the number of competitors is relatively small and when there is high vari-
ance in the bids. That is because with a large number of bidders, each bid price has a lower 
impact on the average bid value and consequently on the bidding results. 
The simulation results for both variants showed that excluding extreme bids for high-
risk projects with small number of competitors leads to slightly higher bid prices for owners 
and lower profits for contractors. On the other hand, as the number of competitors increases 
or the variance in the submitted bids decreases, the truncated versions show similar results 
to the average and below-average based methods. 
Then, this research studied a truncated form of the low bid method which is the sec-
ond low bid method and that defines the winner to be the one whose bid ranks the second 
lowest among all submitted ones. This method has been used in practice to overcome the 
drawback of the low bid method by eliminating potential unrealistically low bids. At the 
same time, it induces more competition than average-based bidding methods which results 
in lower bid prices for the owner as shown in Chapter 11. 
However, and similar to average-based bidding methods, the second-low bid method 
can be subject to collusion practice where a contracting company might form a dummy 
partner that would submit an extremely low bid on the same project such that it gets ex-
cluded for being the lowest bid. This provides the real company with a high chance of 
winning the project even if it submits a very low bid price. 
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The last alternative studied and modeled in this research is the median bid method 
which awards the contract to the median bid among all submitted ones. Two versions of 
the median bid method were formulated and modeled depending on whether the number of 
competitors is odd or even. 
The main advantage of the median bid method over average-based bidding methods 
is that the median value is not affected by the magnitude of the bids and the presence of 
extreme outliers, which helps limit collusion practice. 
However, the median bid method results in higher bid prices than all the other discussed 
bidding methods (as shown in Chapter 11) which is not to the advantage of the owner. Thus, 
the median bid method is mostly efficient in the case of high-risk projects where the con-
tractor expects a high variance in the submitted bids which increases the chance of extreme 
outliers and of collusion practice. On the flip side, for low-risk projects with small vari-
ance in the competitors' bids and with a relatively large number of competitors, there is a 
high probability that the median bid will be close to the average of all bids. Thus, using 
an average-based bidding method is better from the owner's perspective because it leads to 
lower bid prices. 
Based on the analysis conducted in Chapter 9, not only the low bid method but all the 
aforementioned competitive bidding methods encourage innovation and adoption of cost 
reduction techniques by contractors because they lead to lower costs for the owner and thus 
higher profits for contractors. However, a particular bidding method affects how much of 
these cost savings are translated into lower bid prices for the owner. 
A preliminary dynamic model for the bidding market was also developed in this re-
search to observe and compare the long-term behavior of these bidding methods from an 
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outsider's perspective. The model assumed a fixed number of risk-neutral competitors con-
tinuously bidding against each other. Each contractor updates his historical database about 
his opponents' bids after each generated project and estimates his optimum markup for the 
next project accordingly. 
This model showed that as competition in the bidding market increases, the low bid, the 
second-low bid, the below-average and the truncated below-average bid methods reach a 
stable optimum markup with time. However, the average bid method, its truncated version, 
and the median bid method reflect a continuously increasing markup. 
13.1.2 Optimum Markup: A Risk-Sensitive Decision 
This research also developed a general risk-sensitive bidding formula that can be used for 
determining the optimum markup for a project given the risk attitude of the contractor and 
the cost variance of the project. This formula expresses the expected utility of a contrac-
tor for a given project and can be applied to any of the bidding methods studied in this 
research. The probability of winning factor in the expected utility expression comes from 
the simulation results obtained for the modeled bidding methods. 
The developed risk-sensitive bidding formula assumes a constantly risk-averse contrac-
tor with an exponential utility curve. This means that the certain equivalent of any proposed 
lottery is the same for this contractor regardless of his initial amount of wealth. The model 
also assumes that the final cost of the project follows a normal distribution. The estimated 
cost of the project is set equal to the expected value for the actual cost. 
The low bid method and the average bid method were studied from the perspective of 
a risk-sensitive bidding model. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to study the effect of 
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the contractor's risk attitude, the variance in the final cost of the project, and the number of 
opponents on the optimum markup by varying one at a time. 
The analysis showed that the optimum markup for a risk-neutral contractor (with a zero 
risk aversion coefficient) is the same regardless of the project cost variance. This is ex-
pected since a risk-neutral contractor does not care about the risk inherent in the project he 
bids on and thus his optimal markup decision is only based on maximizing his expected 
profit value. However, this does not hold for a risk-averse contractor. In fact given a small 
project cost variance, the more risk averse a contractor is, the lower is his markup. On the 
other hand, as the project variance takes higher values, the highest risk-averse contractor 
adopts the highest markup. The same behavior towards risk is observed under both the low 
and average bid methods. 
This means that for relatively low-risk projects, the risk of winning/losing the job out-
weighs the risk of the unknown project's final cost and thus a more risk-averse contractor 
uses a lower markup to enhance its chance of winning the project. However, for high-
risk projects with high expected variance in the final cost of the project, the risk of losing 
money in case of winning the job outweighs the risk of winning/losing the project in the 
first place. Therefore, the more risk-averse a contractor is, the more concerned he is about 
the uncertainty in the final project cost and thus the higher is his markup. 
Another important conclusion from the sensitivity analysis conducted in this research 
is that a contractor's degree of risk aversion has a higher impact on its optimum markup 
for high values of the project's final cost variance. Thus, for low-risk projects, a contrac-
tor adopts almost the same optimum markup regardless of its risk attitude. The level of 
competition, i.e., the number of opponents, is the main factor in determining the optimum 
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markup in such cases. 
This means that for a high-risk project, the behavior of a risk-averse contractor is dom-
inated by the high uncertainty of his profit lottery due to the high variability of the project 
cost, regardless of the bid-awarding method used for that project. 
As for the average bid method, a contractor has a higher profit margin, and therefore 
the risk of winning/losing the project dominates the risk of uncertainty about the project's 
final cost for a wider range of the project cost variance than for a low bid method. 
Both bidding methods showed that as the number of opponents increases, i.e., as the 
competition becomes stronger, the optimum markup of a risk-averse contractor reflects the 
same behavior with respect to an increase in the project cost variance. Indeed, the opti-
mum markup takes lower values as the number of opponents increases given a particular 
risk aversion degree and cost variance. The main difference is that for a higher number 
of opponents, the risk of losing money after winning the project starts dominating the risk 
of winning/losing the project at a lower cost variance. That is because a contractor should 
expect lower expected profits with an increase in the number of its opponents, which makes 
the uncertainty in the profit lottery higher. Therefore, he can not tolerate the same levels of 
cost variance as when the number of opponents is lower. 
This research also studied the effect of the mean and variance of the opponents' bid-
to-cost ratios on the optimum markup. In the same way that the project cost variance 
represents the risk of losing money after winning the job, the variance of the opposing bid-
to-cost ratios represents the risk of winning/losing the job. The analysis showed that for 
any degree of risk aversion and any coefficient of variation for the project final cost, the 
optimum markup increases as the bid-to-cost variance increases. This is always the case 
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for an average bid method regardless of the mean value for the bid-to-cost ratio. However, 
for a low bid method with a relatively high mean for the opponents' bid-to-cost ratios, the 
optimum markup decreases and then increases as the bid-to-cost ratio variance takes higher 
values. This means that if a contractor expects his opponents' bids to be narrowly clustered 
around a value that is significantly higher than its estimated project cost, then the contractor 
can afford to use a low markup and maintain a high chance of winning the job. Therefore, 
as the bid-to-cost variance increases but remains small, the contractor needs to decrease 
its optimum markup to maintain a high chance of winning. However, as the project cost 
variance takes higher values and as the risk aversion of the contractor increases, the risk of 
losing profit after winning outweighs the risk of winning/losing the job. In such a case, the 
optimum markup reflects a constant increase along with the increase in the bid-to-cost ratio 
variance regardless of the latter's mean. 
Then, this research developed the risk-sensitive bidding formula further by including 
a third source of risk to the optimal markup decision and that is the uncertainty about the 
estimated cost of the project which might be due to insufficient information about previ-
ous projects, complexity of the project, or possible mistakes by the estimating team. Thus, 
the expected value for the actual cost, set previously as a deterministic value equal to the 
project's estimated cost, is now assumed to follow a normal distribution. 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the effect of varying the coefficient 
of variation of the expected actual cost on the optimum markup while keeping everything 
else constant. The analysis showed that both uncertainties in estimated and final cost of the 
project have the same individual impact on the optimum markup. When both are non-zero, 
they have a greater combined effect on the optimum markup which reaches significantly 
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high values for highly risk-averse contractors. 
Finally, this research presented a risk-sensitive bidding model that takes into consider-
ation uncertainties that affect the optimal markup decision such as the risk attitude of the 
contractor, the variance in the estimated cost, and in the final cost of the project. It also 
provided insight about the influence of each of these factors and of their combination on 
the optimum markup decision. 
13.2 Future Work 
This dissertation studied and modeled different alternative competitive bidding methods 
that have the potential to address the problem of unrealistic low bids under a low bid 
method. These models were built from the perspective of one contractor who is bidding 
against his opponents on a given project and who wishes to determine its optimum markup 
for that project. It is true that these models do not simulate the real bidding environment 
with all its complexities, however, this was not the purpose behind this research. The goal 
from modeling several bidding methods with different bid selection criteria was to compare 
their merits and drawbacks relative to each other and to the low bid method. 
A future goal that this research aims to achieve is to develop a dynamic bidding envi-
ronment from an outsider's (e.g., owner's) perspective that can capture several aspects of 
the bidding environment and that can be used to study the influence of each of the studied 
bidding methods on the long-term stability of optimum markups and bid prices in the con-
struction market. This research made a first attempt towards this objective by simulating a 
simplified bidding environment where a fixed number of risk-neutral contractors are con-
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tinuously competing against each other on one project at a time (Chapter 11). This model 
was used to study the long-term stability of optimum markup for each of the considered 
bidding methods. A future goal of this research is to improve the developed interactive bid-
ding model to acquire a more realistic nature by including the risk attitude, capital, bonding 
capacity, total profit of contractors, and many other factors. This allows an owner to get 
further insight about how the bid criterion defined by each of the bidding methods impacts 
the interaction among competitors and their bid price adaptation as time progresses given 
a specific risk behavior of contractors or certain conditions of the market. 
Another future objective of this research is to develop a decision support system that al-
lows a risk-sensitive contractor to easily determine its optimum markup for a given project 
and under a specific bid-awarding method. This bidding framework requires the user (con-
tractor) to enter his data about previous projects such as its estimated cost, its opponents' 
bids, and the number of competitors for each project. In addition, the contractor should pro-
vide his risk aversion coefficient, a list of his actual costs for previously completed projects 
of the same scope and size as the project he wishes to bid on, and the bid-awarding method 
used for the project. Based on this information, the decision support tool will analyze the 
entered data and produce nomographs that are similar to the ones produced in this research 
for a risk-neutral contractor, to help the user choose its optimum markup given the risks 
involved in the project and his behavior towards risk. This framework can also assist a 
contractor in comparing the expected profitability of several advertised projects that are of 
interest to him in order to choose which ones to bid on. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix A 
Simulation Results for the Probability of 
Winning Nomograms 
This appendix presents the simulation results for the probability of winning as a function 
of the standardized bid-to-cost ratio X'Q obtained for each of the bidding methods studied in 
this research. 
Table A.l presents the simulation results for the probability of winning under the low 
bid method given a number of opponents equal to 2, 4, and 8. Table A.2 presents the results 
for the average bid method for a number of opponents equal to 2, 3,4, 6 and 8. Then Table 
A.3 presents the below-average bid method results for n equal to 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. Tables 
A.4 and A.5 show the simulation data for the truncated average and below-average bidding 
methods respectively for n = 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. Table A.6 presents the probability of winning 
for the second low bid method given a number of opponents of 2, 4, and 8. Finally, Table 
A.7 shows the simulation results for the median bid method for n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8. 
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Table A.l Low Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of x!Q. 
Low Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.9973 
0.9963 
0.9949 
0.9931 
0.9907 
0.9876 
0.9837 
0.9787 
0.9724 
0.9646 
0.9550 
0.9434 
0.9294 
0.9129 
0.8934 
0.8708 
0.8450 
0.8158 
0.7831 
0.7471 
0.7079 
0.6658 
0.6212 
0.5746 
0.5267 
0.4781 
0.4296 
0.3818 
0.3355 
0.2914 
0.2500 
0.2118 
0.1770 
0.1460 
n=4 
0.9946 
0.9926 
0.9898 
0.9862 
0.9815 
0.9754 
0.9676 
0.9578 
0.9455 
0.9304 
0.9121 
0.8900 
0.8638 
0.8333 
0.7982 
0.7584 
0.7140 
0.6655 
0.6132 
0.5581 
0.5011 
0.4432 
0.3859 
0.3302 
0.2774 
0.2286 
0.1845 
0.1458 
0.1126 
0.0849 
0.0625 
0.0448 
0.0313 
0.0213 
n=8 
0.9893 
0.9852 
0.9797 
0.9726 
0.9633 
0.9514 
0.9363 
0.9174 
0.8940 
0.8657 
0.8318 
0.7921 
0.7462 
0.6944 
0.6371 
0.5751 
0.5099 
0.4429 
0.3761 
0.3115 
0.2511 
0.1965 
0.1489 
0.1090 
0.0770 
0.0523 
0.0341 
0.0213 
0.0127 
0.0072 
0.0039 
0.0020 
0.0010 
0.0005 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.1187 
0.0952 
0.0752 
0.0585 
0.0449 
0.0339 
0.0252 
0.0184 
0.0132 
0.0094 
0.0065 
0.0045 
0.0030 
0.0020 
0.0013 
0.0008 
0.0005 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0141 
0.0091 
0.0057 
0.0034 
0.0020 
0.0011 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table A.2 Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of x'0 
Average Bid Method 
P[Winlx*0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.0027 
0.0037 
0.0051 
0.0069 
0.0093 
0.0124 
0.0163 
0.0213 
0.0275 
0.0352 
0.0447 
0.0561 
0.0695 
0.0855 
0.1039 
0.1248 
0.1485 
0.1748 
0.2036 
0.2346 
0.2673 
0.3007 
0.3343 
0.3674 
0.3986 
0.4271 
0.4522 
0.4725 
0.4874 
0.4966 
0.4996 
0.4966 
0.4874 
0.4727 
n=3 
0.0007 
0.0009 
0.0013 
0.0018 
0.0025 
0.0035 
0.0047 
0.0064 
0.0086 
0.0115 
0.0153 
0.0202 
0.0265 
0.0343 
0.0443 
0.0569 
0.0720 
0.0902 
0.1118 
0.1367 
0.1650 
0.1962 
0.2298 
0.2644 
0.2998 
0.3331 
0.3634 
0.3886 
0.4079 
0.4204 
0.4247 
0.4206 
0.4083 
0.3886 
n=4 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0003 
0.0005 
0.0009 
0.0014 
0.0023 
0.0036 
0.0057 
0.0087 
0.0131 
0.0193 
0.0279 
0.0393 
0.0544 
0.0737 
0.0976 
0.1261 
0.1591 
0.1956 
0.2345 
0.2737 
0.3105 
0.3427 
0.3682 
0.3844 
0.3897 
0.3838 
0.3679 
0.3426 
n=6 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0016 
0.0029 
0.0050 
0.0087 
0.0146 
0.0235 
0.0367 
0.0549 
0.0795 
0.1110 
0.1483 
0.1903 
0.2335 
0.2739 
0.3074 
0.3283 
0.3358 
0.3278 
0.3062 
0.2728 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0009 
0.0019 
0.0038 
0.0075 
0.0139 
0.0245 
0.0407 
0.0642 
0.0965 
0.1364 
0.1812 
0.2267 
0.2661 
0.2923 
0.3010 
0.2914 
0.2641 
0.2245 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.4526 
0.4276 
0.3987 
0.3670 
0.3337 
0.3001 
0.2668 
0.2346 
0.2036 
0.1749 
0.1484 
0.1248 
0.1035 
0.0852 
0.0693 
0.0559 
0.0445 
0.0351 
0.0274 
0.0213 
0.0164 
0.0124 
0.0093 
0.0069 
0.0051 
0.0038 
0.0027 
0.3628 
0.3323 
0.2990 
0.2641 
0.2294 
0.1959 
0.1647 
0.1364 
0.1114 
0.0900 
0.0718 
0.0565 
0.0441 
0.0341 
0.0262 
0.0199 
0.0150 
0.0113 
0.0085 
0.0062 
0.0046 
0.0034 
0.0024 
0.0017 
0.0012 
0.0009 
0.0006 
0.3097 
0.2725 
0.2334 
0.1944 
0.1581 
0.1252 
0.0967 
0.0730 
0.0539 
0.0388 
0.0275 
0.0190 
0.0129 
0.0086 
0.0056 
0.0036 
0.0023 
0.0014 
0.0009 
0.0005 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2320 
0.1888 
0.1472 
0.1101 
0.0791 
0.0545 
0.0362 
0.0233 
0.0144 
0.0086 
0.0050 
0.0028 
0.0015 
0.0008 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1793 
0.1348 
0.0954 
0.0638 
0.0403 
0.0240 
0.0137 
0.0075 
0.0038 
0.0019 
0.0009 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table A.3 Below-Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of JCQ 
Below Average Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.8227 
0.8085 
0.7939 
0.7789 
0.7636 
0.7481 
0.7324 
0.7168 
0.7013 
0.6862 
0.6718 
0.6579 
0.6450 
0.6329 
0.6218 
0.6117 
0.6024 
0.5937 
0.5854 
0.5772 
0.5684 
0.5578 
0.5461 
0.5325 
0.5160 
0.4959 
0.4729 
0.4465 
0.4173 
0.3855 
0.3516 
0.3167 
0.2816 
0.2472 
n=3 
0.4791 
0.4597 
0.4408 
0.4223 
0.4046 
0.3875 
0.3714 
0.3568 
0.3437 
0.3325 
0.3239 
0.3177 
0.3142 
0.3138 
0.3164 
0.3223 
0.3313 
0.3427 
0.3563 
0.3712 
0.3867 
0.4015 
0.4143 
0.4239 
0.4286 
0.4272 
0.4191 
0.4043 
0.3827 
0.3550 
0.3228 
0.2868 
0.2489 
0.2111 
n=4 
0.2067 
0.1939 
0.1818 
0.1708 
0.1609 
0.1523 
0.1452 
0.1395 
0.1358 
0.1340 
0.1344 
0.1371 
0.1424 
0.1503 
0.1608 
0.1746 
0.1914 
0.2107 
0.2325 
0.2569 
0.2827 
0.3085 
0.3328 
0.3540 
0.3705 
0.3803 
0.3823 
0.3749 
0.3584 
0.3333 
0.3006 
0.2630 
0.2234 
0.1836 
n=6 
0.0208 
0.0193 
0.0182 
0.0175 
0.0173 
0.0175 
0.0181 
0.0194 
0.0211 
0.0235 
0.0265 
0.0303 
0.0351 
0.0409 
0.0482 
0.0577 
0.0695 
0.0839 
0.1018 
0.1232 
0.1487 
0.1779 
0.2098 
0.2423 
0.2732 
0.2999 
0.3180 
0.3248 
0.3180 
0.2988 
0.2685 
0.2298 
0.1876 
0.1453 
n=8 
0.0016 
0.0016 
0.0017 
0.0019 
0.0021 
0.0024 
0.0028 
0.0033 
0.0039 
0.0047 
0.0057 
0.0071 
0.0089 
0.0112 
0.0143 
0.0187 
0.0246 
0.0325 
0.0432 
0.0577 
0.0769 
0.1009 
0.1304 
0.1651 
0.2016 
0.2371 
0.2668 
0.2857 
0.2891 
0.2753 
0.2467 
0.2075 
0.1629 
0.1190 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.2138 
0.1818 
0.1520 
0.1249 
0.1009 
0.0800 
0.0624 
0.0480 
0.0362 
0.0269 
0.0198 
0.0142 
0.0100 
0.0069 
0.0047 
0.0031 
0.0020 
0.0013 
0.0008 
0.0005 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1754 
0.1418 
0.1120 
0.0860 
0.0642 
0.0468 
0.0332 
0.0228 
0.0153 
0.0099 
0.0063 
0.0039 
0.0023 
0.0014 
0.0008 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1460 
0.1121 
0.0832 
0.0594 
0.0412 
0.0274 
0.0175 
0.0108 
0.0065 
0.0037 
0.0021 
0.0011 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1067 
0.0744 
0.0494 
0.0309 
0.0184 
0.0104 
0.0055 
0.0027 
0.0013 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0816 
0.0519 
0.0308 
0.0170 
0.0087 
0.0041 
0.0018 
0.0008 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table A.4 Truncated Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of x!Q 
Truncated Average Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.0027 
0.0037 
0.0051 
0.0069 
0.0093 
0.0124 
0.0163 
0.0213 
0.0275 
0.0352 
0.0447 
0.0561 
0.0695 
0.0855 
0.1039 
0.1248 
0.1485 
0.1748 
0.2036 
0.2346 
0.2673 
0.3007 
0.3343 
0.3674 
0.3986 
0.4271 
0.4522 
0.4725 
0.4874 
0.4966 
0.4996 
0.4966 
0.4874 
0.4727 
n=3 
0.0041 
0.0055 
0.0076 
0.0104 
0.0139 
0.0184 
0.0243 
0.0316 
0.0406 
0.0517 
0.0651 
0.0812 
0.1000 
0.1220 
0.1470 
0.1748 
0.2050 
0.2373 
0.2708 
0.3044 
0.3370 
0.3678 
0.3948 
0.4168 
0.4328 
0.4421 
0.4433 
0.4368 
0.4227 
0.4014 
0.3742 
0.3422 
0.3066 
0.2701 
n=4 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0011 
0.0018 
0.0030 
0.0047 
0.0073 
0.0110 
0.0163 
0.0236 
0.0334 
0.0460 
0.0622 
0.0824 
0.1069 
0.1353 
0.1672 
0.2015 
0.2375 
0.2728 
0.3054 
0.3335 
0.3553 
0.3691 
0.3741 
0.3697 
0.3561 
0.3341 
n=6 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0006 
0.0011 
0.0021 
0.0037 
0.0064 
0.0107 
0.0174 
0.0274 
0.0414 
0.0605 
0.0855 
0.1162 
0.1522 
0.1914 
0.2316 
0.2686 
0.2984 
0.3176 
0.3244 
0.3171 
0.2976 
0.2682 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0005 
0.0011 
0.0024 
0.0047 
0.0088 
0.0159 
0.0270 
0.0440 
0.0681 
0.1002 
0.1387 
0.1815 
0.2239 
0.2599 
0.2843 
0.2930 
0.2843 
0.2597 
0.2234 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.4526 
0.4276 
0.3987 
0.3670 
0.3337 
0.3001 
0.2668 
0.2346 
0.2036 
0.1749 
0.1484 
0.1248 
0.1035 
0.0852 
0.0693 
0.0559 
0.0445 
0.0351 
0.0274 
0.0213 
0.0164 
0.0124 
0.0093 
0.0069 
0.0051 
0.0038 
0.0027 
0.2331 
0.1974 
0.1638 
0.1332 
0.1062 
0.0829 
0.0635 
0.0479 
0.0353 
0.0256 
0.0181 
0.0125 
0.0086 
0.0057 
0.0037 
0.0024 
0.0016 
0.0010 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.3062 
0.2731 
0.2374 
0.2019 
0.1674 
0.1354 
0.1071 
0.0828 
0.0626 
0.0461 
0.0332 
0.0233 
0.0161 
0.0109 
0.0072 
0.0046 
0.0029 
0.0019 
0.0011 
0.0007 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2315 
0.1919 
0.1522 
0.1162 
0.0857 
0.0606 
0.0413 
0.0270 
0.0172 
0.0106 
0.0063 
0.0036 
0.0020 
0.0011 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1811 
0.1385 
0.1000 
0.0682 
0.0439 
0.0268 
0.0156 
0.0086 
0.0046 
0.0023 
0.0011 
0.0005 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table A.5 Truncated Below-Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of 
x0. 
Truncated Below Average Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.0027 
0.0037 
0.0051 
0.0069 
0.0093 
0.0124 
0.0163 
0.0213 
0.0275 
0.0352 
0.0447 
0.0561 
0.0695 
0.0855 
0.1039 
0.1248 
0.1485 
0.1748 
0.2036 
0.2346 
0.2673 
0.3007 
0.3343 
0.3674 
0.3986 
0.4271 
0.4522 
0.4725 
0.4874 
0.4966 
0.4996 
0.4966 
0.4874 
0.4727 
n=3 
0.0041 
0.0055 
0.0076 
0.0104 
0.0139 
0.0184 
0.0243 
0.0316 
0.0406 
0.0517 
0.0651 
0.0812 
0.1000 
0.1220 
0.1470 
0.1748 
0.2050 
0.2373 
0.2708 
0.3044 
0.3370 
0.3678 
0.3948 
0.4168 
0.4328 
0.4421 
0.4433 
0.4368 
0.4227 
0.4014 
0.3742 
0.3422 
0.3066 
0.2701 
n=4 
0.0045 
0.0062 
0.0084 
0.0112 
0.0147 
0.0192 
0.0247 
0.0316 
0.0399 
0.0499 
0.0619 
0.0758 
0.0918 
0.1104 
0.1311 
0.1541 
0.1792 
0.2058 
0.2339 
0.2629 
0.2917 
0.3190 
0.3432 
0.3631 
0.3769 
0.3838 
0.3827 
0.3742 
0.3574 
0.3325 
0.3018 
0.2673 
0.2300 
0.1930 
n=6 
0.0021 
0.0028 
0.0036 
0.0046 
0.0057 
0.0070 
0.0086 
0.0106 
0.0128 
0.0154 
0.0188 
0.0229 
0.0279 
0.0343 
0.0423 
0.0521 
0.0645 
0.0798 
0.0988 
0.1217 
0.1482 
0.1780 
0.2098 
0.2422 
0.2720 
0.2971 
0.3137 
0.3200 
0.3139 
0.2954 
0.2668 
0.2308 
0.1912 
0.1513 
n=8 
0.0003 
0.0004 
0.0005 
0.0006 
0.0008 
0.0010 
0.0012 
0.0016 
0.0021 
0.0027 
0.0036 
0.0048 
0.0065 
0.0088 
0.0120 
0.0164 
0.0226 
0.0309 
0.0423 
0.0575 
0.0774 
0.1020 
0.1319 
0.1663 
0.2025 
0.2366 
0.2646 
0.2817 
0.2841 
0.2714 
0.2446 
0.2074 
0.1647 
0.1229 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.4526 
0.4276 
0.3987 
0.3670 
0.3337 
0.3001 
0.2668 
0.2346 
0.2036 
0.1749 
0.1484 
0.1248 
0.1035 
0.0852 
0.0693 
0.0559 
0.0445 
0.0351 
0.0274 
0.0213 
0.0164 
0.0124 
0.0093 
0.0069 
0.0051 
0.0038 
0.0027 
0.2331 
0.1974 
0.1638 
0.1332 
0.1062 
0.0829 
0.0635 
0.0479 
0.0353 
0.0256 
0.0181 
0.0125 
0.0086 
0.0057 
0.0037 
0.0024 
0.0016 
0.0010 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1574 
0.1248 
0.0963 
0.0723 
0.0523 
0.0368 
0.0256 
0.0170 
0.0110 
0.0069 
0.0042 
0.0025 
0.0014 
0.0008 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1140 
0.0819 
0.0561 
0.0366 
0.0229 
0.0134 
0.0075 
0.0041 
0.0021 
0.0010 
0.0005 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0860 
0.0563 
0.0343 
0.0195 
0.0104 
0.0051 
0.0024 
0.0011 
0.0004 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Table A.6 Second Low Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of x!Q 
Second Low Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.0027 
0.0038 
0.0052 
0.0069 
0.0093 
0.0124 
0.0163 
0.0212 
0.0275 
0.0352 
0.0446 
0.0561 
0.0695 
0.0854 
0.1039 
0.1249 
0.1488 
0.1753 
0.2041 
0.2348 
0.2675 
0.3010 
0.3347 
0.3677 
0.3988 
0.4273 
0.4521 
0.4725 
0.4877 
0.4970 
0.5001 
0.4967 
0.4873 
0.4721 
n=4 
0.0054 
0.0075 
0.0102 
0.0138 
0.0185 
0.0245 
0.0322 
0.0417 
0.0536 
0.0679 
0.0851 
0.1056 
0.1291 
0.1559 
0.1854 
0.2175 
0.2515 
0.2859 
0.3193 
0.3502 
0.3777 
0.4003 
0.4153 
0.4218 
0.4194 
0.4080 
0.3878 
0.3602 
0.3267 
0.2894 
0.2499 
0.2103 
0.1725 
0.1377 
n=8 
0.0108 
0.0149 
0.0202 
0.0272 
0.0363 
0.0478 
0.0621 
0.0798 
0.1013 
0.1264 
0.1555 
0.1882 
0.2233 
0.2598 
0.2961 
0.3297 
0.3584 
0.3794 
0.3905 
0.3902 
0.3778 
0.3533 
0.3186 
0.2769 
0.2316 
0.1859 
0.1428 
0.1051 
0.0740 
0.0494 
0.0313 
0.0190 
0.0109 
0.0059 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.4517 
0.4267 
0.3981 
0.3667 
0.3336 
0.2999 
0.2666 
0.2344 
0.2034 
0.1749 
0.1484 
0.1246 
0.1034 
0.0848 
0.0689 
0.0556 
0.0443 
0.0349 
0.0273 
0.0211 
0.0162 
0.0124 
0.0093 
0.0069 
0.0051 
0.0037 
0.0027 
0.1069 
0.0810 
0.0596 
0.0428 
0.0300 
0.0204 
0.0135 
0.0087 
0.0054 
0.0033 
0.0019 
0.0011 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0031 
0.0015 
0.0007 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
358 
Table A.7 Median Bid Method—Probability of Winning as a function of ^ 
Median Bid Method 
P[Winlx'0, n] 
x'o 
-3 
-2.9 
-2.8 
-2.7 
-2.6 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-2.1 
-2 
-1.9 
-1.8 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-1.1 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
n=2 
0.0027 
0.0038 
0.0052 
0.0069 
0.0093 
0.0124 
0.0163 
0.0212 
0.0275 
0.0352 
0.0446 
0.0561 
0.0695 
0.0854 
0.1039 
0.1249 
0.1488 
0.1753 
0.2041 
0.2348 
0.2675 
0.3010 
0.3347 
0.3677 
0.3988 
0.4273 
0.4521 
0.4725 
0.4877 
0.4970 
0.5001 
0.4967 
0.4873 
0.4721 
n=3 
0.0040 
0.0056 
0.0076 
0.0103 
0.0139 
0.0184 
0.0243 
0.0316 
0.0407 
0.0519 
0.0654 
0.0817 
0.1005 
0.1223 
0.1471 
0.1748 
0.2050 
0.2372 
0.2704 
0.3040 
0.3372 
0.3680 
0.3949 
0.4171 
0.4332 
0.4420 
0.4433 
0.4368 
0.4225 
0.4009 
0.3739 
0.3416 
0.3066 
0.2697 
n=4 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0011 
0.0019 
0.0030 
0.0046 
0.0072 
0.0108 
0.0161 
0.0234 
0.0332 
0.0462 
0.0627 
0.0831 
0.1077 
0.1361 
0.1680 
0.2027 
0.2383 
0.2733 
0.3062 
0.3346 
0.3562 
0.3697 
0.3744 
0.3696 
0.3557 
0.3339 
n=5 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0011 
0.0019 
0.0031 
0.0049 
0.0076 
0.0117 
0.0175 
0.0255 
0.0367 
0.0511 
0.0697 
0.0924 
0.1193 
0.1504 
0.1848 
0.2207 
0.2558 
0.2880 
0.3148 
0.3343 
0.3443 
0.3438 
0.3323 
0.3118 
0.2832 
0.2495 
0.2129 
n=7 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0015 
0.0027 
0.0048 
0.0082 
0.0135 
0.0215 
0.0332 
0.0494 
0.0705 
0.0972 
0.1290 
0.1640 
0.2000 
0.2347 
0.2632 
0.2834 
0.2922 
0.2884 
0.2723 
0.2460 
0.2124 
0.1759 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0005 
0.0011 
0.0022 
0.0041 
0.0076 
0.0134 
0.0226 
0.0360 
0.0549 
0.0797 
0.1103 
0.1454 
0.1827 
0.2179 
0.2474 
0.2668 
0.2728 
0.2655 
0.2462 
0.2164 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
0.4517 
0.4267 
0.3981 
0.3667 
0.3336 
0.2999 
0.2666 
0.2344 
0.2034 
0.1749 
0.1484 
0.1246 
0.1034 
0.0848 
0.0689 
0.0556 
0.0443 
0.0349 
0.0273 
0.0211 
0.0162 
0.0124 
0.0093 
0.0069 
0.0051 
0.0037 
0.0027 
0.2324 
0.1965 
0.1628 
0.1325 
0.1056 
0.0824 
0.0632 
0.0476 
0.0350 
0.0252 
0.0178 
0.0123 
0.0083 
0.0056 
0.0036 
0.0024 
0.0015 
0.0009 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.3052 
0.2723 
0.2371 
0.2013 
0.1666 
0.1346 
0.1064 
0.0824 
0.0620 
0.0456 
0.0329 
0.0231 
0.0159 
0.0108 
0.0072 
0.0047 
0.0030 
0.0018 
0.0011 
0.0007 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1755 
0.1402 
0.1085 
0.0814 
0.0591 
0.0415 
0.0284 
0.0187 
0.0119 
0.0073 
0.0044 
0.0026 
0.0015 
0.0008 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1389 
0.1047 
0.0756 
0.0524 
0.0346 
0.0219 
0.0133 
0.0077 
0.0043 
0.0023 
0.0012 
0.0006 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1812 
0.1441 
0.1092 
0.0787 
0.0541 
0.0355 
0.0221 
0.0133 
0.0076 
0.0042 
0.0022 
0.0011 
0.0005 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
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Appendix B 
Markup Optimization Results 
This appendix presents the results for the optimum markup as a function of the standardized 
mean for opponents' bid-to-cost ratios m'x for all studied bidding methods. The optimum 
markup is derived from the simulation results for the probability of winning that were 
shown in Appendix A. 
First, Table B.l corresponds to the low bid method and shows the optimum markup 
results for n — 2, 4 and 8. Then, Tables B.2 and B.3 show the results for the average and 
below-average bidding methods respectively given n = 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. On the other hand, 
Tables B.4 and B.5 present the optimization results for the truncated average-based bidding 
methods for the values of n equal to 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. Table B.6 presents the optimum 
markup for the second low bid method for n = 2, 4 and 8. And last, Table B.7 reflects the 
results for the median bid method for n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 
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Table B.l Low Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Low Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/ox 
n=2 
0.2845 
0.2968 
0.3098 
0.3238 
0.3387 
0.3546 
0.3716 
0.3898 
0.4092 
0.4299 
0.4527 
0.4756 
0.5007 
0.5274 
0.5558 
0.5859 
0.6178 
0.6516 
0.6873 
0.7248 
0.7643 
0.8058 
0.8492 
0.8945 
0.9418 
0.9910 
1.0420 
1.0949 
1.1495 
1.2059 
1.2639 
1.3236 
1.3848 
1.4475 
1.5116 
1.5771 
1.6439 
1.7120 
1.7812 
1.8516 
1.9231 
n=4 
0.1517 
0.1590 
0.1668 
0.1753 
0.1845 
0.1944 
0.2051 
0.2168 
0.2294 
0.2431 
0.2586 
0.2741 
0.2917 
0.3107 
0.3313 
0.3536 
0.3777 
0.4037 
0.4317 
0.4618 
0.4940 
0.5284 
0.5651 
0.6041 
0.6454 
0.6890 
0.7348 
0.7829 
0.8332 
0.8856 
0.9401 
0.9965 
1.0549 
1.1151 
1.1771 
1.2408 
1.3060 
1.3727 
1.4408 
1.5103 
1.5811 
n=8 
0.0787 
0.0827 
0.0871 
0.0918 
0.0970 
0.1027 
0.1089 
0.1157 
0.1232 
0.1315 
0.1405 
0.1505 
0.1616 
0.1738 
0.1872 
0.2021 
0.2185 
0.2367 
0.2566 
0.2785 
0.3026 
0.3289 
0.3575 
0.3887 
0.4224 
0.4586 
0.4976 
0.5391 
0.5833 
0.6301 
0.6794 
0.7312 
0.7853 
0.8417 
0.9003 
0.9609 
1.0234 
1.0878 
1.1539 
1.2216 
1.2909 
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Table B.2 Average Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Average Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/cx 
n=2 
0.5407 
0.5685 
0.5960 
0.6234 
0.6566 
0.6899 
0.7242 
0.7662 
0.8077 
0.8519 
0.9000 
0.9475 
0.9983 
1.0527 
1.1091 
1.1712 
1.2366 
1.3062 
1.3756 
1.4464 
1.5199 
1.5931 
1.6715 
1.7536 
1.8347 
1.9173 
2.0016 
2.0876 
2.1733 
2.2589 
2.3472 
2.4368 
2.5245 
2.6146 
2.7073 
2.7963 
2.8841 
2.9778 
3.0729 
3.1620 
3.2505 
n=3 
0.4247 
0.4444 
0.4642 
0.4849 
0.5086 
0.5373 
0.5689 
0.6027 
0.6409 
0.6832 
0.7287 
0.7774 
0.8316 
0.8898 
0.9510 
1.0140 
1.0778 
1.1470 
1.2212 
1.2967 
1.3735 
1.4530 
1.5362 
1.6173 
1.6993 
1.7844 
1.8719 
1.9608 
2.0491 
2.1405 
2.2302 
2.3188 
2.4132 
2.5074 
2.5993 
2.6911 
2.7871 
2.8846 
2.9761 
3.0657 
3.1604 
n=4 
0.2986 
0.3146 
0.3340 
0.3548 
0.3783 
0.4057 
0.4370 
0.4715 
0.5087 
0.5495 
0.5967 
0.6496 
0.7043 
0.7632 
0.8256 
0.8915 
0.9619 
1.0355 
1.1134 
1.1927 
1.2746 
1.3593 
1.4443 
1.5307 
1.6194 
1.7091 
1.7985 
1.8898 
1.9809 
2.0710 
2.1660 
2.2595 
2.3509 
2.4463 
2.5445 
2.6382 
2.7298 
2.8253 
2.9221 
3.0211 
3.1192 
n=6 
0.2005 
0.2152 
0.2300 
0.2457 
0.2653 
0.2897 
0.3164 
0.3468 
0.3823 
0.4231 
0.4691 
0.5201 
0.5769 
0.6397 
0.7067 
0.7779 
0.8537 
0.9331 
1.0149 
1.0996 
1.1861 
1.2744 
1.3644 
1.4536 
1.5438 
1.6356 
1.7281 
1.8227 
1.9164 
2.0094 
2.1059 
2.2011 
2.2947 
2.3912 
2.4893 
2.5881 
2.6831 
2.7768 
2.8740 
2.9723 
3.0712 
n=8 
0.1505 
0.1630 
0.1757 
0.1875 
0.2044 
0.2258 
0.2498 
0.2778 
0.3115 
0.3514 
0.3969 
0.4488 
0.5071 
0.5717 
0.6409 
0.7145 
0.7928 
0.8745 
0.9591 
1.0465 
1.1352 
1.2259 
1.3181 
1.4113 
1.5051 
1.5992 
1.6934 
1.7884 
1.8857 
1.9815 
2.0765 
2.1739 
2.2726 
2.3685 
2.4634 
2.5613 
2.6602 
2.7600 
2.8600 
2.9583 
3.0538 
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Table B.3 Below-Average Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Below Average Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/ax 
n=2 
0.3257 
0.3395 
0.3559 
0.3749 
0.3939 
0.4130 
0.4362 
0.4634 
0.4934 
0.5228 
0.5554 
0.5927 
0.6321 
0.6723 
0.7143 
0.7604 
0.8075 
0.8526 
0.9027 
0.9558 
1.0099 
1.0667 
1.1253 
1.1879 
1.2548 
1.3217 
1.3881 
1.4586 
1.5319 
1.6037 
1.6791 
1.7537 
1.8274 
1.9048 
1.9812 
2.0625 
2.1444 
2.2275 
2.3093 
2.3866 
2.4636 
n=3 
0.2356 
0.2496 
0.2647 
0.2829 
0.3033 
0.3224 
0.3443 
0.3711 
0.4009 
0.4318 
0.4643 
0.5023 
0.5448 
0.5854 
0.6269 
0.6763 
0.7310 
0.7892 
0.8506 
0.9143 
0.9819 
1.0521 
1.1236 
1.1976 
1.2735 
1.3480 
1.4254 
1.5097 
1.5958 
1.6796 
1.7621 
1.8474 
1.9343 
2.0210 
2.1077 
2.1986 
2.2931 
2.3838 
2.4717 
2.5644 
2.6587 
n=4 
0.1888 
0.2020 
0.2133 
0.2279 
0.2469 
0.2677 
0.2886 
0.3118 
0.3401 
0.3705 
0.4044 
0.4423 
0.4837 
0.5295 
0.5798 
0.6342 
0.6916 
0.7513 
0.8145 
0.8835 
0.9567 
1.0317 
1.1110 
1.1913 
1.2745 
1.3578 
1.4393 
1.5249 
1.6145 
1.7034 
1.7909 
1.8831 
1.9736 
2.0622 
2.1554 
2.2501 
2.3440 
2.4360 
2.5288 
2.6241 
2.7204 
n=6 
0.1362 
0.1456 
0.1561 
0.1707 
0.1867 
0.2027 
0.2219 
0.2456 
0.2712 
0.2999 
0.3348 
0.3745 
0.4188 
0.4705 
0.5264 
0.5848 
0.6486 
0.7177 
0.7908 
0.8685 
0.9485 
1.0309 
1.1165 
1.2041 
1.2905 
1.3762 
1.4651 
1.5553 
1.6459 
1.7395 
1.8343 
1.9267 
2.0187 
2.1149 
2.2125 
2.3056 
2.3975 
2.4938 
2.5909 
2.6892 
2.7886 
n=8 
0.1070 
0.1186 
0.1262 
0.1365 
0.1499 
0.1657 
0.1832 
0.2044 
0.2302 
0.2606 
0.2940 
0.3332 
0.3808 
0.4351 
0.4948 
0.5599 
0.6298 
0.7039 
0.7815 
0.8618 
0.9451 
1.0310 
1.1185 
1.2069 
1.2976 
1.3897 
1.4820 
1.5764 
1.6696 
1.7629 
1.8593 
1.9553 
2.0504 
2.1461 
2.2426 
2.3407 
2.4382 
2.5347 
2.6318 
2.7295 
2.8271 
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Table B.4 Truncated Average Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Average Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/ax 
n=2 
0.5412 
0.5685 
0.5960 
0.6233 
0.6565 
0.6907 
0.7251 
0.7664 
0.8079 
0.8514 
0.8999 
0.9473 
0.9982 
1.0524 
1.1089 
1.1719 
1.2372 
1.3072 
1.3763 
1.4456 
1.5192 
1.5934 
1.6721 
1.7552 
1.8357 
1.9174 
2.0018 
2.0882 
2.1745 
2.2596 
2.3475 
2.4373 
2.5246 
2.6150 
2.7085 
2.7971 
2.8840 
2.9771 
3.0719 
3.1615 
3.2504 
n=3 
0.2994 
0.3164 
0.3337 
0.3528 
0.3717 
0.3915 
0.4165 
0.4440 
0.4734 
0.5068 
0.5421 
0.5807 
0.6228 
0.6671 
0.7155 
0.7681 
0.8228 
0.8778 
0.9364 
1.0012 
1.0720 
1.1448 
1.2167 
1.2927 
1.3712 
1.4477 
1.5256 
1.6071 
1.6937 
1.7778 
1.8602 
1.9470 
2.0380 
2.1301 
2.2185 
2.3061 
2.3971 
2.4894 
2.5845 
2.6763 
2.7662 
n=4 
0.3129 
0.3329 
0.3560 
0.3796 
0.4054 
0.4337 
0.4647 
0.4995 
0.5420 
0.5881 
0.6333 
0.6817 
0.7355 
0.7953 
0.8593 
0.9276 
1.0007 
1.0760 
1.1505 
1.2276 
1.3068 
1.3867 
1.4689 
1.5529 
1.6397 
1.7284 
1.8189 
1.9081 
1.9969 
2.0918 
2.1839 
2.2732 
2.3670 
2.4650 
2.5598 
2.6520 
2.7466 
2.8432 
2.9420 
3.0401 
3.1345 
n=6 
0.2121 
0.2258 
0.2394 
0.2581 
0.2808 
0.3064 
0.3344 
0.3646 
0.3998 
0.4406 
0.4894 
0.5437 
0.6005 
0.6610 
0.7280 
0.8000 
0.8749 
0.9538 
1.0349 
1.1173 
1.2016 
1.2874 
1.3747 
1.4646 
1.5551 
1.6457 
1.7382 
1.8303 
1.9209 
2.0167 
2.1120 
2.2053 
2.3006 
2.3985 
2.4980 
2.5930 
2.6867 
2.7834 
2.8801 
2.9772 
3.0761 
n=8 
0.1575 
0.1672 
0.1803 
0.1945 
0.2116 
0.2329 
0.2591 
0.2891 
0.3233 
0.3639 
0.4105 
0.4626 
0.5202 
0.5843 
0.6548 
0.7296 
0.8076 
0.8882 
0.9713 
1.0579 
1.1467 
1.2351 
1.3264 
1.4187 
1.5114 
1.6050 
1.6993 
1.7963 
1.8910 
1.9843 
2.0807 
2.1792 
2.2769 
2.3724 
2.4682 
2.5656 
2.6645 
2.7642 
2.8634 
2.9591 
3.0544 
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Table B.5 Truncated Below-Average Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Below-Average Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/cx 
n=2 
0.5407 
0.5685 
0.5960 
0.6234 
0.6566 
0.6899 
0.7242 
0.7662 
0.8077 
0.8519 
0.9000 
0.9475 
0.9983 
1.0527 
1.1091 
1.1712 
1.2366 
1.3062 
1.3756 
1.4464 
1.5199 
1.5931 
1.6715 
1.7536 
1.8347 
1.9173 
2.0016 
2.0876 
2.1733 
2.2589 
2.3472 
2.4368 
2.5245 
2.6146 
2.7073 
2.7963 
2.8841 
2.9778 
3.0729 
3.1620 
3.2505 
n=3 
0.2995 
0.3164 
0.3338 
0.3528 
0.3717 
0.3915 
0.4165 
0.4439 
0.4735 
0.5066 
0.5418 
0.5803 
0.6228 
0.6670 
0.7153 
0.7687 
0.8235 
0.8784 
0.9361 
1.0007 
1.0714 
1.1444 
1.2167 
1.2927 
1.3707 
1.4474 
1.5256 
1.6078 
1.6947 
1.7784 
1.8604 
1.9472 
2.0405 
2.1317 
2.2180 
2.3060 
2.3970 
2.4913 
2.5872 
2.6773 
2.7663 
n=4 
0.2177 
0.2318 
0.2481 
0.2677 
0.2821 
0.2971 
0.3208 
0.3489 
0.3764 
0.4052 
0.4388 
0.4756 
0.5163 
0.5612 
0.6075 
0.6593 
0.7168 
0.7781 
0.8426 
0.9079 
0.9776 
1.0492 
1.1202 
1.1956 
1.2741 
1.3559 
1.4402 
1.5254 
1.6135 
1.7004 
1.7863 
1.8776 
1.9701 
2.0615 
2.1539 
2.2480 
2.3423 
2.4356 
2.5283 
2.6231 
2.7204 
n=6 
0.1504 
0.1619 
0.1699 
0.1827 
0.2006 
0.2192 
0.2385 
0.2610 
0.2880 
0.3188 
0.3529 
0.3927 
0.4391 
0.4890 
0.5430 
0.6018 
0.6644 
0.7311 
0.8037 
0.8802 
0.9584 
1.0392 
1.1219 
1.2072 
1.2923 
1.3780 
1.4687 
1.5598 
1.6496 
1.7433 
1.8364 
1.9282 
2.0228 
2.1197 
2.2154 
2.3092 
2.4042 
2.5008 
2.5982 
2.6971 
2.7942 
n=8 
0.1119 
0.1276 
0.1350 
0.1439 
0.1579 
0.1733 
0.1916 
0.2136 
0.2410 
0.2715 
0.3056 
0.3464 
0.3921 
0.4437 
0.5035 
0.5688 
0.6378 
0.7108 
0.7885 
0.8708 
0.9541 
1.0394 
1.1266 
1.2156 
1.3061 
1.3966 
1.4906 
1.5839 
1.6760 
1.7715 
1.8670 
1.9612 
2.0562 
2.1530 
2.2513 
2.3491 
2.4446 
2.5404 
2.6373 
2.7343 
2.8319 
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Table B.6 Second Low Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Second Low Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/ax 
n=2 
0.5403 
0.5660 
0.5916 
0.6235 
0.6587 
0.6898 
0.7252 
0.7673 
0.8071 
0.8504 
0.8977 
0.9455 
0.9984 
1.0551 
1.1132 
1.1738 
1.2396 
1.3118 
1.3814 
1.4495 
1.5204 
1.5939 
1.6739 
1.7533 
1.8330 
1.9172 
1.9996 
2.0825 
2.1683 
2.2543 
2.3430 
2.4311 
2.5166 
2.6063 
2.6984 
2.7885 
2.8779 
2.9726 
3.0664 
3.1542 
3.2423 
n=4 
0.2059 
0.2172 
0.2293 
0.2426 
0.2591 
0.2767 
0.2931 
0.3107 
0.3325 
0.3574 
0.3837 
0.4130 
0.4467 
0.4840 
0.5233 
0.5664 
0.6146 
0.6654 
0.7210 
0.7802 
0.8409 
0.9042 
0.9719 
1.0442 
1.1187 
1.1936 
1.2724 
1.3522 
1.4322 
1.5165 
1.6025 
1.6897 
1.7769 
1.8637 
1.9549 
2.0455 
2.1352 
2.2273 
2.3195 
2.4107 
2.5022 
n=8 
0.1024 
0.1309 
0.1229 
0.1131 
0.1178 
0.1216 
0.1295 
0.1381 
0.1505 
0.1621 
0.1759 
0.1925 
0.2084 
0.2266 
0.2493 
0.2753 
0.3040 
0.3345 
0.3689 
0.4086 
0.4538 
0.5031 
0.5555 
0.6129 
0.6741 
0.7382 
0.8066 
0.8796 
0.9555 
1.0331 
1.1138 
1.1971 
1.2810 
1.3661 
1.4539 
1.5439 
1.6354 
1.7259 
1.8165 
1.9094 
2.0031 
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Table B.7 Median Bid Method—Optimum Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Median Bid Method 
(x0*-l)/ax 
n=2 
0.5403 
0.5660 
0.5916 
0.6235 
0.6587 
0.6898 
0.7252 
0.7673 
0.8071 
0.8504 
0.8977 
0.9455 
0.9984 
1.0551 
1.1132 
1.1738 
1.2396 
1.3118 
1.3814 
1.4495 
1.5204 
1.5939 
1.6739 
1.7533 
1.8330 
1.9172 
1.9996 
2.0825 
2.1683 
2.2543 
2.3430 
2.4311 
2.5166 
2.6063 
2.6984 
2.7885 
2.8779 
2.9726 
3.0664 
3.1542 
3.2423 
n=3 
0.2973 
0.3121 
0.3313 
0.3525 
0.3726 
0.3915 
0.4154 
0.4442 
0.4744 
0.5055 
0.5398 
0.5782 
0.6190 
0.6627 
0.7113 
0.7643 
0.8212 
0.8811 
0.9423 
1.0028 
1.0687 
1.1406 
1.2149 
1.2936 
1.3719 
1.4475 
1.5273 
1.6089 
1.6918 
1.7755 
1.8592 
1.9441 
2.0311 
2.1214 
2.2125 
2.3019 
2.3935 
2.4874 
2.5838 
2.6759 
2.7656 
n=4 
0.3137 
0.3314 
0.3538 
0.3801 
0.4062 
0.4334 
0.4636 
0.4972 
0.5378 
0.5836 
0.6321 
0.6832 
0.7387 
0.7984 
0.8612 
0.9265 
0.9948 
1.0662 
1.1418 
1.2213 
1.3027 
1.3855 
1.4720 
1.5588 
1.6442 
1.7299 
1.8206 
1.9108 
1.9987 
2.0930 
2.1839 
2.2714 
2.3642 
2.4620 
2.5550 
2.6461 
2.7411 
2.8379 
2.9370 
3.0351 
3.1296 
n=5 
0.2126 
0.2251 
0.2423 
0.2604 
0.2780 
0.2981 
0.3223 
0.3495 
0.3784 
0.4105 
0.4476 
0.4880 
0.5348 
0.5874 
0.6415 
0.7005 
0.7656 
0.8319 
0.8986 
0.9708 
1.0502 
1.1313 
1.2130 
1.2971 
1.3832 
1.4684 
1.5522 
1.6398 
1.7316 
1.8227 
1.9118 
2.0031 
2.0979 
2.1930 
2.2843 
2.3764 
2.4714 
2.5665 
2.6642 
2.7634 
2.8573 
n=7 
0.1702 
0.1792 
0.1934 
0.2082 
0.2242 
0.2441 
0.2669 
0.2923 
0.3204 
0.3536 
0.3923 
0.4373 
0.4879 
0.5421 
0.5998 
0.6620 
0.7291 
0.8011 
0.8779 
0.9562 
1.0384 
1.1253 
1.2110 
1.2956 
1.3841 
1.4740 
1.5641 
1.6594 
1.7541 
1.8465 
1.9398 
2.0351 
2.1329 
2.2284 
2.3201 
2.4137 
2.5103 
2.6074 
2.7051 
2.8043 
2.9042 
n=8 
0.1767 
0.1887 
0.2029 
0.2200 
0.2405 
0.2630 
0.2895 
0.3211 
0.3575 
0.3982 
0.4445 
0.4974 
0.5558 
0.6190 
0.6861 
0.7571 
0.8329 
0.9121 
0.9956 
1.0828 
1.1707 
1.2595 
1.3498 
1.4420 
1.5332 
1.6241 
1.7193 
1.8129 
1.9055 
2.0024 
2.1003 
2.1933 
2.2855 
2.3810 
2.4770 
2.5752 
2.6746 
2.7707 
2.8655 
2.9631 
3.0610 
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Appendix C 
Results for Maximum Expected Profit 
This appendix presents the results for the maximum expected profit derived from the win-
ning probability simulation results shown in Appendix A and from the markup optimization 
results shown in Appendix B. The optimum expected profit is presented as a function of 
the standardized mean for opponents' bid-to-cost ratios m'x. 
Table C.l shows the optimum expected profit for the low bid method and for n = 2, 4 
and 8. Tables C.2 and C.3 present the results for the average and below-average bidding 
methods respectively for n = 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. Then, Tables C.4 and C.5 show the optimiza-
tion results for the truncated average and below-average bidding methods for n = 2, 3,4, 6 
and 8. Table C.6 presents the optimum expected profit for the second low bid method for 
n — 2, 4 and 8. This appendix ends with Table C.7 which corresponds to the median bid 
method given n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 
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Table C.l Low Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Low Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ax 
n=2 
0.0028 
0.0040 
0.0055 
0.0076 
0.0102 
0.0137 
0.0180 
0.0234 
0.0301 
0.0382 
0.0488 
0.0595 
0.0730 
0.0887 
0.1067 
0.1271 
0.1501 
0.1757 
0.2040 
0.2351 
0.2689 
0.3055 
0.3447 
0.3866 
0.4311 
0.4782 
0.5276 
0.5794 
0.6334 
0.6896 
0.7477 
0.8078 
0.8698 
0.9334 
0.9987 
1.0655 
1.1338 
1.2035 
1.2744 
1.3465 
1.4198 
n=4 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0011 
0.0018 
0.0028 
0.0044 
0.0069 
0.0094 
0.0135 
0.0188 
0.0256 
0.0343 
0.0451 
0.0583 
0.0741 
0.0927 
0.1143 
0.1390 
0.1670 
0.1981 
0.2325 
0.2702 
0.3109 
0.3548 
0.4015 
0.4511 
0.5033 
0.5581 
0.6153 
0.6747 
0.7363 
0.7998 
0.8651 
0.9322 
1.0009 
1.0711 
1.1427 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0015 
0.0025 
0.0043 
0.0068 
0.0106 
0.0159 
0.0232 
0.0327 
0.0449 
0.0601 
0.0786 
0.1006 
0.1263 
0.1558 
0.1889 
0.2258 
0.2663 
0.3103 
0.3576 
0.4080 
0.4614 
0.5176 
0.5764 
0.6375 
0.7009 
0.7663 
0.8337 
0.9028 
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Table C.2 Average Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function ofm'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Average Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ax 
n=2 
0.0626 
0.0750 
0.0891 
0.1050 
0.1229 
0.1426 
0.1643 
0.1880 
0.2134 
0.2409 
0.2701 
0.3010 
0.3337 
0.3679 
0.4037 
0.4408 
0.4791 
0.5183 
0.5585 
0.5996 
0.6415 
0.6842 
0.7275 
0.7712 
0.8155 
0.8602 
0.9053 
0.9507 
0.9964 
1.0425 
1.0888 
1.1353 
1.1821 
1.2291 
1.2761 
1.3234 
1.3709 
1.4185 
1.4662 
1.5141 
1.5622 
n=3 
0.0288 
0.0362 
0.0451 
0.0557 
0.0682 
0.0826 
0.0990 
0.1175 
0.1381 
0.1606 
0.1851 
0.2115 
0.2396 
0.2692 
0.3001 
0.3324 
0.3658 
0.4003 
0.4356 
0.4717 
0.5085 
0.5458 
0.5836 
0.6219 
0.6606 
0.6997 
0.7391 
0.7787 
0.8187 
0.8587 
0.8990 
0.9394 
0.9800 
1.0207 
1.0615 
1.1024 
1.1434 
1.1845 
1.2257 
1.2670 
1.3084 
n=4 
0.0117 
0.0162 
0.0220 
0.0295 
0.0388 
0.0501 
0.0636 
0.0792 
0.0972 
0.1175 
0.1400 
0.1645 
0.1907 
0.2187 
0.2480 
0.2788 
0.3106 
0.3434 
0.3770 
0.4111 
0.4459 
0.4811 
0.5167 
0.5527 
0.5890 
0.6255 
0.6622 
0.6992 
0.7363 
0.7736 
0.8110 
0.8486 
0.8862 
0.9240 
0.9618 
0.9997 
1.0377 
1.0758 
1.1139 
1.1520 
1.1902 
n=6 
0.0029 
0.0047 
0.0073 
0.0112 
0.0165 
0.0238 
0.0331 
0.0448 
0.0590 
0.0757 
0.0948 
0.1162 
0.1395 
0.1645 
0.1909 
0.2186 
0.2471 
0.2765 
0.3064 
0.3369 
0.3677 
0.3989 
0.4304 
0.4621 
0.4940 
0.5261 
0.5583 
0.5907 
0.6232 
0.6558 
0.6885 
0.7213 
0.7541 
0.7870 
0.8199 
0.8529 
0.8860 
0.9190 
0.9522 
0.9853 
1.0185 
n=8 
0.0008 
0.0015 
0.0028 
0.0048 
0.0081 
0.0129 
0.0196 
0.0287 
0.0405 
0.0548 
0.0717 
0.0910 
0.1123 
0.1352 
0.1595 
0.1850 
0.2113 
0.2383 
0.2659 
0.2938 
0.3221 
0.3506 
0.3793 
0.4081 
0.4371 
0.4663 
0.4955 
0.5248 
0.5542 
0.5837 
0.6132 
0.6427 
0.6723 
0.7020 
0.7317 
0.7614 
0.7911 
0.8208 
0.8506 
0.8803 
0.9103 
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Table C.3 Below-Average Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Below Average Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ax 
n=2 
0.0081 
0.0110 
0.0146 
0.0193 
0.0250 
0.0320 
0.0406 
0.0507 
0.0625 
0.0761 
0.0917 
0.1091 
0.1285 
0.1498 
0.1731 
0.1983 
0.2253 
0.2543 
0.2851 
0.3175 
0.3516 
0.3872 
0.4243 
0.4627 
0.5022 
0.5428 
0.5844 
0.6270 
0.6703 
0.7145 
0.7594 
0.8052 
0.8515 
0.8985 
0.9461 
0.9941 
1.0425 
1.0914 
1.1407 
1.1904 
1.2406 
n=3 
0.0031 
0.0047 
0.0069 
0.0100 
0.0140 
0.0193 
0.0261 
0.0346 
0.0448 
0.0570 
0.0713 
0.0877 
0.1062 
0.1267 
0.1495 
0.1745 
0.2012 
0.2295 
0.2594 
0.2906 
0.3230 
0.3565 
0.3908 
0.4260 
0.4620 
0.4988 
0.5362 
0.5741 
0.6123 
0.6510 
0.6899 
0.7293 
0.7689 
0.8089 
0.8490 
0.8894 
0.9300 
0.9708 
1.0116 
1.0526 
1.0937 
n=4 
0.0013 
0.0022 
0.0035 
0.0055 
0.0084 
0.0125 
0.0178 
0.0250 
0.0340 
0.0450 
0.0584 
0.0740 
0.0919 
0.1120 
0.1342 
0.1583 
0.1841 
0.2116 
0.2405 
0.2707 
0.3019 
0.3339 
0.3666 
0.4000 
0.4339 
0.4682 
0.5030 
0.5381 
0.5735 
0.6092 
0.6452 
0.6813 
0.7176 
0.7541 
0.7908 
0.8275 
0.8643 
0.9013 
0.9384 
0.9756 
1.0128 
n=6 
0.0003 
0.0006 
0.0011 
0.0021 
0.0037 
0.0062 
0.0099 
0.0153 
0.0225 
0.0320 
0.0440 
0.0583 
0.0752 
0.0943 
0.1152 
0.1380 
0.1624 
0.1881 
0.2149 
0.2425 
0.2707 
0.2996 
0.3289 
0.3585 
0.3884 
0.4188 
0.4494 
0.4802 
0.5112 
0.5423 
0.5736 
0.6049 
0.6364 
0.6680 
0.6996 
0.7314 
0.7632 
0.7951 
0.8270 
0.8589 
0.8908 
n=8 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0009 
0.0018 
0.0035 
0.0062 
0.0104 
0.0165 
0.0249 
0.0357 
0.0493 
0.0654 
0.0836 
0.1038 
0.1255 
0.1486 
0.1727 
0.1977 
0.2233 
0.2495 
0.2761 
0.3031 
0.3304 
0.3579 
0.3856 
0.4135 
0.4414 
0.4695 
0.4977 
0.5260 
0.5543 
0.5827 
0.6112 
0.6397 
0.6682 
0.6968 
0.7254 
0.7541 
0.7827 
0.8114 
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Table C.4 Truncated Average Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Average Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ox 
n=2 
0.0626 
0.0750 
0.0891 
0.1050 
0.1229 
0.1426 
0.1643 
0.1880 
0.2135 
0.2409 
0.2701 
0.3010 
0.3337 
0.3679 
0.4037 
0.4408 
0.4791 
0.5183 
0.5585 
0.5996 
0.6415 
0.6842 
0.7275 
0.7712 
0.8154 
0.8602 
0.9053 
0.9507 
0.9964 
1.0425 
1.0888 
1.1353 
1.1821 
1.2291 
1.2761 
1.3234 
1.3709 
1.4185 
1.4662 
1.5141 
1.5622 
n=3 
0.0077 
0.0106 
0.0145 
0.0194 
0.0255 
0.0332 
0.0425 
0.0537 
0.0668 
0.0819 
0.0991 
0.1186 
0.1401 
0.1636 
0.1891 
0.2165 
0.2455 
0.2762 
0.3086 
0.3422 
0.3770 
0.4127 
0.4492 
0.4866 
0.5246 
0.5633 
0.6025 
0.6423 
0.6824 
0.7230 
0.7639 
0.8052 
0.8466 
0.8882 
0.9302 
0.9723 
1.0145 
1.0569 
1.0994 
1.1421 
1.1849 
n=4 
0.0138 
0.0189 
0.0253 
0.0332 
0.0428 
0.0544 
0.0680 
0.0837 
0.1015 
0.1212 
0.1428 
0.1663 
0.1916 
0.2185 
0.2467 
0.2759 
0.3062 
0.3372 
0.3689 
0.4013 
0.4343 
0.4679 
0.5019 
0.5363 
0.5710 
0.6060 
0.6412 
0.6765 
0.7122 
0.7480 
0.7837 
0.8199 
0.8560 
0.8922 
0.9284 
0.9649 
1.0013 
1.0378 
1.0743 
1.1108 
1.1475 
n=6 
0.0035 
0.0054 
0.0084 
0.0126 
0.0182 
0.0257 
0.0351 
0.0468 
0.0609 
0.0773 
0.0960 
0.1166 
0.1389 
0.1628 
0.1882 
0.2146 
0.2418 
0.2698 
0.2984 
0.3275 
0.3571 
0.3870 
0.4173 
0.4478 
0.4785 
0.5094 
0.5405 
0.5716 
0.6030 
0.6344 
0.6659 
0.6976 
0.7293 
0.7610 
0.7927 
0.8245 
0.8565 
0.8884 
0.9203 
0.9523 
0.9843 
n=8 
0.0009 
0.0018 
0.0031 
0.0054 
0.0088 
0.0138 
0.0208 
0.0300 
0.0417 
0.0559 
0.0725 
0.0912 
0.1119 
0.1342 
0.1578 
0.1824 
0.2078 
0.2339 
0.2605 
0.2875 
0.3149 
0.3425 
0.3704 
0.3984 
0.4266 
0.4548 
0.4833 
0.5118 
0.5402 
0.5690 
0.5977 
0.6264 
0.6552 
0.6841 
0.7129 
0.7418 
0.7708 
0.7997 
0.8286 
0.8577 
0.8867 
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Table C.5 Truncated Below-Average Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function 
of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Below-Average Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ox 
n=2 
0.0626 
0.0750 
0.0891 
0.1050 
0.1229 
0.1426 
0.1643 
0.1880 
0.2134 
0.2409 
0.2701 
0.3010 
0.3337 
0.3679 
0.4037 
0.4408 
0.4791 
0.5183 
0.5585 
0.5996 
0.6415 
0.6842 
0.7275 
0.7712 
0.8155 
0.8602 
0.9053 
0.9507 
0.9964 
1.0425 
1.0888 
1.1353 
1.1821 
1.2291 
1.2761 
1.3234 
1.3709 
1.4185 
1.4662 
1.5141 
1.5622 
n=3 
0.0077 
0.0106 
0.0145 
0.0194 
0.0255 
0.0332 
0.0425 
0.0537 
0.0668 
0.0819 
0.0992 
0.1186 
0.1401 
0.1636 
0.1891 
0.2165 
0.2455 
0.2762 
0.3086 
0.3422 
0.3770 
0.4127 
0.4492 
0.4866 
0.5246 
0.5633 
0.6025 
0.6423 
0.6824 
0.7230 
0.7639 
0.8052 
0.8466 
0.8881 
0.9302 
0.9723 
1.0145 
1.0569 
1.0994 
1.1421 
1.1849 
n=4 
0.0022 
0.0034 
0.0052 
0.0077 
0.0111 
0.0157 
0.0218 
0.0293 
0.0386 
0.0499 
0.0634 
0.0789 
0.0966 
0.1163 
0.1380 
0.1618 
0.1872 
0.2140 
0.2422 
0.2717 
0.3022 
0.3336 
0.3659 
0.3990 
0.4327 
0.4669 
0.5016 
0.5366 
0.5720 
0.6076 
0.6435 
0.6797 
0.7159 
0.7525 
0.7890 
0.8257 
0.8625 
0.8994 
0.9364 
0.9735 
1.0106 
n=6 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0015 
0.0027 
0.0046 
0.0074 
0.0114 
0.0171 
0.0246 
0.0343 
0.0462 
0.0605 
0.0771 
0.0957 
0.1162 
0.1385 
0.1622 
0.1873 
0.2135 
0.2405 
0.2681 
0.2964 
0.3253 
0.3545 
0.3840 
0.4140 
0.4441 
0.4745 
0.5050 
0.5357 
0.5666 
0.5975 
0.6285 
0.6596 
0.6908 
0.7221 
0.7534 
0.7848 
0.8162 
0.8476 
0.8791 
n=8 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0005 
0.0011 
0.0022 
0.0040 
0.0069 
0.0113 
0.0176 
0.0260 
0.0369 
0.0502 
0.0659 
0.0838 
0.1037 
0.1250 
0.1476 
0.1713 
0.1958 
0.2210 
0.2466 
0.2727 
0.2991 
0.3259 
0.3528 
0.3799 
0.4072 
0.4346 
0.4622 
0.4898 
0.5175 
0.5453 
0.5732 
0.6011 
0.6290 
0.6570 
0.6850 
0.7131 
0.7412 
0.7693 
0.7975 
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Table C.6 Second Low Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Second Low Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ax 
n=2 
0.0626 
0.0749 
0.0891 
0.1051 
0.1228 
0.1424 
0.1642 
0.1878 
0.2133 
0.2407 
0.2699 
0.3009 
0.3336 
0.3678 
0.4034 
0.4403 
0.4785 
0.5176 
0.5575 
0.5984 
0.6401 
0.6827 
0.7259 
0.7695 
0.8137 
0.8584 
0.9033 
0.9488 
0.9946 
1.0406 
1.0870 
1.1334 
1.1804 
1.2275 
1.2746 
1.3221 
1.3696 
1.4173 
1.4650 
1.5131 
1.5612 
n=4 
0.0011 
0.0017 
0.0027 
0.0042 
0.0062 
0.0090 
0.0128 
0.0179 
0.0245 
0.0327 
0.0428 
0.0551 
0.0696 
0.0863 
0.1053 
0.1266 
0.1500 
0.1754 
0.2028 
0.2317 
0.2622 
0.2941 
0.3272 
0.3614 
0.3964 
0.4323 
0.4689 
0.5060 
0.5438 
0.5820 
0.6205 
0.6595 
0.6987 
0.7382 
0.7779 
0.8178 
0.8579 
0.8982 
0.9386 
0.9792 
1.0199 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0006 
0.0012 
0.0022 
0.0038 
0.0063 
0.0100 
0.0152 
0.0223 
0.0315 
0.0432 
0.0574 
0.0744 
0.0939 
0.1158 
0.1400 
0.1662 
0.1942 
0.2239 
0.2549 
0.2871 
0.3202 
0.3541 
0.3887 
0.4239 
0.4596 
0.4957 
0.5322 
0.5689 
0.6059 
0.6431 
0.6805 
0.7180 
0.7557 
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Table C.7 Median Bid Method—Optimum Expected Profit as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Median Bid Method 
E[V*]/c0ax 
n=2 
0.0626 
0.0749 
0.0891 
0.1051 
0.1228 
0.1424 
0.1642 
0.1878 
0.2133 
0.2407 
0.2699 
0.3009 
0.3336 
0.3678 
0.4034 
0.4403 
0.4785 
0.5176 
0.5575 
0.5984 
0.6401 
0.6827 
0.7259 
0.7695 
0.8137 
0.8584 
0.9033 
0.9488 
0.9946 
1.0406 
1.0870 
1.1334 
1.1804 
1.2275 
1.2746 
1.3221 
1.3696 
1.4173 
1.4650 
1.5131 
1.5612 
n=3 
0.0076 
0.0105 
0.0144 
0.0193 
0.0253 
0.0329 
0.0423 
0.0534 
0.0664 
0.0814 
0.0986 
0.1181 
0.1395 
0.1632 
0.1888 
0.2163 
0.2454 
0.2762 
0.3082 
0.3417 
0.3764 
0.4121 
0.4487 
0.4861 
0.5241 
0.5627 
0.6019 
0.6415 
0.6816 
0.7221 
0.7631 
0.8043 
0.8458 
0.8876 
0.9296 
0.9717 
1.0140 
1.0565 
1.0990 
1.1417 
1.1845 
n=4 
0.0137 
0.0187 
0.0251 
0.0330 
0.0426 
0.0541 
0.0676 
0.0833 
0.1011 
0.1209 
0.1426 
0.1661 
0.1912 
0.2179 
0.2459 
0.2750 
0.3053 
0.3364 
0.3684 
0.4010 
0.4341 
0.4677 
0.5016 
0.5359 
0.5704 
0.6053 
0.6405 
0.6757 
0.7114 
0.7470 
0.7827 
0.8189 
0.8550 
0.8912 
0.9274 
0.9639 
1.0004 
1.0369 
1.0735 
1.1100 
1.1468 
n=5 
0.0024 
0.0038 
0.0058 
0.0086 
0.0125 
0.0177 
0.0245 
0.0330 
0.0435 
0.0561 
0.0709 
0.0878 
0.1069 
0.1278 
0.1504 
0.1747 
0.2003 
0.2270 
0.2549 
0.2838 
0.3134 
0.3436 
0.3742 
0.4053 
0.4368 
0.4686 
0.5007 
0.5331 
0.5657 
0.5985 
0.6315 
0.6646 
0.6978 
0.7311 
0.7647 
0.7983 
0.8319 
0.8656 
0.8993 
0.9331 
0.9671 
n=7 
0.0009 
0.0016 
0.0027 
0.0044 
0.0070 
0.0107 
0.0159 
0.0227 
0.0315 
0.0425 
0.0556 
0.0708 
0.0880 
0.1069 
0.1275 
0.1494 
0.1726 
0.1968 
0.2217 
0.2473 
0.2735 
0.3000 
0.3268 
0.3540 
0.3815 
0.4092 
0.4371 
0.4651 
0.4932 
0.5215 
0.5498 
0.5782 
0.6066 
0.6350 
0.6638 
0.6925 
0.7212 
0.7499 
0.7787 
0.8075 
0.8363 
n=8 
0.0015 
0.0027 
0.0044 
0.0071 
0.0110 
0.0164 
0.0236 
0.0329 
0.0442 
0.0577 
0.0732 
0.0906 
0.1096 
0.1300 
0.1516 
0.1742 
0.1976 
0.2217 
0.2462 
0.2712 
0.2964 
0.3218 
0.3475 
0.3733 
0.3993 
0.4255 
0.4517 
0.4781 
0.5045 
0.5311 
0.5576 
0.5843 
0.6110 
0.6378 
0.6646 
0.6914 
0.7183 
0.7452 
0.7722 
0.7991 
0.8261 
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Appendix D 
Results for the Probability of Winning at 
the Optimum 
This appendix presents the results for the probability of winning corresponding to the opti-
mum markup as a function of m'x. 
Tables D.l and D.6 present the results for the low and the second-low bid methods re-
spectively for n = 2, 4 and 8. On the other hand, Tables D.2, D.3, D.4, and D.5 present 
the results for the average, below-average, truncated average, and truncated below-average 
bidding methods respectively for n — 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. Finally, Table D.7 shows the results 
for the median bid method for the values of n equal to 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8. 
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Table D.l Low Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup as a function of 
m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Low Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.0099 
0.0134 
0.0178 
0.0234 
0.0303 
0.0386 
0.0485 
0.0601 
0.0735 
0.0889 
0.1069 
0.1250 
0.1458 
0.1681 
0.1919 
0.2169 
0.2429 
0.2697 
0.2969 
0.3244 
0.3518 
0.3791 
0.4059 
0.4322 
0.4578 
0.4825 
0.5063 
0.5292 
0.5510 
0.5718 
0.5916 
0.6103 
0.6281 
0.6449 
0.6607 
0.6756 
0.6897 
0.7030 
0.7154 
0.7272 
0.7383 
n=4 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0013 
0.0022 
0.0035 
0.0055 
0.0084 
0.0124 
0.0179 
0.0262 
0.0345 
0.0461 
0.0604 
0.0774 
0.0971 
0.1195 
0.1445 
0.1717 
0.2008 
0.2314 
0.2631 
0.2954 
0.3279 
0.3603 
0.3921 
0.4231 
0.4531 
0.4819 
0.5094 
0.5354 
0.5601 
0.5833 
0.6051 
0.6255 
0.6446 
0.6625 
0.6791 
0.6947 
0.7092 
0.7228 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0004 
0.0008 
0.0015 
0.0028 
0.0050 
0.0084 
0.0136 
0.0210 
0.0313 
0.0449 
0.0621 
0.0832 
0.1081 
0.1366 
0.1682 
0.2023 
0.2383 
0.2754 
0.3130 
0.3504 
0.3871 
0.4226 
0.4567 
0.4891 
0.5196 
0.5482 
0.5750 
0.5999 
0.6229 
0.6443 
0.6641 
0.6824 
0.6994 
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Table D.2 Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup as a function 
of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Average Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.1161 
0.1322 
0.1498 
0.1687 
0.1873 
0.2069 
0.2270 
0.2454 
0.2644 
0.2828 
0.3001 
0.3177 
0.3342 
0.3495 
0.3640 
0.3763 
0.3874 
0.3968 
0.4060 
0.4145 
0.4220 
0.4294 
0.4352 
0.4398 
0.4444 
0.4486 
0.4523 
0.4554 
0.4585 
0.4615 
0.4639 
0.4659 
0.4682 
0.4701 
0.4714 
0.4733 
0.4753 
0.4764 
0.4771 
0.4788 
0.4806 
n=3 
0.0681 
0.0819 
0.0976 
0.1153 
0.1345 
0.1541 
0.1743 
0.1951 
0.2156 
0.2352 
0.2541 
0.2721 
0.2881 
0.3025 
0.3155 
0.3277 
0.3393 
0.3489 
0.3567 
0.3637 
0.3702 
0.3756 
0.3799 
0.3845 
0.3888 
0.3921 
0.3948 
0.3971 
0.3995 
0.4012 
0.4031 
0.4051 
0.4061 
0.4071 
0.4084 
0.4096 
0.4103 
0.4106 
0.4118 
0.4133 
0.4140 
n=4 
0.0396 
0.0519 
0.0665 
0.0837 
0.1030 
0.1239 
0.1458 
0.1683 
0.1913 
0.2140 
0.2347 
0.2532 
0.2708 
0.2864 
0.3004 
0.3126 
0.3228 
0.3316 
0.3385 
0.3447 
0.3498 
0.3539 
0.3577 
0.3610 
0.3637 
0.3659 
0.3682 
0.3700 
0.3717 
0.3735 
0.3744 
0.3755 
0.3770 
0.3777 
0.3780 
0.3789 
0.3801 
0.3808 
0.3812 
0.3813 
0.3816 
n=6 
0.0148 
0.0222 
0.0325 
0.0462 
0.0631 
0.0827 
0.1052 
0.1296 
0.1546 
0.1791 
0.2022 
0.2233 
0.2417 
0.2571 
0.2701 
0.2809 
0.2894 
0.2962 
0.3018 
0.3063 
0.3100 
0.3130 
0.3154 
0.3179 
0.3200 
0.3216 
0.3231 
0.3241 
0.3252 
0.3264 
0.3269 
0.3277 
0.3286 
0.3291 
0.3294 
0.3295 
0.3302 
0.3310 
0.3313 
0.3315 
0.3316 
n=8 
0.0057 
0.0098 
0.0164 
0.0265 
0.0403 
0.0579 
0.0795 
0.1042 
0.1303 
0.1562 
0.1807 
0.2026 
0.2212 
0.2364 
0.2488 
0.2588 
0.2665 
0.2725 
0.2772 
0.2807 
0.2837 
0.2859 
0.2877 
0.2892 
0.2904 
0.2915 
0.2926 
0.2935 
0.2939 
0.2945 
0.2953 
0.2956 
0.2958 
0.2964 
0.2970 
0.2973 
0.2974 
0.2974 
0.2974 
0.2976 
0.2981 
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Table D.3 Below-Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup as a 
function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Below Average Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.0252 
0.0326 
0.0414 
0.0517 
0.0638 
0.0779 
0.0933 
0.1096 
0.1269 
0.1458 
0.1652 
0.1843 
0.2034 
0.2230 
0.2425 
0.2608 
0.2791 
0.2982 
0.3158 
0.3322 
0.3481 
0.3630 
0.3770 
0.3895 
0.4002 
0.4106 
0.4209 
0.4298 
0.4375 
0.4455 
0.4523 
0.4591 
0.4660 
0.4717 
0.4775 
0.4820 
0.4861 
0.4899 
0.4939 
0.4988 
0.5035 
n=3 
0.0134 
0.0191 
0.0265 
0.0356 
0.0467 
0.0604 
0.0763 
0.0935 
0.1121 
0.1323 
0.1538 
0.1748 
0.1950 
0.2167 
0.2386 
0.2579 
0.2751 
0.2908 
0.3049 
0.3178 
0.3289 
0.3387 
0.3477 
0.3557 
0.3628 
0.3700 
0.3761 
0.3802 
0.3837 
0.3875 
0.3915 
0.3947 
0.3975 
0.4002 
0.4028 
0.4045 
0.4055 
0.4072 
0.4093 
0.4105 
0.4114 
n=4 
0.0071 
0.0111 
0.0169 
0.0247 
0.0347 
0.0471 
0.0625 
0.0806 
0.1004 
0.1220 
0.1446 
0.1675 
0.1901 
0.2116 
0.2314 
0.2495 
0.2662 
0.2816 
0.2952 
0.3063 
0.3155 
0.3236 
0.3300 
0.3357 
0.3404 
0.3448 
0.3494 
0.3529 
0.3552 
0.3576 
0.3602 
0.3618 
0.3636 
0.3657 
0.3669 
0.3678 
0.3687 
0.3700 
0.3711 
0.3718 
0.3723 
n=6 
0.0023 
0.0043 
0.0077 
0.0128 
0.0204 
0.0313 
0.0455 
0.0629 
0.0837 
0.1073 
0.1316 
0.1560 
0.1795 
0.2003 
0.2189 
0.2359 
0.2503 
0.2620 
0.2716 
0.2791 
0.2854 
0.2906 
0.2945 
0.2977 
0.3010 
0.3043 
0.3067 
0.3087 
0.3106 
0.3118 
0.3127 
0.3140 
0.3153 
0.3159 
0.3162 
0.3172 
0.3183 
0.3188 
0.3192 
0.3194 
0.3195 
n=8 
0.0008 
0.0017 
0.0036 
0.0071 
0.0128 
0.0218 
0.0346 
0.0517 
0.0725 
0.0961 
0.1220 
0.1481 
0.1716 
0.1920 
0.2096 
0.2241 
0.2358 
0.2452 
0.2528 
0.2591 
0.2639 
0.2678 
0.2710 
0.2737 
0.2758 
0.2774 
0.2790 
0.2800 
0.2812 
0.2823 
0.2829 
0.2835 
0.2842 
0.2848 
0.2852 
0.2855 
0.2858 
0.2862 
0.2865 
0.2868 
0.2870 
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Table D.4 Truncated Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup 
as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Average Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.1160 
0.1322 
0.1498 
0.1687 
0.1873 
0.2066 
0.2267 
0.2453 
0.2643 
0.2830 
0.3002 
0.3177 
0.3343 
0.3496 
0.3641 
0.3761 
0.3872 
0.3965 
0.4058 
0.4147 
0.4222 
0.4294 
0.4350 
0.4394 
0.4442 
0.4486 
0.4522 
0.4553 
0.4582 
0.4613 
0.4638 
0.4658 
0.4682 
0.4700 
0.4712 
0.4731 
0.4753 
0.4765 
0.4773 
0.4789 
0.4806 
n=3 
0.0259 
0.0339 
0.0437 
0.0552 
0.0691 
0.0852 
0.1025 
0.1212 
0.1413 
0.1619 
0.1831 
0.2043 
0.2250 
0.2453 
0.2643 
0.2818 
0.2984 
0.3146 
0.3295 
0.3417 
0.3516 
0.3604 
0.3691 
0.3763 
0.3825 
0.3890 
0.3949 
0.3996 
0.4029 
0.4066 
0.4106 
0.4135 
0.4154 
0.4170 
0.4193 
0.4216 
0.4232 
0.4246 
0.4254 
0.4267 
0.4283 
n=4 
0.0447 
0.0572 
0.0714 
0.0878 
0.1060 
0.1257 
0.1466 
0.1678 
0.1873 
0.2061 
0.2255 
0.2440 
0.2605 
0.2747 
0.2870 
0.2974 
0.3059 
0.3133 
0.3206 
0.3269 
0.3323 
0.3374 
0.3417 
0.3453 
0.3482 
0.3506 
0.3525 
0.3546 
0.3566 
0.3576 
0.3589 
0.3607 
0.3616 
0.3619 
0.3627 
0.3638 
0.3645 
0.3650 
0.3652 
0.3654 
0.3661 
n=6 
0.0167 
0.0247 
0.0357 
0.0493 
0.0656 
0.0844 
0.1056 
0.1288 
0.1526 
0.1756 
0.1961 
0.2143 
0.2312 
0.2462 
0.2584 
0.2681 
0.2763 
0.2828 
0.2883 
0.2931 
0.2971 
0.3006 
0.3035 
0.3057 
0.3077 
0.3095 
0.3109 
0.3123 
0.3139 
0.3146 
0.3153 
0.3163 
0.3170 
0.3173 
0.3174 
0.3180 
0.3188 
0.3192 
0.3195 
0.3199 
0.3200 
n=8 
0.0064 
0.0110 
0.0180 
0.0283 
0.0424 
0.0602 
0.0810 
0.1045 
0.1294 
0.1538 
0.1765 
0.1971 
0.2150 
0.2295 
0.2409 
0.2499 
0.2572 
0.2632 
0.2681 
0.2717 
0.2746 
0.2773 
0.2792 
0.2808 
0.2822 
0.2834 
0.2844 
0.2849 
0.2857 
0.2867 
0.2873 
0.2875 
0.2878 
0.2883 
0.2888 
0.2891 
0.2893 
0.2893 
0.2894 
0.2898 
0.2903 
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Table D.5 Truncated Below-Average Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum 
Markup as a function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Truncated Below-Average Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*,n] 
n=2 
0.1161 
0.1322 
0.1498 
0.1687 
0.1873 
0.2069 
0.2270 
0.2454 
0.2644 
0.2828 
0.3001 
0.3177 
0.3342 
0.3495 
0.3640 
0.3763 
0.3874 
0.3968 
0.4060 
0.4145 
0.4220 
0.4294 
0.4352 
0.4398 
0.4444 
0.4486 
0.4523 
0.4554 
0.4585 
0.4615 
0.4639 
0.4659 
0.4682 
0.4701 
0.4714 
0.4733 
0.4753 
0.4764 
0.4771 
0.4788 
0.4806 
n=3 
0.0259 
0.0339 
0.0437 
0.0552 
0.0691 
0.0852 
0.1025 
0.1212 
0.1413 
0.1620 
0.1833 
0.2044 
0.2250 
0.2453 
0.2644 
0.2816 
0.2981 
0.3144 
0.3295 
0.3419 
0.3518 
0.3605 
0.3691 
0.3763 
0.3827 
0.3891 
0.3949 
0.3995 
0.4027 
0.4065 
0.4106 
0.4135 
0.4149 
0.4167 
0.4194 
0.4216 
0.4232 
0.4242 
0.4249 
0.4265 
0.4283 
n=4 
0.0104 
0.0152 
0.0214 
0.0292 
0.0399 
0.0534 
0.0682 
0.0845 
0.1031 
0.1236 
0.1446 
0.1660 
0.1871 
0.2073 
0.2273 
0.2453 
0.2611 
0.2750 
0.2874 
0.2991 
0.3090 
0.3179 
0.3266 
0.3336 
0.3396 
0.3443 
0.3483 
0.3518 
0.3545 
0.3573 
0.3602 
0.3620 
0.3634 
0.3650 
0.3663 
0.3673 
0.3682 
0.3693 
0.3704 
0.3711 
0.3715 
n=6 
0.0031 
0.0054 
0.0094 
0.0153 
0.0233 
0.0343 
0.0486 
0.0661 
0.0861 
0.1080 
0.1313 
0.1543 
0.1756 
0.1956 
0.2139 
0.2300 
0.2440 
0.2561 
0.2655 
0.2731 
0.2797 
0.2852 
0.2898 
0.2936 
0.2971 
0.3004 
0.3024 
0.3042 
0.3061 
0.3073 
0.3085 
0.3099 
0.3107 
0.3112 
0.3118 
0.3127 
0.3134 
0.3138 
0.3141 
0.3143 
0.3146 
n=8 
0.0011 
0.0021 
0.0043 
0.0081 
0.0143 
0.0236 
0.0367 
0.0536 
0.0736 
0.0964 
0.1210 
0.1451 
0.1681 
0.1889 
0.2058 
0.2196 
0.2313 
0.2409 
0.2482 
0.2537 
0.2584 
0.2623 
0.2655 
0.2680 
0.2701 
0.2720 
0.2732 
0.2744 
0.2758 
0.2765 
0.2772 
0.2780 
0.2787 
0.2792 
0.2794 
0.2797 
0.2802 
0.2807 
0.2810 
0.2814 
0.2816 
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Table D.6 Second Low Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup as a 
function of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Second Low Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.1160 
0.1327 
0.1508 
0.1687 
0.1866 
0.2068 
0.2265 
0.2448 
0.2643 
0.2831 
0.3007 
0.3183 
0.3341 
0.3486 
0.3624 
0.3751 
0.3860 
0.3945 
0.4036 
0.4128 
0.4210 
0.4283 
0.4336 
0.4389 
0.4439 
0.4477 
0.4518 
0.4556 
0.4587 
0.4616 
0.4639 
0.4663 
0.4690 
0.4709 
0.4724 
0.4741 
0.4759 
0.4768 
0.4778 
0.4797 
0.4815 
n=4 
0.0054 
0.0082 
0.0122 
0.0175 
0.0243 
0.0331 
0.0443 
0.0581 
0.0740 
0.0919 
0.1121 
0.1338 
0.1561 
0.1785 
0.2014 
0.2236 
0.2441 
0.2636 
0.2812 
0.2969 
0.3117 
0.3251 
0.3366 
0.3460 
0.3543 
0.3621 
0.3684 
0.3742 
0.3796 
0.3837 
0.3872 
0.3903 
0.3932 
0.3960 
0.3979 
0.3998 
0.4018 
0.4032 
0.4046 
0.4062 
0.4076 
n=8 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0006 
0.0013 
0.0025 
0.0045 
0.0079 
0.0130 
0.0204 
0.0309 
0.0447 
0.0617 
0.0816 
0.1043 
0.1296 
0.1560 
0.1822 
0.2070 
0.2302 
0.2519 
0.2711 
0.2880 
0.3031 
0.3159 
0.3263 
0.3350 
0.3427 
0.3489 
0.3541 
0.3587 
0.3628 
0.3660 
0.3685 
0.3705 
0.3726 
0.3746 
0.3760 
0.3773 
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Table D.7 Median Bid Method—Probability of Winning at Optimum Markup as a function 
of m'x. 
m'x 
-1 
-0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
2.9 
3 
Median Bid Method 
P[Win 1 x0*, n] 
n=2 
0.1160 
0.1327 
0.1508 
0.1687 
0.1866 
0.2068 
0.2265 
0.2448 
0.2643 
0.2831 
0.3007 
0.3183 
0.3341 
0.3486 
0.3624 
0.3751 
0.3860 
0.3945 
0.4036 
0.4128 
0.4210 
0.4283 
0.4336 
0.4389 
0.4439 
0.4477 
0.4518 
0.4556 
0.4587 
0.4616 
0.4639 
0.4663 
0.4690 
0.4709 
0.4724 
0.4741 
0.4759 
0.4768 
0.4778 
0.4797 
0.4815 
n=3 
0.0258 
0.0340 
0.0437 
0.0550 
0.0685 
0.0847 
0.1021 
0.1205 
0.1402 
0.1614 
0.1829 
0.2043 
0.2255 
0.2463 
0.2654 
0.2830 
0.2988 
0.3133 
0.3270 
0.3406 
0.3521 
0.3613 
0.3693 
0.3757 
0.3819 
0.3887 
0.3940 
0.3987 
0.4029 
0.4067 
0.4104 
0.4137 
0.4164 
0.4184 
0.4201 
0.4221 
0.4236 
0.4247 
0.4253 
0.4266 
0.4283 
n=4 
0.0442 
0.0569 
0.0713 
0.0872 
0.1052 
0.1251 
0.1461 
0.1677 
0.1881 
0.2072 
0.2256 
0.2431 
0.2588 
0.2728 
0.2854 
0.2968 
0.3068 
0.3155 
0.3226 
0.3283 
0.3332 
0.3375 
0.3408 
0.3437 
0.3469 
0.3499 
0.3518 
0.3537 
0.3559 
0.3569 
0.3584 
0.3605 
0.3616 
0.3620 
0.3630 
0.3643 
0.3650 
0.3654 
0.3655 
0.3657 
0.3664 
n=5 
0.0115 
0.0171 
0.0243 
0.0336 
0.0456 
0.0600 
0.0765 
0.0949 
0.1153 
0.1369 
0.1585 
0.1801 
0.1998 
0.2175 
0.2344 
0.2492 
0.2615 
0.2728 
0.2836 
0.2922 
0.2984 
0.3036 
0.3085 
0.3124 
0.3157 
0.3190 
0.3225 
0.3251 
0.3267 
0.3283 
0.3303 
0.3318 
0.3326 
0.3334 
0.3347 
0.3359 
0.3366 
0.3373 
0.3376 
0.3377 
0.3384 
n=7 
0.0054 
0.0090 
0.0142 
0.0216 
0.0317 
0.0445 
0.0600 
0.0782 
0.0988 
0.1204 
0.1419 
0.1620 
0.1803 
0.1972 
0.2124 
0.2256 
0.2366 
0.2455 
0.2525 
0.2586 
0.2633 
0.2666 
0.2699 
0.2732 
0.2756 
0.2776 
0.2795 
0.2803 
0.2812 
0.2824 
0.2834 
0.2841 
0.2844 
0.2850 
0.2861 
0.2869 
0.2873 
0.2876 
0.2879 
0.2880 
0.2880 
n=8 
0.0090 
0.0145 
0.0224 
0.0330 
0.0465 
0.0631 
0.0822 
0.1027 
0.1239 
0.1449 
0.1647 
0.1820 
0.1971 
0.2100 
0.2209 
0.2300 
0.2372 
0.2430 
0.2473 
0.2504 
0.2531 
0.2555 
0.2574 
0.2589 
0.2604 
0.2620 
0.2627 
0.2637 
0.2648 
0.2652 
0.2655 
0.2664 
0.2673 
0.2679 
0.2683 
0.2685 
0.2686 
0.2689 
0.2695 
0.2697 
0.2699 
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